E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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gives the analysis of pleasure, so far as it is of service to the rhetorician.

The general plan of this chapter, and the connexion of its contents, are as follows. First we have a definition of pleasure and a general description of its nature in §§ 1, 2. From this we learn that all that is in accordance with our nature is pleasurable, all that runs counter to it painful, §§ 3, 4. Consequently all natural desires and appetites produce pleasure by their gratification: and these fall into two classes, bodily appetites and mental desires, the former irrational and connected with the pleasures of sense, the latter rational, in so far as they are of an intellectual character, suggested and acquired by some kind of intellectual process of the nature of persuasion, § 5, and conveyed by a faculty, φαντασία, intermediate between sense and intellect. The analysis of these intellectual pleasures (which include the pleasures of imagination, memory and anticipation, of love and friendship, and its counterfeit, flattery) occupies §§ 6—20. In the remainder of the chapter other kinds of intellectual pleasures are distinguished, and referred to the principles implied in the definition.

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The first word of the chapter is a commentary upon the concluding observations of the last: ὑποκείσθω, ‘let us assume’, as a definition, ‘take it for granted’: there is no occasion to enter into details, or attempt to prove that it is what I am about to describe. Similarly ἔστω, 5. 3, 6. 2, 7. 2, 10. 3.

On the terms of this definition, and the comparison of it with other doctrines held by Aristotle himself and other critics on the same subject, see Introduction, Appendix D to Bk. I, p. 234 seq.

κατάστασιν...εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν] This characteristic of pleasure, ‘the resettlement of the soul’, i.e. the vital and sensitive system, ‘into its normal state’ after a disturbance of the balance or harmony, which is pain, reappears in one of the special forms of pleasure, § 21, ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι. So that learning, as a pleasure, like pleasure in general, is, according to this view, the filling up of a vacuum, the supply of a want, the satisfaction of a craving, the restoration of a balance of the system, the re-establishment of a broken harmony. This is the Platonic conception of pleasure; not, so far as I remember, of learning in particular. See Appendix, p. 234. Lucretius takes the same view of pleasure, de Rer. Nat. II 963 (there quoted).

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καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ ποιητικόν] by the ordinary rule, I 6. 2, and note: as all is good that is conducive to good; if the end, then the means; so all is pleasant that is productive of, or conducive to, pleasure. Comp. Eth. N. I 4, 1096 b 10, quoted on the above passage.

τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως] pleasure is here properly called a διάθεσις, ‘a temporary and passing disposition’, as opposed to the ‘confirmed, complete, and permanent state’ which constitutes the ἕξις. On the distinction of the two, see Categ. c. 8, p. 8 b 27, διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μονιμώτερον. τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί...διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἅ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα :καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, οἷον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα: διάκειται γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γενόμενος κ.τ.λ.

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If pleasure is what it has been described to be, a return from a temporary disturbance or unnatural state into a state of nature (φύσις being here understood in one of the ordinary Aristotelian significations, the normal nature, nature in its best and completest condition), then all ‘passing into a natural state’ must be pleasant, ‘and especially whenever what takes place in accordance with it has reached its own proper nature’, i.e. its acme or maximum, the highest attainable point of its development, for instance, drinking, quenching the thirst is a pleasure, learning is a pleasure, but the acme or highest point they reach is still more pleasant in both. Schrader, who suggests these examples, expresses the later of the two stages in each, by sitim restinxisse, didicisse, which not only does not give Aristotle's meaning correctly, but also, as I think, is not true as a matter of fact.

ἀπειληφότα ᾖ] has attained to, acquired as its due, the opp. of ἀποδιδόναι, see note on I 1. 7. Gaisford cites in exemplification of this application of ἀπολαμβάνειν, Plutarch, de tuenda sanitate, II 130 E, τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἡ φύσις ἀπείληφεν (Nature has recovered, regained her own).

καὶ τὰ ἔθη κ.τ.λ.] ‘and all habits, for in fact that which has become habitual now (by this time, now that it has reached this point) takes the form (γίγνεται) of something just like what is natural: for habit is a thing (τί) closely resembling nature; because frequent repetition makes a near approach to the constant and uniform, and nature belongs to the constant and uniform, and habit is a case of frequent repetition’. With this statement about habit, comp. de Memoria 2. 16, p. 452 a 27, ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἤὸη τὸ ἔθος, and line 30, τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσιν ποιεῖ. Gaisford refers to Plutarch, de tuenda sanit. 132 A, τὸ ἔθος τρόπον τινὰ φύσις τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν γέγονεν.

Consuetudo altera natura. Prov. ap. Erasm. (Adagia) p. 994. Eth. N. VII 11, 1152 a 30, ῥᾷον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως: διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπὸν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνος λέγει, φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι φίλε, καὶ δὴ | ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

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καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον] ‘and freedom from constraint, freedom of action’ by the same rule; because all external force, compulsion or violence, is unnatural. ‘And therefore all necessity (of every kind) is painful’. This marks the distinction of ἀναγκαῖον and βίαιον. Fate, for example, is ἀναγκαῖον, and Necessity (Ἀνάγκη herself).

There is a chapter on τὸ ἀναγκαῖον which includes βίαιον as a species, in Metaph. Δ 5. There are four kinds of ‘necessary’ things’. The first is physical necessity, as breath and food are necessary to life: the second class consists of things necessary as means to an end, as taking medicine to get well, to take a voyage to Ægina to recover a sum of money: under this head comes βία (and τὸ βίαιον), an external force that controls us, something independent of ourselves and our own will, (here the external compulsion or violence is the necessary means to the attainment of its end, control). βίαιον is thus described, 1015 a 26, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐμποδίζον καὶ κωλυτικόν. τὸ γὰρ βίαιον ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται, διὸ καὶ λυπηρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνός φησι, ‘πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ̓ ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ.’ καὶ ἡ βία ἀνάγκη τις, ὥσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς λέγει ‘ἀλλ̓ ἡ βία με ταῦτ̓ ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν’ (this is incorrectly quoted; memoriter, as Bonitz thinks; the line runs, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ βία γὰρ ταῦτ̓ ἀναγκάζει με δρᾷν, Electr. 256). The third species of ἀναγκαῖον includes τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν; and the fourth, which is somewhat unnecessarily distinguished from this, is the necessity of demonstration, ἀπόδειξις, of which the conclusion ‘can only be in one way’—which shews that it ought to be included in the preceding. See also Waitz, ad Organ. 83 b 38, Comm. II p. 358.

καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται] ‘Pentameter statim subsequens laudatur quoque ab Arist. in Met. IV 5, et in Ethic. ad Eud. II 7; necnon a Plutarcho in l. quod non suaviter vivi possit secundum Epicurum, 1102 C. Tribuitur utrobique Eveno Pario, poetae Elegiaco, Philisti historici praeceptori. Le-gitur tamen idem versus unica voce immutata ap. Theogn. 470 (472 Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. Gr. p. 382) πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγ<*>αῖον χρῆμ̓ ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ.’ Buhle.

‘And all acts of attention or study, serious effort, vigorous exertion are painful’ (supply ἀνάγκη εἶναι λυπηράς), ‘for all these imply necessity and constraint, unless they become habitual; but then the habit makes them pleasant. The opposites are of course pleasant; all states of ease and comfort, and idleness and inattention, carelessness and indifference, and sports, and recreations, and sleep, belong to the family (or class) of things pleasant; for none of these is related to (or has a tendency to, πρός) necessity’.

