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The general sense and connexion of the contents of this chapter upon the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις of the practice of Rhetoric, those adjuncts of proof and external supports of the case, which consist in the various kinds of evidence which can be adduced by the pleader in confirmation of his statements and arguments, have been already given in the Introduction to this Commentary, pp. 193—207, to which I now refer and which I need not here repeat. They are called ‘unartistic’ or ‘inartificial’ because they are not due to the artist's inventive skill, but are supplied to him from the outside, as it were, of his art; and all that he has to do is to use them to the best advantage. Rhet. I 2. 2. It is this distinction of two kinds of proof or modes of persuasion which explains the application of the term inventio by the Latin rhetoricians to that part of the art to which Aristotle first gave the name of ἔντεχνοι πίστεις, and the title of one of Cicero's rhetorical treatises, the de Inventione. The author himself, l. c., applies the term εὑρεῖν to the ἔντεχνοι πίστεις. In commenting therefore upon this chapter we shall have to occupy ourselves principally with the details of language, argument, and allusion, and so fill up the outline which has been sketched out in the Introduction.
‘Next to the subjects already discussed’ (the ἔντεχνοι πίστεις, the logical or dialectical proofs of Rhetoric and their topics in cc. 4—14), ‘we have to run over (give a hasty sketch, or summary cf) what are called the unartistic proofs, or modes of persuasion, because’ (γάρ, this is the appropriate place for them, because we have just been engaged upon the forensic branch of Rhetoric, and ‘these are peculiar to law proceedings (or forensic practice)’. On the treatment of these ἄτεχνοι πίστεις by other writers on the subject see Introd. 205—207. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων...ἐπιδραμεῖν] See note on I 9. 14; on the redundant use of περί, ὑπέρ, &c. ἐχόμενον] with genit, partitive, ‘holding, hanging, on by (lit. to a part of,)’, ‘clinging to’, ‘connected with’, ‘in succession to’, ‘following’. Very frequent in Herodotus. ἐπιδραμεῖν] ‘to run over’, commonly in its literal signification takes the accusative, sometimes the dative. Here we may suppose that περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων is substituted for the accusative: as it is also in pseudo-Demosth. περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν, 217. 7, μικρὰ ἐπιδραμοῦμαι περὶ αὐτῶν πολλῶν ὄντων. This passage and Xen. Oecon. XV I are the only two instances that are given by the Lexicons of the metaphorical sense in which it occurs here. [Cf., however, Pol. III 15, 1286 a 7, θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας, Index Aristotelicus. S.] Compare a similar use of ἐπελθεῖν of ‘pursuing an inquiry’ or ‘going over, reviewing, a subject’. Pol. I 13, 1260 b 12, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν. Ib. VI (IV) 2, ult. πειρατέον ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραί κ.τ.λ. et passim.
χρηστέον προτρέποντα] i. e. πῶς δεῖ τινα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς προτρέποντα. The verbal adjective can be resolved into δεῖ with an indefinite object, with which the participle is made to ‘agree’. Demosth. Olynth. β. 21, 24, πολλὴν δὴ τὴν μετάστασιν καὶ μεγάλην δεικτέον τὴν μεταβολὴν εἰσφέροντας ἐξιόντας. Other examples in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 447. 4. It appears from the addition of προτρέποντα and ἀποτρέποντα that the first of the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις, the laws, are not confined to forensic practice, but can also be used by the deliberative orator in addressing a public assembly: and this is true also of some kinds of witnesses, viz. the ‘authorities’ appealed to in support of a statement, which may be as serviceable in enforcing considerations of public policy, the συμφέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον, as the δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον of a legal process in a court of justice; see § 16. The original statement therefore of § 1, ἴδιαι γὰρ αὗται των δικανικῶν, requires modification.
ἐναντίος τῷ πράγματι] ‘opposed to the facts on our side, to our view of the case’. Comp. infr. § 12.
With ὅτι here, and in the following topics, λεκτέον or something similar must be supplied from χρηστέον, §§ 3—4. τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ] Supply κρίνειν or δικάζειν; the former is expressed in Rhet. II 25. 10, τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν. This was the dicasts' oath, taken when they entered the court. The usual form was γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ. Dem. c. Aristocr. 652 sub fin. γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ δικάσειν ὀμωμόκασιν (οἱ δικασταί), ἡ δὲ τῆς γνώμης δόξα ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἂν ἀκούσωσι παρίσταται... πᾶς γὰρ ὁ μήτε δἰ ἔχθραν μήτε δἰ εὔνοιαν μήτε δἰ ἄλλην ἄδικον πρόφασιν μηδεμίαν, παῤ ἃ γιγνώσκει, θέμενος τὴν ψῆφον εὐσεβεῖ...ἀλλ̓ εἴ τις εἰδὼς ἐκείνους προδέδωκεν ἢ ἐξαπατᾷ, οὗτος ἐστ̓ ἔνοχος τῇ ἀρᾷ: c. Boeot. de Nom. 1006. 27, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γ᾽ ἂν μὴ ὦσι νόμοι γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ δικάσειν ὀμωμόκατε. adv. Lept. 493. I. Ar. Pol. III 16, 1287 a 25, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ̓ ἐπιτηδὲς παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, which explains the meaning and object of the oath. The form of the oath is found in Pollux VIII 10 [ὁ δ᾽ ὅρκος ἦν τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι εἰσί, ψηφιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ ὧν μὴ εἰσί, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ]; see Meier & Schömann, Attischer Process, p. 128; comp. p. 135. τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις] The meaning of the oath is, ‘that the judges are not to employ, i. e. to enforce, to its full extent, in its strict and literal interpretation, the rigour of the written statute’.
‘And that equity and the universal law are constant and unchangeable, like the laws of nature whose operation is uniform; to which the appeal is made in Sophocles' Antigone (line 450 seq.); for her defence is, that the burial (of her brother) was indeed against Creon's law, but not against that which is unwritten’. οὐδ᾽ ὁ κοινὸς (μεταβάλλει).
