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ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ] ‘by yourself’, supra, § 20, note on I 1. 12, I 7. 35. ἑκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν] On the ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ as affecting the character of actions, see Eth. Nic. III cc. 1, 2, 3, where the subject is thoroughly discussed; and on the degrees of criminality, and the distinction of wrong actions done with malice prepense, ἐκ προνοίας, or with deliberate purpose, προαιρέσει, and those which are due to accident, mistake, ἀπατή, or the momentary blindness of passion, see Eth. N. V 10, both of which passages have already been more than once referred to. On βία as a supposed source of action, I 10. 14, and the Appendix ‘On the seven sources of action’, Introd. p. 225. The term ‘injustice’ or ‘criminality’ can only be applied to actions voluntary in the proper sense of the word: the pleader who has executed two contracts, one conflicting with the other, and thus violated his engagements, argues that this was done in one or the other instance, either by force or fraud, compulsion or mistake, and that this exempts him from responsibility.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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