τῶν ἡδέων (τι）] Comp. I 9. 25, νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν, I 11. 16 and 17. These are examples of a mode of expression, not unknown to earlier and contemporary writers, but more familiar to Aristotle. It is the substitution of a genitive case with τί omitted, for the direct predicate in apposition or agreement with the subject. In Aristotle τί or ἕν τι is sometimes expressed. I have not noted it in any writer earlier than Plato, but have no reason to suppose that he was the first to use it. Protag. 319 C, τῶν γενναίων. Theaet. 164 B, τῶν ἀδυνάτων τι ξυμβαίνειν φαίνεται. Phaed. 68 D, Rep. II 376 E (Stallbaum's note), Ib. IV 424 C, θὲς τῶν πεπεισμένων, 437 B, IX 577 B, ἡμεῖς εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ἂν κρῖναι. Æsch. c. Tim. § 143, ἕν τι τοῦτο τῶν λυπηροτάτων. Demosth. c. Lept. sub init. ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δωρεὰν τῶν ἀδίκων ἐστίν, Olynth. I 16, τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων ἂν εἴη, Olynth. II p. 18. 13, ὡς ἔστι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν αἰσχίστων, de Fals. Leg. § 345, τῶν ἀπιστούντων. Isocr. κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν § 2, ἓν τοῦτο τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστι. § 16, οὐκ εἶναι τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν. Ar. Eth. Nic. VI 7, 1141 b 3, τῶν τιμιωτάτων, VI 12, sub init. 1152 b 4, VIII 1 ult. τῶν καλῶν ἕν τι. Polit. I 2, 1253 a 2, τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, Ib. 5, 1254 a 22, c. 9, 1257 a 36, VI (IV) 4, 1291 a 9, ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, Ib. c. 8, 1294 a 1, VIII (V) 3, 1303 a 19, τῶν ἀρχόντων γενομένου Ἡρακλεοδώρου, Ib. 7, 1306 b 28, IV (VII) 6, 1327 a 27, Ib. c. 9, 1329 a 9, Ib. c. 14, 1332 b 32, ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων. de Anima A 1. 2, 402 a 10, c. 5, 411 a 15, τῶν παραλογωτέρων (comparative, very unusual). de Caelo, I 5. 1, sub init. II 12. 4, 292 a 12, τῶν ἀναριθμήτων εἶναι. Hist. An. III 11. 4, 518 a 2, τῶν συνεχῶν δὲ τὸ δέρμα ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ζῴοις. Topic. B 9, 114 b 18, 19, 21, Γ 6, 119 b 11, Z 3, 141 a 5, τῶν ἀτόπων, Θ 2, 157 a 25. Waitz ad Org. 121 b 36, Vol. II p. 473.

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καὶ οὗ ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ] Anything is pleasant of which the desire is innate in us, ‘the object of any of our natural desires or appetites’, the definition of desire being ‘an impulse towards pleasure’. de Anima B 3. 2, 414 b 2, ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, b 5, τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη (ἡ ἐπιθυμία). Ib. Γ 10. 4, 433 a 25, ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξίς τις ἐστιν; and compare the following sections on ἐπιθυμία and its congeners. Eth. N. III 15, 1119 b 6, κατ᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις. Similarly Plato speaks of desire as naturally associated with pleasure, Phaedrus 237 D, ἡ ἔμφυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία η<*>δονῶν.

This leads to a distinction of desires into rational and irrational, corresponding severally to the two parts of our moral and intellectual nature, the λόγον ἔχον and the ἄλογον—the latter division is attributed to Plato by the author of Magna Moralia, I 1. 7, 1182 a 23.

The irrational appetites, the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν (Republic), are those which are not accompanied or guided by reason, which act naturally or by a physical necessity, ὅσαι λέγονται φύσει, (these are Plato's ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιθυμίαι; Rep. VIII 554 A, 558 D, 559 A, B, see the whole passage, IX 572 C, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίους, ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἕνεκα γιγνομένας; and have corresponding ἡδοναί, Rep. VIII 558 D, Phileb. 72 E), and are not prompted by any ‘supposition’, ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν τι, any suggestion of ulterior advantage of any kind thereby accruing, but are forced upon us by the imperious demands of nature; such as bodily appetites (those which we have, which come to us, through the channel or medium of (διά) the body, sensual, αἱ σωματικαί, Eth. N. VI 6, sub init. ἀναγκαῖα τὰ σωματικά, compare the whole passage), for instance, that of food, thirst, and hunger, and the (special) desires of particular kinds of food (special tastes leading to particular kinds of pleasure); and those connected with taste in general, and with sex, and universally with touch (which includes taste, ‘gustus’, with feeling in general, τὸ δὲ γευστὸν ἁπτόν τι, de Anima B 10 init.), and with smell (of fragrance), and hearing and sight. The rational, those which are accompanied with reason, are such as owe their origin to ‘persuasion’ of some kind—these are artificial and acquired tastes, as opposed to the natural and inborn τὰ ἔνοντα, φυσικά—because the hearing (things praised and admired by others) and persuasion in general (the influence of fashion and association and instruction as well as direct persuasion) suggest to us a taste for, or desire of, seeing and possessing things.

The division accordingly resolves itself into (1) natural and necessary, (2) artificial and acquired, desires and tastes.

ὅσας ἐπιθυμοῦσιν] sc. ἐπιθυμίας, is a cognate accusative; ἐπιθυμεῖν is construed only with the genitive case and infinitive mood.

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The received text followed by Bekker and Spengel puts a full stop at ἐλπίζει [p. 206, line 3]. (The latter editor has also adopted the reading of MS A^{c} ἀεὶ ἐν for κἄν). With this punctuation, κἂν τῷ μεμνημένῳ—ἐλπίζει must be the apodosis, and the argument runs thus: ‘If pleasure consists in sensation, and φαντασία is a kind of sensation, then (assuming that there is pleasure in memory and anticipation) memory and anticipation must be always accompanied by a mental impression of what is remembered or anticipated’—pleasure being the middle term, without which the supposed apodosis will not follow from the premisses. But this is not what Aristotle undertakes to shew; and also it assumes first what is proved in the next sentence, viz. that pleasure does accompany memory and anticipation. Surely Victorius and Vater are right in supposing the apodosis of the entire sentence, ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. to be δῆλον ὅτι—καὶ αἴσθησις, which is in fact what Aristotle here wishes to establish. Substitute a colon for the full stop: retain κἂν (for καὶ ἐν) instead of ἀεὶ ἐν; and understand the first three clauses ἐπεὶ—ἐλπίζει, as three distinct and independent propositions, the basis of the conclusion which follows; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο is a repetition in sum of the foregoing, ‘if all this, I say, be so’, (δέ is appropriate in a resumption of what has been just said, note on I 1. 11); if pleasure is a mode of sensation, if φαντασία is a feeble kind of sensation, and if memory and hope are attended by a φαντασία or mental impression of that which is remembered or hoped (some phenomenon past or future, the former a fact, the latter an imagination), it follows that pleasure, which is sensation, accompanies the memory of the past and the anticipation of the future because φαντασία does, which is a form of sensation, ἐπείπερ καὶ αἴσθησις¹. In this case κἄν is to be retained in preference to ἀεὶ ἐν. The latter necessarily makes the clause that it introduces, the apodosis; καὶ ἐν merely couples this with the preceding premisses. The mood ἀκολουθοῖ ἄν, which might seem objectionable in the mere statement of a proposition, must be considered as a qualified statement of the fact, ‘will be likely to attend’; only so much can be affirmed.

φαντασία] which is here called a ‘sort of feeble sensation’, is described otherwise in the psychology of the de Anima. It is defined Γ 3, 429 a 1, ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη (for γιγνομένης, Trendelenburg and Torstrik), not, therefore, a mode of sensation as here, but a motion generated by sensation in active exercise: and again 428 a 1, φαντασία καθ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι: ‘the presentative faculty’ (Sir W. Hamilton). It is a faculty intermediate between sensation and memory, and thus becomes connected with the intellect; the seat of memory is τὸ πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν, viz. the heart, where the results of sensation are all collected in a focus, and thence transmitted to the mind. The memory is defined, de memoria, c. 1, ult. 451 a 15, φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα, ἕξις; which represents it as a state (in the heart, or the appropriate organ) of the impression φάντασμα, transferred by the faculty of φαντασία from the sensation itself, which (the impression) is the representation (the εἰκών) of the real object of sense, that of which it is the φάντασμα. The office of the φαντασία is therefore to convey the impressions of the actual objects of sense delivered to it by sensation, and to impress or print them on the organ fitted for their reception; when thus impressed or ‘represented’ they become memory, and so are passed on to the intellect. To compare with what is said in the Rhetoric, of this φαντασία being a sort of feeble sensation, we have in the de Anima, Γ 3, 428 b 11, what almost (not quite) justifies it, ἐπειδὴ... ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν...καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. Though thus closely allied with sensation, and dependent upon it, the φαντασία is not a faculty of mere sensation, but belongs equally to the intellect, φαντασία ἅπασα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική, de Anima Γ 10 ult. 433 b 29, (being apparently intermediate between them and partaking of the nature of both); of which (intellect), when we take the whole of it, the διάνοια as well as the νοῦς, into account, the φαντασία actually forms a part; c. 3, 427 b 28, τούτου δὲ (τοῦ νοεῖν) τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις. ‘Imaginatio inter sensuum perceptiones et mentis cogitationes media intericitur, ut imaginatio sensibus, mens imaginatione egeat.’ Trendelenburg ad de Anima III 3, 4, p. 453. On the various relations of the φαντασία, see the notes of the same Comm. ad de Anima, pp. 166, 462, 538, also Bonitz on Metaph. A 1, 980 b 26, p. 38, Waitz ad Org. 100 b 27, Vol. II, p. 440. [Ueber den Begriff des Wortes φαντασία bei Aristoteles. J. Freudenthal (Göttingen) 1863, pp. 59. S.]