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν] δίκαιον ἀληθές ἐστι κ.τ.λ. ‘and that justice is something real, genuine, and salutary, but this sham, apparent justice (the rigorous interpretation) is not. And therefore the written law, the letter of the statute, is not; because it sometimes—and this is one of the cases—does not do the proper work of the law’, which is to do substantial, not merely apparent and fallacious justice, that which seems to be, but is not justice. On the superiority of natural justice to positive enactments, see Cicero, de Legg. I 15, referred to in Introd. p. 194. ‘And we may further argue that the judge is like an assayer of coin and appointed for the purpose of distinguishing base justice from genuine’. ἀργυρογνώμων] Moeris, Lex. Attic. (p. 50, ed. Koch) ἀργυραμοιβοί, Ἀττικῶς: κολλυβισταί (money-changers, who change large coin for small, κόλλυβος), Ἑλληνικῶς. ἀργυρογνώμονες, Ἀττικῶς: δοκιμασταί, Ἑλληνικῶς, and Pierson's note, who refers to the pseudo-Platonic dialogue περὶ ἀρετῆς, 378 D (Zurich ed. p. 867), ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τὸ χρύσιον καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον εἰσὶν ἡμῖν δοκιμασταί, οἵτινες ὁρῶντες κρίνουσι τό τε βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον; Εἰσίν. Τίνας οὖν τούτους καλεῖς; Ἀργυρογνώμονας. Pollux, VII § 170. To the same family of words belong προβατογνώμων Agam. 768 (see Blomfield's Glossary) a ‘discerner of the flock’, one that can distinguish the several sheep of a flock; hence ‘a judge of character’; ἱππογνώμων in the same metaphorical sense, Aesch. Fragm. Tox. 224 Dind. Cf. φυσιογνώμων, Ar. de Gen. Anim. IV 3. 32, and on φυσιογνωμονεῖν, as an art (the study of character from the indications of the features and other external peculiarities), see Anal. Pr. II 27, 70 b 7—38; and the treatise φυσιογνωμονικά, printed with Aristotle's works, Bekk. Vol. II. p. 805. Compare Cic. de Fato, 5. 10 (quoted in Blomfield's note, as ‘De Nat. Deor. I 8’), Quid? Socratem nonne legimus, quemadmodum notarit Zopyrus, physiognomon, qui se profitebatur hominum mores naturasque ex corpore oculis vultu fronte pernoscere? Compare, lastly, the simple γνώμων, Xen. Memor. I 4. 5 (ap. Blomfield), of the tongue as distinguishing between sweet and bitter, and Agam. 1099, θεσφάτων γνώμων ἄκρος.
See Introd. p. 194. Correct there the second line of the quotation, Hor. I Ep. 16, 52, which should be, tu nihil admittes in te formidine poenae: ‘tu’ is addressed to men in general, and therefore the second line speaks as generally as the first. Schrader appears to refer this topic to c. 7 § 12, καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος μεῖζον, for its authority; the topic of § 16, καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς...τὸ μὲν γὰρ τέλος, τὸ δ᾽ οὐ τέλος, is equally applicable.
‘Or if the (written) law (which is against us) chance (που) to be contradictory, either to any other law of repute, or to itself; as, for example, in some cases one law enacts the validity of all contracts whatsoever, whilst the other (of the two opposite laws) forbids the contracting of any engagement contrary to the law (except those that the law allows)’. On this Victorius, ‘Exemplum hoc est legis legi repugnantis; ἀντινομία autem id vocatur. Alterius vero exemplum, cum lex aliqua secum ipsa discordat, omisit, ut rei sua vi satis notae’.
This very elliptical sentence must apparently be thus filled up. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος (ὁ νόμος, χρηστέον αὐτῷ from §§ 3, 4, or λεκτέον), ὥστε (so as to, in such a way as to...) στρέφειν (αὐτόν) καὶ ὁρᾷν κ.τ.λ. ‘and if the law (which we have to interpret) be ambiguous, (we must deal with it, treat it, or interpret it) in such a way as to wrest (twist) it (in either direction according as it suits our purpose) and to see to which of the two constructions either strict justice (the letter of the law) or expediency, i. e. equity, (whichever of the two we are arguing for) will adapt itself, and then employ that’. τὸ συμφέρον here stands for ‘equity’, because by accommodating itself to the varying circumstances of particular cases it is more ‘generally serviceable’ than the stiff unbending letter of the law. ἀγωγή (τοῦ νόμου) ‘leading’, ‘guiding’ of the law. This ‘leading of the law’ represents the law itself as leading those who have to use it by the ‘interpretation’ or ‘construction’ that may be put upon it in one or another direction, and corresponds exactly to ductus in the phrase ductus litterarum. The following passage of the Politics, VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 12, throws light upon this use of ἀγωγή, and as they mutually illustrate one another I will quote it entire. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβέβηκεν ὥστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν παρ᾽ ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δ̓ ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. Here again the ἀγωγή is τοῦ νόμου, the leading, direction given to, or interpretation put upon the law in the actual practice of the society. The difference which sometimes arises between the theory of the constitution as laid down in the laws, and the actual administration and conduct of the government, is accounted for, first, by the character and habits of the people, either natural to them or as cultivated and formed by education; and secondly, by the ‘direction’ they give to, or the ‘interpretation’ they put upon, the actually existing laws, in accordance with the character which they wish to give to the practical administration of the government. Compare καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς ἄγουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, c. 11, 1296 a 26, and Thuc. II 65, of Pericles' direction of the state policy, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ πλήθους) ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε. ἀμφίβολος] III 5. 4, ἀμφίβολα, ‘ambiguous phrases’. Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26). 1, διαφεύγων τὸ ἀμφίβολον, opposed to οἰκεῖα ὀνόματα. Ib. 36 (37). 22, 29. Comp. note on III 5. 4.
The highly condensed contents of this section, which gives the other side of the foregoing arguments for the treatment of laws, shewing how to argue when the written law is in our favour, have been developed in extenso in the Introd. p. 195—6, and we may now proceed to the details. πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα] ‘in favour of our case’ as τῷ πράγματι § 4. τὸ ἁπλῶς, τὸ αὑτῷ] I 7. 35, καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἁπλῶς, and note there. παρασοφίζεσθαι] ‘to attempt to outdo (to go beyond, παρά) the physician (note the generic τόν; one of the two uses of the definite article, to mark the member of a class) in skill and subtlety, ingenuity and cleverness’. The proverb, ‘to be wiser than your physician’, is applied to ἰδιῶται who pretend to rival the professors, τεχνῖται or σοφοί, men of special knowledge, skill, and experience in any art or science. In Athen. p. 137 F, quoted by Victorius, the verb stands for ‘over refining’ in the art of cookery, τὸν δὲ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ κρέας ταριχηρὸν εἰς τάριχος διασκευάσαντα μαστιγωθῆναι, ὡς παρασοφιζόμενον πονηρῶς. τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Cleon ap. Thuc. III 37, οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι...καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις: and a little before, πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ...μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χείροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείστων ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις, ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφροσύνης ὠφελιμώτερον ἢ δεξιότης μετ᾽ ἀκολασίας, κ.τ.λ. Bacon, de Augmentis, Lib. VIII. Aphor. 58 (Vol. I. p. 816, ed. Ellis and Spedding), quotes this maxim as proverbial, ‘licet enim non male dictum sit, neminem oportere legibus esse sapientiorem;’ on which Ellis has this note, ‘Bacon refers perhaps to D'Argentré's maxim, Stulta videtur sapientia quae lege vult sapientior videri. In the passage from which these words are taken he is condemning the presumption of judges who depart from the text on the pretence of equity—which is precisely what the advocate is supposed to be doing here.’
