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τὰ πάθη] Of the various senses and applications of πάθος, and also of its special signification in Aristotle's ethical system, an account is given in the Introduction, p. 133 seq.; together with a comparison of the two lists here and in the Nic. Ethics. These two it will be seen differ materially. I have further referred (p. 246, note 1, on the summary of this chapter) to Mr Bain's work On the Emotions and the Will for a complete and scientific explanation of the actual facts of those which are also included in Aristotle's lists, either here or in the Nic. Eth., viz. anger, resentment, righteous indignation, terror and confidence or courage, love and hatred. What is here said of them, that they are characterised, as parts of our moral nature, by being always attended by pleasure and pain—one or both, as anger—is found likewise in Eth. N. II 4, sub init. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θράσος (so written here; more correctly θάρσος, II 5. 16,) φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη. In Eth. Eudem. II 2, 1220 b 12, it is said of them, λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβων αἰδῶ ἐπιθυμίαν, (this is of course not intended for a complete list: αἰδώς and ἐπιθυμία come from the Nic. Eth., the former from the end of Book IV., where it appears with νέμεσις as an appendage to the list of virtues; it is found likewise in the Rhet. II 6, under the name αἰσχύνη. ἐπιθυμία is absent in the Rhetoric), ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (this is a modification of Aristotle's statement) ἡ αἰσθητικὴ (this also is an addition) ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη καθ᾽ αὑτά. In Magn. Mor. A 7, 8, there is a summary account, borrowed directly from Aristotle, of the three elementary divisions of man's moral nature, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις. Of the first we find, πάθη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὀργὴ φόβος μῖσος πόθος ζῆλος ἔλεος, τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷς εἴωθε παρακολουθεῖν λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, 1186 a 12, which is afterwards thus modified, c. 8, 1186 a 34, τὰ δὲ πάθη ἤτοι λῦπαί εἰσιν ἢ ἡδοναί, ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἡδονῆς. These πάθη proper are therefore distinguished from other πάθη, feelings or affections of like nature, such as the appetites, hunger and thirst (which are also attended by pleasure and pain), not by pleasure and pain in general, as seems to be implied in the above statements, but by the particular kinds of pleasures and pains that severally accompany them; bodily in the one case, mental and moral in the other. So that the appetites belong to the body or material, the ‘emotions’, as they are now called, to the mind and the moral, immaterial, part of man; and feeling (the general term) and emotion (the special term) are thus distinguished: all emotions are feelings, all feelings are not emotions. μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι] (differ by change) ‘are brought over to a different state of mind or feeling’. πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις ‘in respect of their decisions’, of all kinds; but especially judicial decisions and those of national assemblies on questions of policy or expediency.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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