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Consequently all pleasures may be reduced to three classes, according as they are referred to things present, past, or future. The pleasures of the present are the immediate pleasures of direct sensation; those of the past are the ‘pleasures of memory’, the pleasures that accompany, or are revived by, association, in the way of recollection, of past facts; and those of the future are derived by a similar association from the anticipation of future pleasure. ἡδεῖα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν πάροντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη: ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν [Eth. N. IX 7, 1168 a 13]. Of memory, Ov. Heroid. XVIII 55, (Hero to Leander) Nox erat incipiens; namque est meminisse voluptas; cum foribus patriis egrediebar amans.

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Therefore everything that can be remembered is capable of giving pleasure; not only things that were pleasant at the time they happened, but some that were not, provided the after consequence of them was something right or good (right, morally; good, as tending to profit or advantage)²; whence the saying, ‘nay truly, pleasant it is to remember past troubles after deliverance (escape) from them’. Fragm. Eur. Andromed. XV (Dind. XXXVI), Wagner, Fragm. Poet. Trag. Gr. Vol. II p. 75, cited by Plut. Symp. II 1, p. 630 E, and translated by Cicero, de Fin. II 32. 105, suavis laborum est praeteritorum memoria. Cic. Ep. ad Fam. V 12. 2 habet enim praeteriti doloris secura recordatio delectationem. Wagner adds, ‘ex hoc loco et altero Archippi Comici apud Stobaeum LIX 7, profecisse Epictetum ap. Schweig. T. III, p. 104, scribentem, ὡς ἡδὺ τὴν θάλατταν ἀπὸ γῆς ὁρᾷν, οὕτως ἡδὺ τῷ σωθέντι μεμνῆσθαι πόνων, monuit Meinek. ad Menandrum p. 86.’ Stobaeus quotes a second verse of Archippus, ὡς—ὁρᾷν, ὦ μῆτέρ ἐστι, μὴ πλέοντα μηδαμοῦ, which supplies the link of association from which the pleasure is derived. It is from a contrast of past trouble with present immunity, and the feeling of security which it engenders; and it has for its foundation the same feeling as is suggested by the celebrated lines of the opening of the second book of Lucretius' poem, the famous suave mari magno. The same association, the sense of comfort and security derived from an uncomfortable contrast, is the foundation of the pleasure expressed in the exquisite lines of Sophocles, Fragm. Tymp. 563 (Dind.) apud Stobaeum LIX 12, φεῦ φεῦ, τί τούτου χάρμα μεῖζον ἂν λάβοις τοῦ γῆς ἐπιψαύσαντα κᾆθ᾽ ὑπὸ στέγῃ πυκνῆς ἀκοῦσαι ψεκάδος εὑδούσῃ φρενί;—to make the land, and then, the fatigues and perils past, to sit safe and snug under shelter, listening in dreamy and drowsy mood to the fastfalling drops of rain overhead—sign of the storm still raging, reminiscence of the past, and contrast with the comfort within. Comp. Cic. ad Atticum II 7, cupio istorum naufragia ex terra intueri; cupio, ut ait tuus amicus Sophocles, κἂν ὑπὸ στέγῃ et cet.

Another illustration of this source of pleasure is taken from Homer Odys. o' (XV) 399, which Aristotle, as usual, has misquoted. With this compare Virg. Aen. I 202, revocate animos maestumque timorem mittite. Forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit. Comp. again Cic. ad Fam. l. c. Nihil est aptius ad delectationem lectoris quam temporum varietates fortunaeque vicissitudines: quae etsi nobis optabiles in experiendo non fuerunt, in legendo tamen erunt iucundae.

τούτου δ᾽ αἴτιον κ.τ.λ.] ‘and the reason of this is that there is pleasure even in the absence of evil’; that is, in the way of contrast with our former condition, from which we are now relieved; all relief, the removal of oppression and constraint, is pleasurable.

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τὰ δ᾽ ἐν ἐλπίδι (ἡδέα ἐστίν) κ.τ.λ.] ‘everything is pleasant in anticipation which appears to confer great delight or profit when present; and to do this without any accompanying pain’, ‘and in general, all that delights when present, delights for the most part in anticipation and recollection. Therefore even anger is pleasant’—the prospect of vengeance lends a solace and a charm even to anger; comp. II 2.2, πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἕπεσθαί τινα ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι κ.τ.λ. and the same line of Homer, Il. Σ 100, is quoted in illustration, ‘for no one is angry with one who is plainly beyond the reach of his vengeance’, (see the above passage of Book II,) ‘or with those who are far above him in power; either not at all, or less’. ἀδικούμενοί τε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται ἢ βιαζόμενοι: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου δοκεῖ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος καταναγκάζεσθαι, Thuc. I 77. 5. On φαινόμενος = φανερός, see note on II 2. 1.

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Most appetites and desires are accompanied by a certain pleasure: which is felt either in the recollection of the past, or in the anticipation of the future, enjoyment; for instance, those who are suffering under (lit. held, possessed by) fevers feel a pleasure in the thirst (that attends them), either from the remembrance of former draughts, or the expectation of future; and lovers in talking of their beloved (in his absence), or painting his portrait, or drawing his likeness, from memory, and composing verses in his honour’ (so Victorius and Vater; else, γράφοντες ‘writing of him’, and ποιοῦντές τι ἀεί ‘in anything that they ever do which has any connexion with him’, περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου ‘so as to recall him to their recollection’); for in all such cases the recollection appears to their fancy (οἴονται) to be like the (present) perception (by any of the senses) of the beloved.

All these last are pleasures of memory, agreeable reminiscences. The pleasures of memory are further exemplified in this, that when the love which has already arisen from the delight found in the actual presence of the beloved is retained by the memory in his absence, this is a sure sign of the commencement of a genuine and lasting passion. Bekker, ed. 3, followed by Spengel, has put ἐρῶσιν in brackets: F. A. Wolf had previously objected to it. It may be retained and explained as I have translated it, but the text and the general meaning would not suffer by its omission. ἐρῶσιν if retained implies that the passion is already conceived. Gaisford, after Victorius, quotes Eth. Nic. IX 5, 1167 a 4, ἔοικε δὴ (ἡ εὔνοια) ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾷν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή: μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐθεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐθὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ.

ἐχόμενοι] Victorius inquires here whether ἐχόμενοι should be construed with ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς, as Plat. Phileb. 45 B, ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι, or with ταῖς δίψαις: the case is doubtful, either will do.

ταῖς δίψαις] their thirst, that which naturally belongs to them: the possessive use of the definite article.

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‘And this again is the reason why, even when (the beloved) (becomes painful) causes pain (to his admirer) by his absence, there is still some pleasure that finds its way into (grows up, is engendered, in) his lamentations and wailings; for the pain that he feels is at the want of him, but with that, there is a pleasure in the recollection and, in a sense, sight of himself, and what he used to do, and how to look and behave, (οἷος what sort of person he was, in external appearance, and character, i. e. conduct)’. The very absence, and the pain that it causes, and the expression of grief, have a charm in them which affords some compensation by the recollection of all that he is and does. ‘Hence the appropriateness of the saying’,—meaning especially the use of the word ἵμερος, which implies eager desire, in relation to γόος—‘thus spake he, and in them all aroused longing desire for wailing’. This is a familiar phrase in Homer, and occurs several times both in the Iliad and Odyssey. See in Damm's Lexicon, s. v. ἵμερος. Andromache looking back at Hector as she was taking leave of him, δακρυόεν γελάσασα, is a picture of the mixture of pleasure and pain (Il. Z 484).