διωρίσθω] See on I 11. 29, p. 224. κρίσεις φανεραί] ‘decisions, judgments, published, or notorious’. Quint. V 11. 36, Adhibetur extrinsecus in causam et auctoritas. Haec secuti Graecos, a quibus κρίσεις dicuntur, iudicia aut iudicationes vocant ...si quid ita visum gentibus, populis, sapientibus viris, claris civibus, illustribus poetis (all γνώριμοι,) referri potest. οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι Ὁμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος] Quint. u. s. § 40 (as an instance of the appeals to ‘authorities’ mentioned in § 36), Neque est ignobile exemplum, Megareos ab Atheniensibus, quum de Salamine contenderent victos Homeri versu, qui tamen ipse non in omni editione reperitur, significans Aiacem naves suas Atheniensibus iunxisse. The ‘versus’ or rather two verses here in question are, Il. B 557—8, [Αἴας δ᾽ ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας, στῆσε δ̓ ἄγων, ἵν̓ Ἀθηναίων ἵσταντο φάλαγγες] which were quoted by Solon (and said to have been interpolated by him in the text of Homer for that purpose, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Sol. § 48) as an ‘authority’ in favour of the Athenian claim to the possession of Salamis. See Heyne, Paley, and Trollope's notes on the passage of Homer, Plut. Vit. Sol. c. 10, Strabo, Attica, IX 1. Plutarch says that the current opinion in his time attributed the interpolation of the line (the second of the two) to Solon, though the Athenians denied it: in Strabo's time it was condemned by the critics: he enters at length into the question, and gives the reasons for rejecting the verse. Another well-known instance of the authority of a γνώριμος, or distinguished man, is the proverbial αὐτὸς ἔφα, ipse dixit, of the disciples of Pythagoras. καὶ Τενέδιοι ἔναγχος κ.τ.λ.] Of this event, ‘recent’ at the time of Aristotle's writing, nothing more is known than we learn from this passage. ‘Ex verbis his colligo’, says Victorius, ‘Tenedi insulae incolas cum Sigeensibus disceptantes usos et ipsos prisco teste Periandro: qui, quamvis multis antea saeculis mortuus esset, poema reliquerat quo praecepta quaedam ad beate vivendum, ὑποθῆκαι vocatae a Graecis, continebantur. Laertius qui vitam ipsius scripsit hoc narrat: in eo autem, ut suspicari licet, aliquid fuit quod causam Tenediorum adiuvaret.’ Κλεοφῶν] a mischievous profligate demagogue, who took a leading part in public affairs at Athens during the latter years of the Peloponnesian War. He was tried and condemned by the Council during the siege of Athens in 405 B.C. One of the results of the political rivalry between him and Critias, one of the leaders of the opposite party, was this charge which he brought against him, at some time not ascertained. The various references to him in Aristophanes, Xenophon, and the Orators, will be found in the article on him in Smith's Dict. of Biography, and other particulars respecting his habits and character in Meineke, Fragm. Com. Graec. 1 p. 171 seq, in the account of the play bearing his name, which Plato the Comic poet wrote to assail him. Κριτίου] The person accused by Cleophon was the well-known oli garchical leader, one of the thirty tyrants, maternal uncle of Plato the philosopher, and great-grand-nephew of Solon, Plat. Charm. 155 A. He was son of Callaeschrus, ibid. 153 C, who was the son of another Critias, son of Dropides, brother of Solon. Comp. Tim. 20 E. Cleophon, in his accusation, took occasion to quote ‘as from an authority’ some elegiac verses of Solon from whose family he was descended, to shew that reckless licentiousness was hereditary in the race. ἀσελγής] Hesychius ἀκόλαστος, ἀκάθαρτος. Gram. ap. Bekk. Anecd. I 451, ἀσελγές, πᾶν τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ βίαιον. καὶ ἀσέλγεια ἡ μετ᾽ ἐπηρεασμοῦ καὶ θρασύτητος βία. καὶ ἀσελγὴς ὁ ἀνάγωγος (intractable, unmanageable, like ‘unbroken’ horses and dogs, Xenophon, from ἄγειν, ‘to train or educate’). Δημοσθένης (c. Mid. 521. 2), καὶ ὁ κωμικός. Ὥσπερ ἀνέμου ἐξαίφνης ἀσελγοῦς γενομένου (Eupolis, Fr. Inc. XXV. Meineke, Vol. II. p. 558). οἷον αὐτόπνιγος (or τὸ πνῖγος) ὡς ἀσελγής (Pherecr. Fragm. Inc. XXIX. Meineke, II 348). ἀσελγὲς σκῶμμα, Eupolis, bis. Hence it appears that the primary sense of the word is ‘untamed or untameable’, from a and θελγειν (on the analogy of ἀμιγής ‘unmixed’, one who cannot be soothed, charmed, tamed; hence violent, extravagant, excessive—Arist. Plut. 559, παρὰ τῷ μὲν (πλούτῳ) γὰρ ποδαγρῶντες καὶ γαστρώδεις καὶ παχύκνημοι καὶ πίονές εἰσιν ἀσελγῶς, ‘extravagantly fat’—and specially in the indulgence of the appetites and passions, reckless in character and conduct; licentious, profligate to excess. Arist. Pol. VIII (V) 5, sub init. διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν, ‘license’ in conduct; ib. c. 6, 1305 b 40, γίγνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς, ‘by a life of reckless extravagance’. Plat. Rep. IV 424 E (the word is rare in Plato). Demosth. Olynth. II 23. 19, Phil. IV. 131. 11, c. Mid. 521. 2 u. s., ap. eundem ἀσελγῶς ζῇν, διακεῖσθαι, διάγειν τὸν βίον, χρῆσθαί τινι. εἰπεῖν μοι] This, and the following line of Solon's elegy, is quoted, with two variations from Aristotle's version, by Proclus ad Tim. 20 E, εἰπέμεναι Κριτίῃ ξανθότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν: οὐ γὰρ ἁμαρτινόῳ πείσεται ἡγεμόνι, the father of Critias being Solon's brother, Dropides. These verses, which were probably intended by the author as a compliment to the father, are misconstrued by the malicious Cleophon into a reflection on the son, whose recklessness and licentiousness had brought upon him his father's displeasure: the authority of Solon is appealed to to shew that the grandson inherited his grandfather's vices. Whether πυῤῥότριχι is another malicious perversion of Cleophon, on the hypothesis that red hair implies a licentious disposition, or depravity in general—as seems to have been the opinion of the Normans, who had the proverb, entre poil roux et félonie s'entreportent grant compagnie, (Wace, Roman de Rou, quoted by Sir F. Palgrave, Hist. of Norm. II 721)—or Aristotle, quoting from memory, has misquoted, more suo, cannot now be ascertained. At all events it is unlikely that Solon intended any such imputation on Critias' character, whatever may have been the case with Cleophon; for Critias is evidently considered as a boy or very young man from the tone of the address or message, and Victorius shews from Theocr. Id. VIII. 3, ἄμφω τώγ᾽ ἤτην πυῤῥοτρίχω, ἄμφω ἀνάβω, that red hair in a boy in the eyes of the Greeks was a beauty and not a deformity. It seems to me that Solon wrote ξανθότριχι, as Proclus gives it, and that the other reading is due either to Cleophon's malice if we interpret it in deterius, or to Aristotle's want of memory, if we take it as synonymous with ξανθότριχι. The evidence of Critias' ἀσέλγεια derived from the verses is plainly a false inference of Cleophon and not really contained in the original: the statement in Plat. Charm. 157 E, that Solon wrote Elegies in praise of ‘the house of Critias’, and spoke of its members as ‘distinguished by personal beauty and virtue and all other so-called happiness’, is altogether against any such supposition. Victorius, who regards the inference drawn by Cleophon as justified by the language of the verses, endeavours to reconcile this with the eulogistic character of the elegy, by the remark that Critias may have been an exception to the general good character of his family. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. p. 331, follows Proclus' version. The other variation, εἰπεῖν μοι, and εἰπέμεναι, may be either another slip of Aristotle's memory, or εἰπεῖν μοι a mere false reading of εἰπέμεναι, the one being very easily mistaken for the other. Lastly, μοί, if it were retained, would be a good example of the dativus ethicus corresponding in Greek to the familiar use of ‘me’ in the earlier English writers: as Shakespeare, Rob me the treasury; He smiled me in the face (Dame Quickly of Falstaff); See how this river comes me cranking in (Hotspur). [Abbott's Shaksp. Gr. § 220. S.]
