Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3

[222] country and devotion to the cause were no less than his own. It pained him to differ with the soldier with whom he had shared so many campaigns; he was unwilling to show distrust in the efficiency of one who had been so efficient; to over-rule the general who was the object of so much deserved attachment from individuals and armies.

And yet he had no doubt that Thomas's judgment was wrong; that the arming of even five thousand cavalry was of far less importance than the immediate destruction of Hood; that the danger which existed so long as Hood was undestroyed was infinitely more important than all the good which ten thousand fresh cavalrymen could accomplish; and above all, that the army on the Cumberland was fully able, at this moment, to destroy its opponent. And so there came, amid all the other anxieties that crowded on the general-in-chief, this new and unexpected care created by Thomas's determination to delay.

Meanwhile, the first news from Sherman was received, through the rebel newspapers. Immense supplies in kind, intended for Hood and Lee, had been piled along the roads, all of which Sherman had seized, or the enemy was obliged to destroy, to prevent their falling into his hands. The consternation on his line of march was universal. Spies and scouts, prisoners and refugees, soon confirmed the story. There were even indications of a disposition to submit, such as had hitherto not been permitted to appear. Four newspapers on one day called for another leader. ‘The people,’ they declared, ‘will follow. They are tired of this madness, and if it ’