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‘And revenge is sweet’, by the logical theory of convertible opposites, ‘for where failure is painful, success must be pleasant; and angry men, whilst they are vexed beyond all measure if they miss their revenge, are equally delighted in the anticipation of it’. ἀνυπερβλήτως, ‘unsurpassably’, a rare word, found as adj. in Isocr. Paneg. § 71, Xen. Cyrop. VIII 7. 15, Plat. Defin. 412 B, Dem. Olynth. II 23. 11, Epitaph. 1389. 7, Lycurg. c. Leocr. § 101, and more frequently in Polybius. Of the adverb I find only this one example. [Cf., however, Rhet. ad Alexandrum, 12, 1430 b 25, ἀνυπερβλήτως τιμωροῦνται, Index Aristotelicus. S.]

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And victory is a source of pleasure—not only to those who have a special and peculiar ‘fondness’ for it (τοῖς φιλονίκοις), but universally, to everybody; because it gives rise to (γίγνεται, there arises) an impression (fancy or notion) of superiority, of which all feel the desire either in a slight degree or more strongly. Comp. I 9. 39, ἡ δ᾽ ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν... ἐπείπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ δοκεῖ μηνύειν ἀρετήν. Superiority is a noble or right aim, or end of action; and indicative of ‘virtue’. This is one of the modes in which the ‘love of power’ manifests itself, to which, as a purely selfish instinct, Hobbes sought to trace all our feelings and springs of action. The Emotion of Power is, in Mr Bain's Classification of the Emotions as sources of action, one of the most important of a family of eleven which together compose our moral constitution. Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 59, and the admirable analysis, 145—162. See also Dugald Stewart on this subject, there quoted p. 145. ‘The objects of the sense of power may be described as the effects or consequences of our own agency surveyed under such a comparison as to set forth some kind of superiority.’ This is the ὑπεροχή in question.

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This love of victory, as an evidence of superiority, is the foundation of the amusement derived from all sports and games into which competition enters; all, namely, that involve a contest either of bodily strength and skill (as cricket, athletic exercises, and all encounters of a combative character, μαχητικάς, cock-fights, bear-baiting, pugilistic encounters, tournaments and sham-fights of all kinds), or ‘wit-combats’, intellectual and dialectical encounters (ἐριστικάς); games of knucklebones, of ball, of dice, and draughts.

Three MSS Q, Y^{b}, Z^{b} here add αὐλητικάς, (τὰς μαχητικὰς καὶ τὰς αὐλητικὰς καὶ ἐριστικάς), to represent ‘musical’ contests, which spoils the antithesis, and introduces a vicious classification.

On the zeal and eagerness and love of victory manifested by children in their sports, comp. Cic. de Fin. V 22. 61. On παιδιαὶ ἐριστικαί, Probl. XVIII 2 (referred to by Gaisford). Διὰ τί οἱ ἰριστικοὶ λόγοι γυμναστικοί εἰσιν; ἢ ὅτι ἔχουσι τὸ νικᾷν ἢ ἡττᾶσθαι πυκνόν; φιλονείκους οὖν εὐθὺς ποιοῦσιν: καὶ γὰρ νικῶντες διὰ τὸ χαίρειν προάγονται μᾶλλον ἐρίζειν καὶ ἡττώ- μενοι ὡς ἀναμαχούμενοι. καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγῶσι ταὐτό: διὸ καὶ μαχόμενοι καὶ ἥττους ὄντες πολλάκις οὐ βούλονται διαλύεσθαι.

ἐριστική here in the Rhetoric means nothing more than the practice of dialectics, arguing against an opponent, and for victory. It has, however, almost always in Plato, and not unfrequently in Aristotle, the additional connotation of captious reasoning, quibbling and sophistry. In Top. IV (de Soph. El.) 11, 171 b 24, the ἐριστικοί are defined as οἱ πάντως νικᾷν προαιρούμενοι, and again 25, οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἐριστικοὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Here there is already the imputation of an over-disputatious habit implied by the word, but by and by, in lines 30, 32, it is associated with sophistry and sophists; but with this distinction —they both argue unscrupulously, ‘but the eristics do this to gain an apparent victory, the sophists to make a show of wisdom’; the definition of the sophist being, c. 1, 165 a 22, χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας οὔσης δ᾽ οὔ. Again, c. 2, 165 b 7, they are distinguished from the genuine dialecticians, who deal with τὰ ἔνδοξα real probabilities, by this sophistical habit and mode of arguing, ἐριστικοὶ δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδόξων μὴ ὄντων δὲ συλλογιστικοὶ ἢ φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοί. ψευδὴς λόγος καλεῖται τετραχῶς: ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ὅταν φαίνηται συμπεραίνεσθαι μὴ συμπεραινόμενος, ὃ καλεῖται ἐριστικὸς συλλογισμός. Top. Θ 12, 162 b 3. In Rhet. II 24. 10, τὰ ἐριστικά stands for the sophistical practice of unfair reasoning, γίγνεται φαινόμενος συλλογισμός ‘lead to an apparent, or fallacious, conclusion’.

ἀστραγαλίσεις] The game of ἀστράγαλοι, ‘knucklebones’, cut into rough dice with only four flat sides (talus), and so distinguished from the κύβοι (tesserae), which (as the name imports) had all six sides flat, is described in Rich, Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Antiq. p. 64, Smith, Dict. Antiq. s. v. talus, p. 1095 (ed. 2), Becker, Gallus, Exc. II, p. 499 (Engl. Tr.), Charicles, Exc. III, p. 354. And for an account of the other games mentioned see the same authorities (reff. in Index); [also K. F. Hermann's Lehrbuch der Griechischen Privatalterthümer, ed. 2, § 55. S.]

σφαιρίσεις] Theaet. 146 A, Athen. A 25, 26, p. 14 D—15 C, πολὺ δὲ τὸ σύντονον καὶ καματηρὸν τῆς περὶ τὴν σφαιριστικὴν ἁ μίλλης κ.τ.λ.

κυβείας καὶ πεττείας] often go together, Plat. Phaedr. 274 D, Rep. II 374 C, (on the difficulty of these two games); Soph. Naupl. Fragm. 4, πεσσοὺς κύβους τε. Fragm. 380, 381 (Dindorf). Plut. (Cap. Descr.) Qu. Rom. p. 272 F, Ζάκορός τις...ἀπολαύων σχολῆς ἔθος εἶχεν ἐν πεττοῖς καὶ κύβοις τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύειν. The πεττοί in particular was an old and favourite game, which appears from the constant allusions to it in Greek literature. The earliest mention of it occurs in Homer, Od. ά 107. The corresponding Latin game, latrunculi, is described by Ovid, Ars Am. II 208, III 357.

The same is the case with ‘serious’ games (games that require study and attention, such as chess, and πεττεία and κυβεία, according to Plato, l. c.)—the only difference between serious games and games of mere amusement, in respect of the pleasures they afford, is that the pleasure in the one case must be acquired, and arise from habit and cultivation, whereas others are naturally agreeable, lit. at once (εὐθύς, from the very first); to this latter class belong hunting with dogs, and every kind of chace.

Various ‘kinds of chace’ are enumerated in the Politics, I 8, in the description of the ‘hunting stage’, the second, according to Aristotle, in the development of human civilization. He takes occasion from this to distinguish the several kinds of hunting. οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἕτεροι ἑτέρας, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λῃστείας, οἱ δ̓ ἀφ̓ ἁλιείας, ὅσοι λίμνας καὶ ἕλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην (i. e. of the same kind as the lakes, marshes and rivers, namely, fish-producing) προσοικοῦσιν, οἱ δ᾽ ἀπ̓ ὀρνίθων ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων, piracy, man-hunting, fishing, fowling, and hunting wild animals, hunting proper.

Wherever there is rivalry or competition, there is also victory, the opportunity of shewing one's superiority. And this is what makes practice at the bar and in the law courts (where there is a perpetual struggle and contest for the victory going on between the two rival pleaders), and that of dialectics (what is avowedly and technically a contest between two opposites), pleasant occupations.