χρησμολόγοι] amongst whom Themistocles is included as the interpreter of an oracle which referred to future events, περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων, here denotes not merely professional soothsayers, but amateurs also who followed the diviner's craft. Herod., VII 141, gives the oracle here quoted: the verses run thus, τεῖχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς μοῦνον ἀπόρθητον τελέθειν, τό σε τέκνα τ᾽ ὀνήσει. c. 143 gives Themistocles' interpretation. The professional interpreters of the oracles are called χρησμολόγοι by Herodotus. αἱ παροιμίαι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται] These words will not bear the ordinary interpretation of ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ‘as has been already said’, because this is not true. Therefore Victorius and Vater propose to render ὥσπερ as if it were οἵαπερ, huiuscemodi, ‘proverbs are also used as evidence, such as has been mentioned’, viz. evidence of the future: and Muretus proposed καὶ τὸ ὥσπερ εἴρηται, “and the ‘as has been said’,” any general remark that has been habitually made, whether proverbial or not. We may follow Victorius in his explanation, without however supposing that ὥσπερ is used in any but its literal and proper meaning ‘proverbs are evidence, in the way that has been stated’, evidence (that is) of the future. μήποτ᾽ εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα] Suidas, s. VV. ἄχρηστα et μήποτ᾽ εὖ ἔρδειν, quotes the proverb at length, in two different forms, both of them corrupt. The proverb conveys the maxim εἰς ἄχρηστα μὴ ἀναλίσκειν. Gaisford from the materials supplied by Suidas has put together the following lines, μήποτ᾽ εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα, μηδὲ παῖδα βάσκανον: μὴ λαλητικὴν γυναῖκα, μηδὲ γείτονος κύνα: μὴ κυβερνήτην φίλυπνον, μὴ λάλον κωπηλάτην. νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει] The verse is taken from Stasinus' Cypria: quoted by Clemens, Strom. VI 747. Düntzer, Fragm. Epic. Gr. p. 16. It is repeated II 21. 11. Herod. I 155, Cyrus to Croesus, on hearing of the revolt of the Lydians, ὁμοίως γάρ μοι νῦν γε φαίνομαι πεποιηκέναι, ὡς εἴ τις πατέρα ἀποκτείνας τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ φείσαιτο. Liv. XL 3, of Philip king of Macedon, father of Perseus, Postremo negare propalam coepit satis tutum sibi quicquam esse nisi liberos eorum, quos interfecisset, comprehensos in custodia haberet, et tempore alium alio tolleret (Victorius). Eur. Androm. 518, καὶ γὰρ ἀνοία μεγάλη λείπειν ἐχθροὺς ἐχθρῶν, ἐξὸν κτείνειν καὶ φόβον οἴκων ἀφελέσθαι. Comp. Toup. Emend. in Suid. II 185 (G.). Comp. Heracl. 1005, where it is put in the mouth of Eurystheus; and Herc. Fur. 168, in that of Lycus. Plutarch has the proverb, νεκρὸς οὐ δάκνει.
Εὔβουλος] Ἀναφλύστιος (ψήφισμα ap. Dem. de Cor. § 29), a demagogue (so Harpocration and the Schol.), orator and political opponent of Demosthenes, who mentions him very frequently in de Cor., de F. Leg., and elsewhere. This Eubulus is omitted in Smith's Dict. of Biogr.; but Baiter and Sauppe, in their excellent Index Nominum (Orat. Att. III. Ind. Nom. pp. 48, 9), have furnished a complete list of all the references to him from the Greek Orators, Scholiasts, and Lexicographers, which in some degree supplies the place of a biography. See also Ruhnken, Hist. Crit. Or. Gr. p. 146 [and especially Arnold Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, I 173—191. S.]. He is attacked and apostrophized by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. §§ 290—293, and a passage of one of his speeches is referred to in § 292. ‘Eubulus in the law-court (at the trial) employed against Chares the saying of Plato (the Comic poet) against Archibius, that “the avowal of knavery (rascality) has grown in the city”.’ Meineke, in his Fragm./ Comm. Gr. (Plat. Fragm. Inc. XLI.) Vol. II 692, merely quotes this passage without attempting to restore the verse or explain the allusion. In his Hist. Crit. (Fr. Com. Gr. I 161, note) he had proposed to substitute Ἀγύῤῥιον for Ἀρχίβιον in the text of Aristotle, an opinion which is afterwards retracted in the other place referred to.
καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες...ψεύδεσθαι] ‘Those who share the danger’ (with the person for whom they give evidence, i. e. are liable to the penalties of ψευδομαρτυρία, as the other is to those of the offence with which he is charged) ‘if they be suspected of falsehood’, sc. πρόσφατοί εἰσι, are reckoned amongst ‘recent’ or contemporary witnesses. That they are so is shewn by their actual presence in court, and the risk they consequently run. See Introd. p. 196, for the explanation of the remainder of the section. δόξωσιν. ‘quia si credantur etiam mendaces falsique, non tantum si fuerint, plectuntur.’ Victorius. With εἰ συμφέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον, which recognises this kind of ἄτεχνος πίστις as available also in deliberative speaking, comp. § 3, and the note.
