Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3

[237] James, to superintend the movements there. His dislike to wound the feelings of another should doubtless, at this crisis, have been sacrificed. Those who have never been placed in situations of great delicacy and responsibility, or who cannot realize the various considerations, military, political, and personal, which affect the decisions of men in power —will doubtless here find cause to censure Grant.

This day the general-in-chief sent further and more definite orders to Sherman, to guide him on his arrival at the coast. ‘Establish a base on the sea-coast. Fortify, and leave all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry to protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior that the militia of the South will have to be left at home. With the balance of your command come here by water, with all dispatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command; but you, I want, in person. Unless you see objections to this plan which I cannot see, use every vessel going to you, for purposes of transportation.’ In the same letter, he informed Sherman: ‘Hood has Thomas close in Nashville. I have said all I could to force him to attack, without giving the positive order, until to-day. To-day, however, I could stand it no longer, and gave the order, without any reserve. I think the battle will take place to-morrow.’

On this day Grant's hands and time were full indeed. He sent orders to Thomas to attack Hood, ‘without any reserve’; he gave directions to Sherman to move his army by sea to Richmond; he wrote detailed instructions to Butler for Weitzel's expedition, and minute orders to Meade for the movement southward against the Weldon road.