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This quasi-sensation, the φαντασία, is again employed to explain the pleasure we derive from honour and fair fame, the favourable opinion of others. These are pleasant because every one who possesses them always acquires an impression or fancy that he must be such an one as is the good (such as ὁ σπουδαῖος, to whom alone such things are really due), and a φαντασία, being a form of sensation, always carries pleasure with it, § 6; and this pleasure is still greater (the φαντασία becomes still more vivid, and its effect greater) when he believes that those who say so (ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος ὁ σπουδαῖος) are likely to be right in what they say. Such (οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀληθεύειν) are near neighbours who know a man better, and are therefore better judges, than those (friends) that live at a distance; intimates (familiar, habitual associates, συνήθεις, note on I 1. 2, 10. 18), and fellow-citizens rather than strangers afar off, (who only know him by report); contemporaries rather than posterity (to whom the same reason applies); wise men rather than fools; many rather than few. This is because (γάρ; i. e. the preference, expressed by the μᾶλλον in each case, is due to the fact that) those (first) mentioned are more likely to arrive at the truth than the opposite; for when a man has a great contempt for any one, as children and beasts, he cares not at all for their respect and good opinion, at least on account of the opinion itself, but, if at all, for something else.

τῶν ἡδίστων] Note on § 4, supra.

τῶν ἄπωθεν] The fact that words (substantives, adjectives, adverbs, and pronouns, Διόθεν οὐρανόθεν οἰκόθεν, ἀλλόθεν παντόθεν, ἔντοσθεν ἔξωθεν πρόσωθεν ἔσωθεν, ὅθεν σέθεν ἐμέθεν) with the old genitive termination -θεν, are often substituted for the primitive forms, particularly with the definite article as οἱ αὐτόθεν (see many instances of this idiom in Index to Arnold's Thucyd. s. v.), οἱ ἔξωθεν, οἱ ἄνωθεν, κάτωθεν, οἰκόθεν, ἐκεῖθεν, and such like, in phrases where the termination seems to have entirely lost its force, has been long known and noticed: see examples in Wunder's note, Antig. 519, and Lobeck, Phryn. p. 128: but the explanation of this usage, so far as I know, is still wanting. It is to be found in an observation of Hermann, on Soph. Electr. 888, ἐσχάτης δ᾽ ὁρῷ πυρᾶς νεωρῆ βόστρυχον, and 882, ὁρῶ κολώνης ἐξ ἄκρας νεοῤῥύτους πηγὰς γάλακτος, ‘solent Graeci spatia non a vidente et audiente ad id quod ille videt et audit, sed ab isto ad hunc metiri’: they reverse our order of proceeding; we measure from ourselves to the object, the Greeks from the object to themselves. The application of this simple fact to all the cases resembling those above given solves the whole mystery of the idiom, which, as Lobeck says, olim vel barbatos magistros obstupefecit. (Lobeck is speaking merely of the knowledge of the fact; he himself assigns no reason.) Rhet. I 15. 16, οἱ δ᾽ ἄπωθεν, II 6. 23, τοὺς ἄπωθεν. In Eurip. Ion 585—6 (Dind.) both points of view are taken, οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶδος φαίνεται τῶν πραγμάτων πρόσωθεν ὄντων ἐγγύθεν θ᾽ ὁρωμένων, unless, as is at least equally probable, the interpretation of ἐγγύθεν ὁρωμένων be, ‘seen’ not ‘from a near point’ where we are, but ‘seen’, the sight of them proceeding, from a near point, where they are. Arist. Pol. VII (VI) 4, 1319 a 8, gives an excellent illustration of this difference between the Greek and our point of view: Aristotle is speaking of some restrictions on the occupation of land: ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι κεκτῆσθαι πλείω γῆν μέτρου τινὸς ἢ ἀπὸ τινὸς τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἀστὺ καὶ τὴν πόλιν—or, as we say, ‘within a certain distance from the city’. Plat. Theaet. 165 D, ἐγγύθεν ἐπίστασθαι πόῤῥωθεν δὲ μή (not, as in English, at a distance, but from a distance, as seen from a distance), Rep. VII 523 B, τὰ πόῤῥωθεν φαινόμενα, Ib. C, εἴτ᾽ ἐγγύθεν προσπίπτουσα εἴτε πόῤῥωθεν. Ib. 514 B, εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, φῶς πυρὸς ἄνωθεν καὶ πόῤῥωθεν καόμενον ὄπισθεν αὐτῶν. Soph. Oed. Col. 505, τοὐκεῖθεν ἄλσους, Philoct. 27, δοκῶ γὰρ οἷον εἶπας ἄντρον εἰσορᾶν. Ὀδ. ἄνωθεν, ἢ κατωθεν; οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. Eur. Iph. T. 41, σφάγια δ᾽ ἄλλοισιν ἄῤῥητ̓ ἔσωθεν τῶνδ̓ ἀνακτόρων θεᾶς. Tyrtaeus, Fragm. 8. 38, 9. 12 (Bergk, Fr. Lyr. Gr.), ἐγγύθεν ἱστάμενοι. Examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

As regards ἄπωθεν and ἀπόθεν, the former is condemned as formed on a false analogy from an imaginary ἀπω by Göttling on Ar. Pol. II 1, p. 311.—See Lobeck on Phryn. p. 8—10, who shews that both forms are good. The MSS vary in the prose form, but ἄπωθεν is found in verse (Eurip. and Aristoph.), which guarantees its existence.

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ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων] § 16, τῶν ἡδίστων, note on § 4 supra.

τό τε γὰρ φιλεῖν ἡδύ...οἴνῳ] Friendship or a friend belongs to the class of pleasant things—the term φίλος or φιλεῖν, ‘to be fond of’ anything, implies pleasure; no one is said for instance to be fond of wine who does not take pleasure in it; and the converse, ‘to be liked’ is also pleasant— for here again comes in the ‘impression’ or fancy that the thing liked or loved (φιλεῖν has just the same double sense as the French aimer, the stronger ‘love’, and the feebler ‘liking’) must have some good in (belonging to) it, good in some form or other being the universal object of desire of all sentient beings; i.e. of all creatures that are capable of appetites and affections, which capacity depends on sensation, the power of feeling pleasure and pain, de Anima B 3, 414 b 1—5, line 4, ᾧ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία: τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη. This φαντασία &c. belongs to, and is meant to illustrate, the active liking, τὸ φιλεῖν ἡδύ. Every one who likes anything always has the impression that the object of his liking has something good about it, which is the reason for his liking it, since good is the universal desire. ‘And being liked or loved is to be valued, esteemed, for one's own sake and for nothing else’. This is what may be called the ‘passive’ liking, said of the recipient of the action or liking; and is opposed to the active form of liking or love in this respect; that it is an end or ultimate object in itself, whereas the other looks to some further end beyond itself, namely, some good which it seems to see in the object of its affection. It is probable that little or no distinction is here intended to be made between φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾷν, since it is the end and not the process that is here in question, and they seem to be used pretty nearly as synonyms. They represent two different aspects of love, as a natural affection or emotion, and as an acquired value, which we express by ‘esteem’. See further, in Appendix A at the end of this Book.

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καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι] ‘And admiration is a source of pleasure, due to the very honour or respect (that it carries with it or implies)’. αὐτό the honour itself, alone, and nothing else: notwithstanding that there is no more substantial benefit derived from it (Victorius). τιμή is pleasant, § 16. Flattery is pleasant, because it is accompanied by the φαντασία (which is always capable of conveying pleasure, § 6) the pleasant impression (not reality) of admiration and friendship in the flatterer.

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The frequent repetition of the same acts is pleasant, because they become habitual and familiar; as we were told (ἦν) in c. 10. 18. Probl. XIX 5, ult. ἔτι καὶ τὸ σύνηθες ἡδὺ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀσυνήθους.

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And change is pleasant; by the definition, because change is a relapse into the normal condition of our nature: ‘the constant repetition of the same thing causing a (vicious) excess of the settled state’. It is this vicious excess which is represented in the proverbial μηδὲν ἄγαν, ne quid nimis, ‘toujours perdrix.’ When we have reached a ‘settled state’, as a state of health finally established by a gradual course of medical treatment, the medical applications which were repeatedly employed during the cure should be at once discontinued or the state of body will be vitiated: and so in all cases when a state has reached its acme or normal condition anything that causes it to exceed this is injurious. Eating and drinking too much are other cases in point; when the system is settled or satisfied, the repetition of the acts of eating and drinking disturbs the harmonious balance and produces discomfort or disease. The same expression occurs in Eth. N. VII 13, 1153 a 4, ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, where from the contrast of the two participles the first plainly signifies the state of progress towards satisfaction, and the second the complete or satisfied state; and so the Paraphrast explains it, πληρωθέντες ἡδόμεθα κ.τ.λ.: and similarly ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ ἡλικίᾳ, Thuc. II 36, means, a confirmed and settled, mature and vigorous time of life, when the age of growing is over.