οἱ ἄπωθεν] i.e., according to the Greek usage, those who give their evidence, not at a distance (as we say) but from a distance, measuring the distance from the object to the subject. See note on I 11. 16, p. 213. πιστότατοι οἱ παλαιοί] Living witnesses may be corrupted, bribed to give false evidence: the ancient witnesses or authorities, appealed to in confirmation of statements or opinions, are inaccessible to corruption, and therefore most to be relied on. πίστωμα, which seems to occur only in Aeschylus (Pers. 171 γηράλεα πιστώματα, abstr. pro concr., for πιστοὶ γέροντες, and Choeph. 977, Eumen. 214, in the sense of ‘pledge, guarantee, assurance’) and in Empedocles and Clearchus and one or two late authors, is here no doubt connected with the rhetorical πίστεις, and means the assurances that are produced in the minds of the audience by the rhetorical proofs alleged. It can hardly be identifiable with the πίστεις themselves, though ‘proofs’ of some kind is the meaning required. ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατῆσαι—ψευδομαρτυριῶν] Compare Hermogenes, περὶ στάσεων (Speng. Rhet. Gr. II p. 144), ὁ δὲ κατηγορῶν ἀποφανεῖ τὸν διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἔλεγχον ἀξιοπιστότερον τοῦ διὰ τῶν μαρτύρων: οὔτε γὰρ πεπεισμένα τὰ πράγματα οὔτε χαριζόμενά τῳ λέξει ὥσπερ οἱ μάρτυρες πολλάκις, ἀλλ᾽ οἷά ἐστι φύσει, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐξεταζόμενα φαίνεται. Cic. pro Caelio, c. 9 (quoted by Victorius), Equidem vos abducam a testibus: neque huius iudicii veritatem, quae mutari nullo modo potest, in voluntate testium collocari sinam; quae facillime effingi, nullo negotio flecti ac detorqueri potest. Argumentis agemus; signis omni luce clarioribus crimina refellemus; res cum re, causa cum causa, ratio cum ratione pugnabit. ‘Probabilities can't be bribed to cheat (the judges), as witnesses can’. οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα] ‘probabilities are not responsible (liable to trial and penalty) like witnesses, and therefore less to be trusted’. ὑπόδικος, formed upon the analogy of ὑπεύθυνος, ὑπαίτιος, ὑπόσκιος, ὑπόσπονδος, ὕποσμος (Ar. de Anima, II 9. 5), ὑπαίθριος, ὑπόστεγος, ὑπόφορος; and following that of ἐπαίτιος, ἐπιζήμιος, ἐπικαίρος or -καίριος, ἐπίνοσος, κ.τ.λ. (liable or exposed to so and so); from ὑπό sub, ‘under’, ‘subject to’, either literally as ὑπόσκιος, or metaphorically as ὑπεύθυνος, ὑπόδικος. It occurs in the Orators, frequently in Plat. Leges, Aesch. Eumen. 250, ὑπόδικος θέλει γενέσθαι χερῶν, and Rhet. ad Alex. 4 (5). 6.
αἳ μὲν περὶ αὑτοῦ αἳ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος] ‘Evidence (may be brought) either for ourselves or against the opposite party’; the indeterminate περί, ‘about’, ‘concerning’, takes its specific meaning from the words with which it is immediately joined; like the chameleon its colour from the objects round it. περὶ τοῦ πράγματος...περὶ τοῦ ἤθους, ‘either to facts or character’; to support our own, and to invalidate and depreciate those of the opposite party. εἰ μὴ γάρ] (εὐπορεῖ τις, or ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν, μαρτυρίας, with which ὁμολογουμένης is supposed to agree). ἀλλά (at any rate, at least) subaudi εὐπορεῖ γε... ‘For if we have no evidence as to the fact, either in agreement with our own side of the case, or opposed to that of the adverse party, at all events (we shall be sure to find plenty) as to character, (εἰς, tending to, bearing on,) to establish, that is, either our own respectability or the opponent's worthlessness’. ὁμολογουμένης ‘in agreement with’, comp. II 22. 15, ὁμολογούμενα and (the opposite) ἀνομολογούμενα. In § 21 of this chapter, the sense is different, ‘admitted’, as in Plato and Arist. Rhet. I 13. 9 bis.
ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων...λέγομεν] ‘(the arguments on these subjects) must be drawn from the same topics (i.e. the εἴδη) as those from which we derive our enthymemes also’. See Introd. p. 198.
περὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν] On συνθῆκαι see note on I 1. 9, περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα. They are contracts, bonds, engagements, agreements of any kind between two or more parties. They are probably intended to include documentary evidence of all kinds, which is expressed by the Latin tabulae of Cicero and Quintilian. See on this head Quint. v 5. αὐτῷ] ‘for oneself’. Add this to the instances of αὐτοῦ, &c. for αὑτοῦ and the rest, in notes on I 1. 12; I 7. 35; and see the references there given. ‘On the subject of contracts, arguments may be so far employed as to magnify or reduce (pull down, met. extenuate, depreciate, disparage (their value and importance), or (in other words) confirm or destroy their credit (or trustworthiness); if we have them (to produce) (χρῆσίς ἐστι ποιεῖν) we must argue for their credit and validity (κυρίας, their authoritative character); in the case of (if they apply to, are on the side of) the opposite party, the reverse’.
κατασκευάζειν] is a technical term of dialectics, denoting the constructive process and object of argumentation or syllogism, viz. to establish some positive conclusion, to maintain or confirm a thesis; and opposed to ἀνασκευάζειν, which represents the ‘subversive’, ‘destructive’ (ἀνασκευάζειν ‘to undo’, comp. λύειν ‘to break up, or dissolve a thing into its elements’), ‘refutative’ syllogism or reasoning which proves a negative. On these terms see further in Introd. p. 268, and note (on p. 267) on the same page. ‘Now in regard of establishing their credit or discrediting them, the treatment of this in no respect differs from that of the witnesses; for according to the character of those whose names are attached to, subscribed to, (inscribed upon, as ἐπίγραμμα, the title of a crime or a legal prosecution, I 13. 9,) the document, or contract, or who have it in their keeping, the measure (degree) of credit or trustworthiness of the contract is determined (lit. by them are the contracts made trustworthy)’. τούτοις πισταί] is a somewhat irregular expression, meaning τοσούτῳ πιστοτέραι εἰσὶν αἱ συνθῆκαι or τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ συνθῆκαι τῷ πισταὶ εἶναι. The degree of integrity of those who have the document in their custody is a measure of the probability of its having been tampered with or not. ‘The existence of the contract being admitted, if the document be our own (§ 26), we must magnify it (cry it up; increase, exaggerate, its value and importance); for the contract (we may say) is a law, special and partial; and it is not the contracts that give authority, or validity, to the law, but the laws to the contracts which are made in conformity with them (legally)’. Either of these arguments may be urged to shew that a covenant has the sanction of law, and shares its authority. ‘And, speaking generally, the law itself is a kind of contract, and therefore any one who violates (disobeys) the provisions (understand συνθήκῃ after ἀπιστεῖ) of a contract or makes away with it, is in fact subverting, doing away with, the laws’. This doctrine has already been stated in other words, c. 13. 2, νόμον...ἴδιον μὲν τὸν ἑκάστοις ὡρισμένον πρὸς αὑτούς. This is therefore the positive, written, local or national law, varying in different societies, and enacted by each of them severally for mutual convenience, under an implied contract to observe and maintain them. Analogous to this view of law as a contract is the theory, in Politics, of the Social Contract, which has been maintained by Locke, Rousseau, and many others. This view of the origin of the social organization and of government, is founded upon the natural freedom and equality of men; and assumes a common agreement amongst the members of a state to live and act together for purposes of self-defence and mutual advantage in obedience to laws and an executive authority which the theory supposes to have emanated originally from themselves, and to be invalid without their consent. Similar to this are the ‘laws of war’, which give the conqueror certain rights over the conquered, amongst them that of enslaving, and result from a sort of international compact, or universal agreement. Polit. 16, sub init. ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τίς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασίν. Compare also Pol. III 9, 1280 b 10 seq. καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη, καὶ καθάπερ ἔφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας.
