T. G. Tucker, Commentary on Thucydides: Book 8

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ὅτῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη ἐς κ.τ.λ. a free use of the so-called indirect question: ‘devised the whole matter, how it was brought to this result.’ Properly a mixture of the notions ξυνέθηκεν, ὅτῳ τρόπῳ καταστήσεται ἐς τοῦτο, ‘devised by what way the matter should be brought, etc.,’ and ξυνέθηκε τὸ πρᾶγμα, ᾧ τρόπῳ κατέστη ἐς τοῦτο, i.e. ‘he contrived the matter, as to the way in which it was brought to this issue.’ ὅτῳ can scarcely = ᾧ in classical Attic prose. The only instance in Thucydides where ὅστις apparently = ὃς is in vi. 3, βωμόν, ὅστις νῦν ἔξω τῆς πόλεώς ἐστιν, a passage where other peculiarities occur (see Wolfflin in Classen), and which is by no means decisive for the equivalence (v. P-S ad loc.）

Ἀντιφῶν of Rhamnus, the earliest of the ten orators of the ‘canon,’ and the first λογογράφος. He was as unpopular with the comic poets as with the δῆμος. Thucydides is said to have been his pupil, but this statement, resting on a secondhand remark of the Pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. Orat.) and others, is of dubious truth. The authenticity of some of the extant orations of Antiphon (fifteen φονικοὶ λόγοι) is questioned. On his style and works see Jebb's Attic Orators.

ἀρετῇ not in the moral sense of ‘virtue,’ but = ‘ability, force of character and faithfulness to party ties’ (Jowett). So ii. 37 a citizen at Athens οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ πλέον ἐς τὰ κοινὰ ἢ ἀπ᾽ ἀρετῆς προτιμᾶται. In ii. 40 ἀρετή = ‘kindliness.’

ὕστερος There is little to choose between this and the δεύτερος of Vat. Both words are variously constructed, e.g. c. 41, § 1, ὕστερα πρὸς . . ., but i. 91, οὐδενὸς ὕστεροι. So δεύτερος πρὸς . . ., Soph. Frag. 325; δεύτερος οὐδενός, Hdt. i. 23; but πολὺ δευτέρα μετὰ . . ., Thuc. ii. 97.

ἃ [ἂν] γνοίη M. Cf. c. 54, § 2, ὅπῃ [ἂν] αὐτοῖς δοκοίη ἄριστα ἕξειν. The present instance cannot be defended even on the ground which is possible there. For the general expression cf. ii. 60, ὁ γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη.

ἀγῶνα ‘arena,’ Jowett. The reference is particularly to judicial procedure.

δεινότητος that sort of cleverness which can ‘make the worse appear the better reason,’ sophistry. Cf. iii. 37, μὴ δεινότητι καὶ ξυνέσεως ἀγῶνι ἐπαιρομένους παρὰ δόξαν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει παραινεῖν.

καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ i.e., says P.S, in ordinary δίκαι which went straight to the courts, and also in cases of προβολὴ and εἰσαγγελία before the ecclesia. But ἀγωνιζομένους ἐν δήμῳ has a much more general reference, being used of other contests than those of litigation. A person wishing to speak (‘contend a point’) in the assembly on a ψήφισμα might seek the help of Antiphon beforehand, or one who sought political honours and position (τοῦ δήμου προεστάναι) might do the same. Cf Xen. Mem. iii. 7, 4, οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν, ἔφη, ἰδίᾳ τε διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει ἀγωνίζεσθαι (where Charmides has been encouraged to seek political distinction).

ὠφελεῖν sc. as λογογράφος.