And in general, all excess is vicious; as the Pythagoreans and Plato (Philebus) held, and Aristotle himself proves by induction in the establishment of the doctrine of the mean, in the Nicom. Ethics, II. The concluding words of the seventh book of the Nic. Eth. may serve as a commentary on this topic; μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύτατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά: (i. e. imperfection: we are always wanting a change, because we never are in a ‘complete state’). ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς: οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιεικής. The ‘poet’, referred to here and in the Rhetoric, is Euripides, Orest. 234, ἦ κἀπὶ γαίας ἁρμόσαι πόδας θέλεις χρόνιον ἴχνος θείς; μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ. The ‘changeableness’ of the bad man in the illustration, is deduced, I presume, from the axiom that right is one, error and wrong infinite, ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί: see the whole passage from which this apothegm is taken, Eth. Nic. II 5, ult. 1106 b 29, ἔτι τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς κ.τ.λ.

It is this pleasure which is felt in change that makes men and things pleasant that present themselves to us or happen ‘after an interval’; ‘because they bring a change from our present condition or circumstances, (this is a di-version or a-musement,) and at the same time that which can be used (or enjoyed) only at intervals is rare’: but rarity makes things ‘better’, c. 7, 14, 29, 32, or gives them a preference over others in value and importance—not necessarily however in the amount of pleasure which may be derived from them; though in many cases, such as the possession of any rare object, print, coin, gem, in a collection, it certainly does.

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And learning and wondering are pleasant for the most part; wonder, because in it is contained, manifested, the desire of learning; and therefore the wonderful is an object of desire (every desire is directed to some pleasure, § 5) and consequently pleasant; and learning includes, implies, a settlement into our normal condition’. φύσις here stands for the true and highest nature, the normal perfect state, of anything, see Grant, on Eth. N. II 1. 3, Polit. I 2, 1252 b 32, οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκαστοῦ, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας. This highest condition of our nature is θεωρία, philosophy, the contemplation of truth, which is also the highest form or ideal of happiness, Eth. Nic. X 8 and 9. A state of knowledge, to which learning leads, may therefore be regarded as a settled or complete state, and to be the ‘normal condition of the intellect’, the noblest part of the entire ψυχή. A settlement into this condition must therefore by the definition, § 1, be a form of pleasure.

On wonder, or curiosity, as the origin of learning, of all speculative inquiry or philosophy, compare Plato, Theaet. 155 D, to whom the observation is due, μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν: οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, κ.τ.λ. From Plato it is borrowed by Aristotle, Metaph. A 2, 982 b 12, διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν...ὁ δὲ ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν, Poet. IV 4, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως: ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῶν, and Coleridge again, Aids to Reflection, on spiritual religion, Aph. IX., has thus improved upon Plato and Aristotle, ‘In wonder all philosophy began: in wonder it ends: and admiration fills up the interspace.’ See also Sir W. Hamilton's Lect. on Metaph. Lect. IV. Vol. I. p. 77 seq. Ar. Met. init. πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει, κ.τ.λ. Here (in the Met.) as elsewhere, the pleasure of learning or knowledge is assumed. The reverse of this is the cynical Horatian Nil admirari, &c., followed by Pope, “‘Not to admire is all the art I know, To make men happy and to keep them so.’ Plain truth, dear Murray, needs no flowers of speech, So take it in the very words of Creech.” [Epist. I, 6. 1.]

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The pleasure of conferring and receiving benefits and favours is made to arise, in the case of the reception of good, or good treatment, from the gratification of our desires which this implies, any gratification of a desire being pleasant, § 5; and the other, the pleasure of conferring favours, is due to the gratification of our love of power (Hobbes again, cf. p. 210); the power, namely, evinced in our having (ἔχειν) the means of bestowing them, and of shewing our superiority (ὑπερέχειν) by doing so. Aristotle, neither here nor elsewhere, takes any account of the benevolent affections as elements of human nature.

Similarly τὸ ἄρχειν is said to be ἥδιστον, § 27.

From the pleasure of doing service in general is derived the particular pleasure of ‘setting our neighbours right’ (rectifying, restoring their fallen fortunes or character to its normal or upright state) either in their property, when their affairs have gone wrong; or in their judgment, when they have made a mistake; or in their conduct, when they have deviated (παρεκβαίνειν) from the right path: and also of supplying their deficiencies (as before, pecuniary, intellectual, and moral) and bringing them up to a complete or satisfactory condition. ἐπιτελεῖν is ‘to put the end upon’, (as ἐπιστέφειν, ἐπισφραγίζειν, ἐπιγράφειν, ἐπιχρωματίζειν Plat. Rep. X 601 A, ἐπιτιθέναι, et sim.), hence, to finish, complete, or ‘fill up’.

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The pleasure derived from the ‘imitative arts’ is next traced to the same sources, the pleasures, namely, of learning and wonder. These being assumed, it follows that every work of imitation, as of painting, sculpture, poetry—especially dramatic poetry—(we must either read here with Vater γραφικῇ &c. in the dative, as had occurred to myself, or suppose that the ‘art’ in the three cases is carelessly substituted for the ‘product’ or result of the art); and especially any exact imitation, even when the object imitated is not pleasant in itself; the pleasure lies in the mere imitation, and arises from exercise of the intellect in drawing an inference or ‘conclusion (συλλογισμός) from this to that’; which is a reasoning process, and a kind of learning.

The inference is from the copy to the original, which must have been seen before, if any pleasure is to be derived from the imitation; and the learning arises from the observation of the two and the comparison of them whereby we acquire some knowledge of what the things really are. This explanation is found in Poet. c. 4. 5. I will quote the entire passage from the beginning of the chapter, as a complete commentary on the passage of the Rhetoric, which indeed seems to be directly taken from the other. In the Poetics, as here in the Rhetoric, the love of imitation is ultimately based upon the love of learning; § 4, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου κ.τ.λ. infra. The faculty or power of imitation which attends us from our very birth, σύμφυτον, and the love of imitation which accompanies it, both natural, are the two causes of poetry, §§ 1 2, and also of the other mimetic arts. Ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινές, καὶ αὗται φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστί, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. σημεῖον δὲ τοῦτο τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων: ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων (the lowest and most degraded) καὶ νεκρῶν. (§ 4) αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως: ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος, ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ προεωρακὼς οὐ διὰ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν (the execution, elaboration, finish, Plat. Rep. VI 504 D) ἢ τὴν χροιὰν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν. In the first three chapters of this treatise it is assumed that all the fine arts, painting, sculpture, music, and poetry in all its branches—architecture, except so far as the sculpture employed in decoration is concerned, does not appear in the list—are imitative, and derived from the love of imitation and the power of imitation characteristic of humanity; and it is upon the various modes of imitation that the division of the fine arts is founded.

In the same way the pleasure which we derive from metaphors consists in tracing the resemblance—a process of learning, μάθησίς τις— between the word ‘transferred’ and the thing it, sometimes remotely, resembles; so that here again the natural pleasure which attends all acquisition of knowledge, τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥᾳδίως ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσίν ἐστι, is assumed as the foundation of the love of imitation. Rhet. III 10. 2. Comp. III 8. 2, ἀηδὲς γὰρ καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἄπειρον. III 9. 2, 11. 9. And in Probl. XIX 5, the same principle is applied to music: διὰ τί ἥδιον ἀκούουσιν ᾀδόντων ὅσα ἂν προεπιστάμενοι τυγχάνωσι τῶν μελῶν ἢ ὧν μὴ ἐπίστανται;...... ἢ ὅτι ἡδὺ τὸ μανθάνειν; τούτου δὲ αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ μὲν λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τὸ δὲ χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίζειν ἐστίν.