ἔτι δὲ πράττεται κ.τ.λ.] Transl. in Introd. p. 199. πράττεται ‘are transacted’. On συναλλάγματα, ‘the ordinary dealings’ of men with one another, especially in trade and exchange of commodities, see note on I 1.9. καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια] ‘all voluntary transactions’, in general, is added because συναλλάγματα may include τὰ ἀκούσια, frauds, crimes, offences, which may arise in men's dealings with one another: Eth. Nic. v 5 sub fin., 1131 a 2, τῶν μὲν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δ᾽ ἀκούσια: ἑκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πρᾶσις, ὠνή, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη, χρῆσις, παρακαταθήκη, μίσθωσις: ἑκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἑκούσιος, τῶν δ̓ ἑκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπή, μοιχεία, φαρμακεία, προαγωγεία, δουλαπατία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, θάνατος, ἁρπαγή, πήρωσις, κακηγορία, προπηλακισμός. χρεία] ‘usus’ as χρῆσθαι ‘uti’, ‘intercourse’, the use that men make of one another. ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν] This phrase occurs again, Rhet. II 16. 1, and Hist. Anim. IX 38. 2, ἡ μὲν οὖν μυρμήκων ἐργασία πᾶσίν ἐστιν ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν. In Rhet. II 23. 30, τὸ ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι expresses ‘superficiality’. It seems to be said of things that ‘lie on the surface, things prominent and conspicuous, so as to be seen by every one’, ὥστε τινὰ or πάντας ἰδεῖν αὐτά. This explanation is confirmed by the substitution of εὐθεώρητα, to express the same notion, in § 25 infra (so Victorius). If this be so, the verb should be written ἐστιν, and not ἔστιν (for ἔξεστιν) as in Bekker's text. ἐπιπολῆς] is the genitive of a substantive ἐπιπολή ‘a surface’, only used by later and non-Attic writers; ‘veteribus illis...ἐπιπολῆς adverbii vicem fuit, Herod. I 187, Arist. Plut. 1207, Eccles. 1108, Thucyd. VI 96, et compluries Xenophon. Neque eius substantivi alius tum casus in usu fuit’. Lobeck ad Phryn. p. 126—7. It is an adverb of place or position, after the analogy of Ἀθηνῶν ‘at Athens’, λαιας χειρός (Aesch. P. V. 720) ‘on the left hand’, &c.; see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 377: (this seems to be omitted in Jelf's Grammar, though there are articles on the ‘genitive of position’; §§ 524—528, which however is illustrated only by the genitive of relative position, not that which expresses place itself. The genitive, it is to be presumed, is in both cases partitive, denoting a point in space;) it is also after the analogy of the local adverbs, οὗ, ὅπου, ὁμοῦ, οὐδαμοῦ, ποῦ and πού, ἀγχου, τηλοῦ, πανταχοῦ. ἐπιπολή itself not being in use, the substantive ‘surface, superficies’ is formed by the addition of the definite article, as Plat. Phileb. 46 D, (ὁπόταν) τὸ...ἐπιπολῆς μόνον διαχέῃ. Ar. περὶ ἐνυπνίων 2. 8, τὸ ἐπιπολῆς τοῦ ἐνοπτροῦ, ‘the surface of the mirror’. Its derivatives ἐπιπολαῖος and ἐπιπολάζειν (to be on the surface), have three different senses all arising from the properties attributable to things on the surface; either (1) ‘popular’, ‘prevalent’, ‘fashionable’, ‘current’, like things that come to the top, come uppermost, and so ‘prevail’ over the rest, as δόξαι μάλιστα ἐπιπολάζουσαι, Arist. Eth. N. I 2, 1096 a 30, ἐπιπολάζοντος τοῦ γελοίου, ib. IV. 14, 1128 a 13, Hist. Anim. IV 1. 26, τὸ μάλιστα ἐπιπόλαζον ‘the most abundant kind’, VI 37. 2, de Gen. Anim. I 20. 11, οὐ μὴν ἐπιπολάζουσί γε αἱ καθάρσεις ὥσπερ ἀνθρώποις: or (2) (if indeed there be any difference between this and the preceding) ‘conspicuous’, ‘prominent’, compared with such as are deep down, or buried, out of sight; Rhet. bis, Hist. Anim. quoted above on ἐπιπολῆς: and (3) ‘superficial’, opposed to βαθύς; either literally, de Insomn. (περὶ ἐνυπνίων) 2. 12, οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσδύεται ἡ κηλὶς ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιπολαιότερον, or metaph., as Rhet. III 11. 10, ἀληθὲς καὶ μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον. II 23. 30, above referred to. III 10. 4, τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, followed by the explanation, ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ α<*> μηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι, is doubtful; for an enthymeme may be too easy to follow and therefore unacceptable, either because it is intellectually ‘superficial’ (this I think is the more probable meaning, because more applicable to an intellectual process) or because it is ‘prominent and conspicuous’, saute aux yeux, and therefore is δῆλον πᾶσιν, Top. A 1, 100 b 27. Similarly in Pol. III 3, 1276 a 19, ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιοτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας ζήτησις (the most obvious and apparent, the clearest and plainest) περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν, and again, ib. c. 12, 1282 b 30, ἢ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦδος; (evident on the surface). In these two last instances the literal sense of the word is uppermost.
‘But if the contract or document be opposed to us, and (on the side) of the adverse party, first of all, the same arguments are suitable as may be used in contending against an adverse law’. ἅπερ is a cognate accusative extended by analogy from the direct cogn. acc. ἥνπερ μάχην μάχέσαιτο, for which the neuter plural, expressing the details of the contention, or the arguments employed in it, is substituted. ‘For it is absurd to suppose that we are not bound to obey the laws, if their constitution is defective and the framers of them have been led into error, and yet that (in like cases) contracts are necessarily binding (that it is necessary to obey or observe them)’. [For κείμενοι...τιθέμενοι compare note on I 1. 7, p. 10. S.]
εἶθ᾽ ὅτι] The gist of the topic is to be found in Introd. p. 200. βραβευτής] the umpire in the games, who awards the prize to the successful candidate, i. e. to the most deserving, is here used as an image of the judge who dispenses justice to the competitors in a court of law. It is he that is to be appealed to, not a mere contract, which has no regard for the general principles of justice. Justice (ὡς δικαιότερον) must prevail over contracts when they are in conflict. Dem., Cl. III 36. 7, has the verb in the same sense, τὰ των ἄλλων δίκαια βραβεύειν. βραβευτής is the prose form; βραβεύς belongs to the Poets. τοῦτο] is ‘what we are talking about’, ‘that which is before us’, δει. κτικῶς; the contract, namely, and its contents.
‘And again, justice cannot be perverted (have its nature altered) by fraud or compulsion like a contract, because it is natural (constancy and uniformity are characteristic of nature); whereas contracts are undertaken, entered into, under the influence of deceit (under false pretences) and compulsion.’ The two genitives in construction follow συνθῆκαι, ‘contracts of men deceived are made’. οἰκείοις ἢ ἀλλοτρίοις] ‘domestic or foreign’. τὸ συμφέρον] In arguing against the validity of a contract, you may take into account the consequences of carrying its provisions into effect, so far as they affect the judges, whose ‘interest’ or ‘advantage’ (or the reverse) may be involved in them: when these results happen to be adverse to the judges' interest, arguments from this source may be employed to invalidate the contract; ‘and all other topics of the same kind, (may be used) (which need not be enumerated) because they are equally easy to observe (with the preceding)’, too clear to need enumeration.
οἰκεῖαι] ‘of one's own’, ‘on our side’, supr. § 21. διαλύοι ἄν τις] or λύειν and διαλίειν, see Introd. p. 267 note. τἀληθῆ λέγων] These words have been variously interpreted. Muretus omitted τἀληθῆ, as contrary to Aristotle's opinion on the subject of torture—which however must be gathered from the words of the text, and not assumed a priori, and the text altered in conformity with the hypothesis—evidently supposing that if retained it must be construed with διαλύοι and not with λέγων. There can be no doubt that the latter is right, and that the words do express Aristotle's opinion upon the use of torture, by asserting the truth and right of the arguments directed against the use of it. [On ‘torture’ see C. R. Kennedy's Demosthenes, Vol. IV., pp. 382—391, appendix. S.] διακαρτεροῦντες] (thoroughly, διά,) obstinately, resolutely, persisting, (holding out). καὶ ῥᾳδίως καταψευδόμενοι] ‘and ready to make false accusations (κατά ‘against others’) in the expectation of a speedier release’. On the passage which in MS A^{c} concludes this section, and is printed in the note of the Oxford reprint of Bekker's 1st ed., see in Introd. p. 201, and the note. It is omitted by Bekker. Spengel, On the Rhetoric, in Bav. Trans. 1851, p. 51, thinks that it is an extract from some other treatise on Rhetoric, introduced by the transcribers. The last sentence at all events must be corrupt, being as it stands devoid of meaning and connexion with the preceding. Brandis in his tract in Schneidewin's Philologus, IV i. p. 43, informs us that his Anonymous Annotator found the passage in the MSS that he used, though he thinks that Victorius was right in rejecting it as an interpolation. Victorius, a man whose judgment is to be relied on, writes thus. ‘Delevi autem quia adulterinos putavi; aut enim ex alio scriptore artis haec pars sumta est (so Spengel), aut Scholion olim fuit quod importune post in contextum verborum Aristotelis translatum sit;...Qui accurate quae supra a philosopho iam tradita erant perpendit ipsius haec non esse manifesto intelligit; cuncta enim ille quae ad quaestiones pertinentia dicere voluerat iam explicaverat; sententia vero quae his viribus exponitur superioribus continetur; vox etiam iuncta illic est quae sermonem Aristotelis non redolet, viz. λιθόδερμος (this applies still more strongly to καταθαῤῥεῖν); et omnis denique haec locutio, e. c. ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντες δυνατοί, locutionis Aristotelicae dissimilis videtur’.
περὶ ὅρκων...διελεῖν] On περί, and other prepositions, redundant in the later Greek writers, see note on 1 9. 14, ‘oaths admit of a fourfold division’. On oaths, see the corresponding chapter of Quintilian, V 6. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 17 (18). A full explanation of the connexion and general meaning of this and the following sections to the end of the Chapter will be found in the Introd. pp. 202—205, to which the reader is referred; so that we may confine ourselves here as before to the details that require notice. One puzzling circumstance which pervades this Chapter, tending to confusion, and adding to the difficulties arising from the extreme brevity of the expression (‘brevis esse laborat obscurus fit’, is especially true of Aristotle here, as indeed in most of his writings,) it may be worth while to draw attention to; and that is, that throughout it both plaintiff and defendant are made to argue in the third person; to avoid this, you may may be substituted for Aristotle's he to designate the person who is in immediate possession of the argument, whichever side of the case he may be at the time maintaining. On the technical expressions belonging to ὅρκοι, see note in Introd. p. 202, διδόναι ὅρκον, in Aristotle and the Orators, is to offer or tender an oath, λαμβάνειν (or δέχεσθαι, in the Orators), to accept, or take it. εἰ ὀμώμοσται οὗτος] ‘when this (the oath above mentioned) has been already taken by one or other of the two parties’. ὀμώμοσται here is represented by γεγενημένος in § 32.
οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι] Supply τὰ χρήματα (the deposit, or something else which the opponent is unjustly withholding), which is added in three MSS, apparently from a marginal gloss. The case is: you refuse to tender the oath to the adverse party because it is of no use; he is so little embarrassed by scruples of conscience that he will take the oath and keep the money, so that you gain nothing by your motion. τούς δε ‘but the judges, you think, if he do not swear, will decide against him’. Another reason, or topic, for refusing to tender the oath is, that ‘this form of risk’, the risk that one runs by leaving the matter to, by throwing oneself upon, the judges (ὁ κίνδυνος οὗτος ὁ ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς), is to be preferred (κρείττων), viz. to the risk incurred of losing your suit by tendering oath to the adversary, who will probably perjure himself: you therefore refer your case to the decision of the judges, because you can trust them, but not the other.