Twining in his note on Poet. IV 4 (note 22, p. 186 seq.) in describing and illustrating this doctrine of Aristotle, remarks that ‘he does not see how any information can be said to be acquired by the spectator’ (or listener) from the mere identification of two objects, the inference that ‘this is that’. And this remark is true if this were all that Aristotle means by his doctrine. The mere identification of an object compared with one already known conveys no new knowledge, which is essential to the notion of learning. But what seems to be Aristotle's real meaning is (as I have expressed it above) that by the comparison of the representation with the original, whether it be a picture, or a trait of character in a tragedy, or a metaphor, you learn something new in this respect; that the representation, in proportion to its accuracy and finish (the number of details introduced), enables you to discover or observe by the comparison something new in the object which you had never observed before: and this is the ‘inference’ from the resemblance, which the συλλογισμός, here and in the Poetics, is intended to express. On the love of imitation, and the pleasure derived from the imitation of objects in themselves disagreeable, Schrader quotes de Part. Anim. I 5, b 45, a 5. [καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἄτοπον εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἷον τὴν γραφικὴν ἢ τὴν πλαστικήν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῷμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοί γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμοτέρων ζῴων ἐπίσκεψιν.]

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From the love of wonder arises the pleasure that we derive from (tragic) ‘catastrophes’ and ‘narrow escapes from danger’, which are all objects of wonder. Poet. XI init. ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή,...καὶ τοῦτο δὲ...κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον. The term περιπέτεια therefore expresses merely the ‘sudden change or revolution of fortune’ of the actors in the drama; the later appellation καταστροφή (Polybius) conveys the same notion of ‘revolution’ (στροφή), with the additional annotation of a ‘downward’ tendency (κατά) or downfall, to degradation or ruin.

παρὰ μικρόν] The preposition, which in this and similar phrases, παρὰ βραχύ, παρ᾽ ὀλίγον, παῤ οὐδὲν (ἄγειν, τίθεσθαι, ἡγεῖσθαι), is usually translated in English by ‘within’, ‘within a little of’, ‘within an ace or an inch of’, in reality implies comparison; two things when set ‘side by side’ being more easily compared together. (Rhet. II 23. 30, παρ᾽ ἄλληλα φανερὰ... μᾶλλον, III 2. 9, διὰ τὸ παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι, Ib. 9. 8, 11. 9, 17. 3.) The comparison in these phrases is expressed in terms of quantity, ‘about as much as, amounting to˙’; and so παρὰ μικρόν becomes ‘nearly about, closely approaching to, or within a little of’. A few instances of a very common idiom are given in Jelf's Gr. Gr. § 637 on παρά, Vol. II, p. 301, [Kuhner's Ausführliche Grammatik, § 440, Vol. II, p. 445] and Matth. Gr. Gr. 588 a, who does not properly explain it. Victorius quotes from Phys. B 5, 8, 197 a 27, a sentence which conveys a sort of explanation of παρὰ μικρόν: διὸ καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν μέγα λαβεῖν ἢ δυστυχεῖν ἢ εὐτυχεῖν ἐστίν, ὅτι ὡς ὑπάρχον λέγει ἡ διάνοια: τὸ γὰρ παρὰ μικρὸν ὥσπερ οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν δοκεῖ.

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καὶ...τὰ συγγενῆ δέ] Note on I 1. 11, p. 20. συγγενῆ are things that belong to the same γένος or family, congeners of all kinds, ‘all things akin to and resembling one another’: the συγγενῆ, besides the examples given directly, man, horse, youth, are also indirectly illustrated by the things mentioned in the proverbs: they are ‘class fellows’, any thing of the same kind with another. All that is natural is pleasurable—by the definition—things belonging to the same class have a natural connexion, (‘κατὰ φύσιν inter se esse dicit quod eiusdem naturae participes sint,’ Vict.) —therefore all συγγενῆ are ἡδέα; but only ‘for the most part’, not always: for sometimes ‘a man's greatest foes are those of his own household’, and ‘two of a trade can never agree’; κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, Hes. Op. et D. 25. The two sides are given, Eth. Nic. VIII 2 init.

ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει] Crabbed age and youth cannot live together. Hence ἡλικιώτης is ‘a companion and friend’, as Arist. Nub. 1006. The Schol. on Plat. Phaedrus 240 C, ἥλικα γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τὸν ἥλικα, gives the remainder of the line, ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπε, γέρων δέ τε τέρπε γέροντα. The proverb occurs again in Plato, Gorg. 510 B, Symp. 195 B, Lys. 214 A, and is alluded to Rep. I 329 A, πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθά τινες εἰς ταὐτὸ παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες, διασώζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν. Eth. Nic. VIII 14, 1161 b 35, μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν...τὸ καθ᾽ ἡλικίαν: ἧλιξ γὰρ ἥλικα, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι. Eth. Eudem. VII 2, 1238 a 34, where another of these proverbs of association is quoted from Eur. Belleroph. Fr. VIII (Dind.) κακῷ κακός τε συντέτηκεν ἡδοναῖς. Cic. de Senect. c. 3. Ast and Stallbaum's notes, ad ll. cc.

ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον] ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον, Hom. Od. ρ́ (XVII) 218. Eth. N. VIII 2, init. IX 3, 1165 b 17, Eth. Eud. VII 1, 1235 a 7, Magn. Mor. II 11, 1208 b 10, Theophrastus περὶ φιλοπονηρίας, ult. καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ τῆς παροιμίας, τὸ ὁμοῖον πρὸς τὸ ὁμοῖον πορεύεσθαι.

ἔγνω δὲ θῆρ θῆρα] Eth. Eud. u. s., ἔγνω δὲ φώρ τε φῶρα καὶ λύκος λύκον.

κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν] Birds of a feather flock together. Eth. Eud., u. s., καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν. Magn. Mor. II 11, 1208 b 9, καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιὸν ἱζάνει (‘perch together’), Eth. N. VIII 2, u. s. Theocr. Id. IX 31, τέττιξ μὲν τέττιγι φίλος, μύρμακι δὲ μύρμαξ, ἵρηκες δ᾽ ἵρηξιν. Epicharmus, apud Diog. Laert. III 1. 16 (quoted by Gaisford), καὶ γὰρ ἁ κύων κυνὶ κάλλιστον εἶμεν φαίνεται, καὶ βοῦς βοΐ, ὄνος δ᾽ ὄνῳ κάλλιστόν (ἐστιν Gaisford; Mullach, Fragm. Phil. Gr. p. 142; ὗς δὲ θὴν ὑΐ, Cobet, Diog. L.), ὗς δ᾽ ὑΐ. Three of these proverbs are illustrated by Erasmus, Adagia, pp. 1642—44.

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Next from the principle of the ‘fondness of like for like’ is deduced the universality of ‘self-love’. τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἡδὺ ἑαυτῷ stands for τὰ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ ἡδέα ἀλλήλοις ἅπαντα; ‘since all things that are like and akin (closely related) are agreeable to one another, and a man stands in the highest degree in this relation to himself, (τοῦτο πέπονθεν, ‘suffers this’, has this affection, i. e. relation to...) all men must be more or less fond of self (self-lovers); because all such relations (ὁμοιότης and συγγένεια) belong to him (ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ), most of all to himself’; i. e. he stands in these relations more nearly to himself than to any thing or any body else. In the discussion of τὸ φίλαυτον, the subject of Eth. Nic. IX 8, two kinds of self-love are distinguished; the one low and vulgar, characteristic of the πολλοί, which consists in τὸ ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμειν τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς...τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται...οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς—διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος, 1168 b 16, seq.; and it has therefore got a ‘bad name’: but τὸ φίλαυτον in its true sense, when this desire of superiority over others, and consequent preference of self—this grasping spirit. πλεονεξία, in a good sense—manifests itself in a desire to excel them in honour and virtue, then becomes praiseworthy and right. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ καθάπερ εἴρηται: ὡς δ᾽ οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή, 1169 a 35. Comp. Pol. II 5, 1263 b 2, τὸ δὲ φίλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως: οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσί γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. So we say ‘fond of money’ or anything else, meaning ‘over-fond’ of it. The natural fondness is in all cases to be distinguished from the vicious over-fondness.

This love of self will naturally be extended to all that immediately belongs to, or is closely connected with, oneself, τὰ αὑτῶν, as our ‘words’ and ‘works’. λόγοι all that we ‘say’—and, as we should now add in this our ‘reading age’, ‘read and write’—all our talk, studies, habits of thought, theories, arguments and such like, everything in which intellect is expressed; and ἔργα, all that we do, or produce, all our actions and works; in which latter is included the propagation of children, αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργα τὰ τέκνα. Comp. Plat. Rep. 1 330 C, ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι ταύτῃ τε δὲ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. This natural fondness for our own ‘works’ is assigned in Eth. Nic. IX 7 as the reason why benefactors usually feel more affection for those on whom they have conferred their favours than these are inclined to return. The compensation principle, the debtor and creditor account between the two parties, belongs to justice, and has nothing to do with this natural affection, φιλία. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας, 1167 b 29: and then follows the true explanation, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν: πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου. μάλιστα δ᾽ ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει: ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα.