ἀντὶ χρημάτων] is, setting a pecuniary value upon the oath (estimating it against money, at so much money value), which is degrading to the dignity and sanctity of the oath, and therefore it is that you refuse to take it, and not from any baser motive. κατωμόσατο] κατομνύναι (ὅρκον) occurs in Arist. Ran. 305, 306, appa rently as a mere synonym of the simple verb, Δ. καἶθις κατόμοσον. Ξ. νὴ Δἴ; Δ. ὄμοσον. Ξ. νὴ Δία. With ὅρκον and a second accus. of the thing sworn by, Eur. Hel. 835, ἀλλ᾽ ἁγνὸν ὅρκον σὸν κάρα κατώμοσα. The middle voice is found again in Herod. VI 65, but in a different sense ‘to swear against’, with a genitive following. Here, and in the two other cases quoted above, the κατά seems to have an intensive force, expressing the ‘binding force’ of an oath. This sense of κατά comes from the original, physical, notion of ‘keeping down’. For the interpretation of this obscure topic, see Introd. p. 203. The obscurity is a little heightened by Bekker's punctuation, and may be very slightly cleared up by reading μὴ ὀμόσας δ᾽ οὔ (with colon instead of full stop) and at the end of the next clause τὸ μή. (with full stop instead of colon). There is a considerably closer connexion between the two clauses which he separates by a full stop, than there is between the two which are divided only by a colon. The intention of the topic is to shew the purity and disinterestedness of the speaker's motives in refusing to take the oath. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους] Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the Eleatic school of Philosophy (Plat. Soph. 242 D, τὸ δὲ παῤ ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ε<*>θνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους...ἀρξάμενον）—of which Parmenides his follower was the most distinguished representative, who converted the theological conception of universal being, represented by Xenophanes as God, into the metaphysical conception of the Universe as One, ἓν τὸ ὄν— appears to have conveyed his philosophical doctrines in hexameter verse, an example subsequently followed by Parmenides and Empedocles. He also wrote elegies and iambics, the latter directed against Homer and Hesiod, whose manner of speaking about the Gods he disapproved, Diog. Laert. IX 2. 18. The verse quoted here is a trochaic tetrameter; on which Mullach remarks, Fragm. Phil. Gr. Xenoph. Fr. 25, p. 106, note, ‘cuius versiculi hiatus in voce αὕτη caesurae excusationem habet, prima autem syllaba in ἀσεβεῖ producitur ad aliorum nominum velut ἀθάνατος similitudinem’. So Karsten, Xenophanes, p. 79. The work which contained this verse is unknown. Mullach and Karsten agree in the opinion that this verse is all that belongs to Xenophanes in Aristotle's reference; the succeeding illustration is his own. All that is repeated in the converse of Xenophanes' maxim, § 30, is what is contained in the verse itself. I have no doubt they are right. On Xenophanes and his philosophy, besides the two works already referred to, which contain collections of the surviving fragments, see the histories of Greek Philosophy, by Brandis, Zeller, Ritter, Butler, with Dr Thompson's notes and the rest; also Grote's Plato, Vol. I. pp. 16—19. ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοία καὶ εἰ] In this illustration of Xenophanes' dictum, the parallel case proposed by Aristotle, the strong man is the unscrupulous or godless man, who is ready to swear anything, true or false; he has the same advantage over the scrupulous, godfearing man, in a challenge to swear, as the strong man would have over the weak in a challenge to fight. πατάξαι ἢ πληγῆναι] These forms are in general use in Attic Prose as the aorist active and passive of τύπτω. Eth. N. V 5. 4, p. 1132 b 28, εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν οὐ πληγῆναι μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. Ib. v 4. 4, p. 1132 a 8, ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ̓ ἀποθάνῃ. de Anima, B, 8, p. 419 b 15, τὸ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον followed by ἂν πληγῇ, ib. p. 420 a 24, τυπτόμενον καὶ τύπτον followed by ἐὰν πατάξη. For further illustrations see Dem. Select Private Orations, II. pp. 207—211, Excursus on the defective verb τύπτω. S.]
ὅτι πιστεύει αὑτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δ᾽ οὔ] ‘that he can trust himself (not to swear to what he knows to be false), but not the other’. (In this case, if you accept the oath, or consent to swear) ‘Xenophanes' dictum may be inverted (turned round to the other side), and you may say, that this is the fair way of proceeding, for the godless man to tender the oath, and the godfearing to take it’; (because the latter won't perjure himself, the other will). μεταστρέψαι, in § 25, was used in a somewhat different sense ‘to pervert’ justice; ‘and (you may add) it is monstrous for you to refuse to take it yourself, in a matter in which (ὑπὲρ ὧν) you1 require those gentlemen (the judges, namely,) to take an oath before they decide’. The judges were sworn upon entering the court to decide ‘according to the best of their judgment’, § 5, supra.
‘If you tender the oath, (you argue) that to entrust the case to the decision of heaven is an act of piety; and that (your opponent) ought to require no other judges than himself; and therefore (lit. you say this because, γάρ) you offer him the decision of the matter’. Comp. Quint. V 6. 4, At is qui defert alioqui agere modeste videtur quum litis adversarium iudicem faciat, et eum cuius cognitio est onere liberat, qui profecto alieno iureiurando stari quam suo mavult. Victorius thinks that this is borrowed from Aristotle.
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ] ‘by yourself’, supra, § 20, note on I 1. 12, I 7. 35. ἑκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν] On the ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ as affecting the character of actions, see Eth. Nic. III cc. 1, 2, 3, where the subject is thoroughly discussed; and on the degrees of criminality, and the distinction of wrong actions done with malice prepense, ἐκ προνοίας, or with deliberate purpose, προαιρέσει, and those which are due to accident, mistake, ἀπατή, or the momentary blindness of passion, see Eth. N. V 10, both of which passages have already been more than once referred to. On βία as a supposed source of action, I 10. 14, and the Appendix ‘On the seven sources of action’, Introd. p. 225. The term ‘injustice’ or ‘criminality’ can only be applied to actions voluntary in the proper sense of the word: the pleader who has executed two contracts, one conflicting with the other, and thus violated his engagements, argues that this was done in one or the other instance, either by force or fraud, compulsion or mistake, and that this exempts him from responsibility.
συνακτέον] συνάγειν like συλλογίζεσθαι, συλλαμβάνειν, συλλέγειν, συνορᾷν, συνιδεῖν, συνιέναι, &c., and similarly comprehendere, colligere, all convey the notion of ‘gathering’ facts together, for the purpose of comparison, and so drawing a conclusion of some kind. συνάγειν and συλλογίζεσθαι are to ‘draw logical inferences’, from facts or premisses which you put together, and so by comparison are led to infer some general conclusion respecting them. τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῷ στόματι] This is the famous ἡ γλῶσσ᾽ ὀμώμοχ̓ ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος, Eur. Hippol. 612. The success of Aristophanes, and the vulgar misapprehension arising chiefly therefrom, have brought on Euripides a most baseless charge of immorality, so far at least as it is grounded upon this line. Cicero, de Off. III 29, has seen and exposed the fallacy. All the moralists without exception admit that the essence of a lie resides not in the words, but in the intention and moral purpose; and the verse when properly interpreted asserts no more than this. See Paley's note. It seems to me that the Hippolytus in its second and altered form, as we now have it, is, with the exception of the one fatal blot of Phaedra's false charge which brings about the death of the hero, one of the most moral and high-toned, as it certainly is one of the very best, of the extant tragedies of Euripides. ἀναιρεῖ] supra § 21, ἀναιρεῖν συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους. καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ὀμόσαντες] ‘the laws also (as well as other things) are not enforced till an oath has been taken’, ‘the laws in particular are only enforced after an oath has been taken’. καὶ ὑμᾶς μέν] On the explanation of this topic, and of the var. lect. ἐμμενοῦμεν and ἐμμένουσιν, see Introd. pp. 204—5. MS A^{c} has ἐμμένουσιν; the rest ἐμμενοῦμεν, which Bekker retains.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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