It is this love which men feel for what is specially their own in word or work that is the foundation of their liking for flattery, for the love of others, and for honour, the external tokens of respect—all of which are recognitions of their merit in word or deed in some shape or other, and evidence of respect, admiration, and regard; from the flatterer a mere pretence, with the others a reality. It is also the explanation of the parental affection, children being in a special and peculiar sense a man's own work.

And this accounts also for the pleasure which we find in supplying a defect, or bringing anything to a state of perfection (see on § 22), ‘because now (by this time, not before, ἤδη) the work becomes our own’: the perfection of it is due to ourselves, and we get the credit of the whole. Victorius remarks upon this, that the difference between this form of pleasure and that which is expressed in the same words in § 22, lies in the difference of the source of the pleasure and the motive of the action in either case. In the former the motive is benevolent, and the pleasure is that of doing good to others; here the motive is selfish, and the pleasure that of gratifying oneself.

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ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἥδιστον] ‘ut res plana certaque ponitur’. Victorius. However, it may most readily be deduced from the innate love of power, already indicated in §§ 14, 22, q. v. To this natural impulse or emotion is traced the pleasure that is derived from ‘wisdom’, or the reputation of it—this is not the same as the pleasure of learning or acquiring knowledge, but that of possessing and exercising it, or the influence which the reputation of it carries with it—Now ‘wisdom’ may be understood in two senses; ‘practical wisdom’, φρόνησις, τὸ φρονεῖν, which is pleasant to possess and exercise because it implies power, in the shape of influence over the actions of others; and ‘speculative wisdom’, σοφία, which gratifies our love of wonder, § 21, because it brings with it the knowledge of all sorts of things that are interesting and curious (and therefore objects of wonder). One would have supposed that the love of taxing, censuring, or finding fault with our neighbours and friends, ἐπιτιμᾷν, is directly traceable to the pleasure of exercising power so frequently noticed before. Here however an intermediate step is introduced between the feeling and its real origin. This is the love of honour. Censuring and finding fault implies an advantageous contrast between ourselves and those whom we thus ‘tax’, a superiority in judgment or virtue, which gives us the right to find fault; and the honour we all love is reflected upon ourselves by the contrast. But the pleasure lies ultimately not in the honour itself, but in the superiority that respect and the outward signs of it indicate.

MS A^{c} here adds καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν after ἡδὺ εἶναι, adopted by Spengel. It would mean of course the general exercise of authority, an extension of the special ἐπιτιμᾷν, and analogous to it, as manifested in various modes of punishment or correction by word and deed. And herein would lie the distinction. The private citizen can only find fault (viz. with his tongue); the ruler can inflict actual penalties, personal or pecuniary.

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There is pleasure again in ‘dwelling upon’, lingering in (passing one's time in, διατρίβειν) any pursuit or occupation in which one is ‘at one's very best’. διατρίβειν is by a similar metaphor applied to dwelling on, brooding over, nursing, the prospect of vengeance, II 2. 2. This same topic is also applied to ‘good’, I 6. 29; the difference being in the ‘ends’ or motives severally proposed, which stimulate the action in each; in the one it is success, a form of good; in the other, pleasure; the skill or degree of excellence shewn in the exercise of any faculty, bodily or mental, is the same in both. To dwell on that in which our superiority is shewn is of course pleasant, by the preceding rule. Problem XVIII 6, quoted by Gaisford, raises the question suggested by this topic. The solution which corresponds to the explanation here given, is the second: ἢ ὅτι ἐν οἷς οἴεται ἕκαστος κρατιστεύειν ταῦτα προαιρεῖται, ὃ δὲ αἱρεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐπείξεται (here follows the quotation from Euripides; and it is added,) ὅτι δ᾽ ἄν τινες ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἕλωνται, κἀν οἷς ἂν συνεθισθῶσιν, οὐδὲ κρίνειν δύνανται τὰ βελτίω: διέφθαρται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια διὰ φαύλας προαιρέσεις: that is, men in these cases choose a lower kind of pursuit instead of a higher, in consequence of a depravation of judgment arising from the familiarity created by constant exercise of those practices in which their special skill lies.

αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ βέλτιστος] Matth. Gr. Gr. § 460. The superlative in these phrases seems to be substituted for the comparative, and to belong to the rather large family of misuses of the former, which are found in our own language no less than in the Greek.

This fragment of Euripides' Antiope (Fr. XX Dind., XXVII Wagner) is quoted also in Plato's Gorgias 484 E, &c., with one or two trifling variations. The second line there runs thus, νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος; which, with αὐτῷ instead of τούτῳ, is also the reading of the Problem. The third line is quoted in Alcib. II 146 A, with κράτιστος. In the Problem also, κράτιστος stands for βέλτιστος. In the two following pages of the Gorgias a good deal more of the same passage has been incorporated in Callicles' speech as prose. Of the attempted restorations of this I have given an account in Note A, Appendix to Translation of Gorgias, p. 134. [On p. 64 the lines here quoted are translated as follows: ‘Each shines in that, to that end presses forward, Devotes to that the better part o' the day, Wherein he chances to surpass himself.’]

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τῶν ἡδέων] Note on I 11. 4.—ἄνεσις, ‘relaxation’, metaphor from unscrewing and thereby relaxing the strings of the lyre, and so lowering the tone; and ἐπίτασις the opposite: ἐπιτείνειν and ἀνιέναι are hence extended to denote ‘intensification’ and ‘relaxation’ in general. See note on I 4. 12. The undue propensity of people in general to the enjoyment of ‘the ridiculous’ is noticed in Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 13 (on εὐτραπελία the mean in the use of the γελοἶον), ἐπιπολάζοντας δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῄ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. The discussion of τὸ γελοῖον here referred to as existing in the Poetics, and again in Rhet. III 18. 7, where we are told that the ‘kinds’ of it are enumerated, cannot possibly mean the passage which we actually find there in c. 5. 2, which is a mere definition. The subject was probably treated in the second book of the two of which the Poetics originally consisted³; and most likely formed part of the treatise on Comedy, which the author promises at the commencement of the sixth chapter of the extant work. Such are the opinions of Heitz, the latest writer on the question; Verlorene Schriften Arist. pp. 87—103.

On the ‘ludicrous’, see Cicero de Orat. II 58 seq. de ridiculo; Quint. Inst. Orat. VI 3. Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας in the chapter—περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι χαρίτων, ap. Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 298 seq. Bain, On the Emotions and Will, pp. 282—285; and Herbert Spencer, Essays &c., 2nd Series, Essay III, The Physiology of Laughter.

εἰρήσθω] This is the first instance in the Rhetoric of the use of this most familiar Aristotelian form of expression (a verb in the third person of the imperative passive), which in some of his works occurs sometimes at the end of nearly every chapter. It expresses the completeness and sufficiency of any action or process, that a thing has been completely gone through and finished, and that that is sufficient, and no more need be said or done about it. Thus εἰρήσθω, ‘let so much have been said upon the subject’, means, let it suffice to have said so much, let this be considered sufficient, and the subject closed; and let us now ‘have done with it’, and go on to something else. It is not peculiar to Aristotle, though very much more common in him than in other writers. It occurs for instance in Xenophon, Mem. IV 2. 19, ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω μοι, ‘be satisfied with my saying so much’, let it suffice to have said so much: Plato, Phileb. 57 C, εἰρήσθω, ‘let it be said once for all’, and no more about it. Ib. 62 E, μεθείσθων, and Stallbaum's note on Phaedr. 278 B, πεπαίσθω, ‘enough of this joking’, Ib. 250 C, κεχαρίσθω, Theaet. 197 D, πεποιήσθω, Euthyd. 278 D, πεπαίσθω ὑμῖν, Rep. VIII 553 A, 562 A, IX 588 D, πεπλάσθω. Thucyd. I 71, ὡρίσθω, ‘let this definition suffice’. Ar. Eth. Nic. I 1 ult. πεφροιμιάσθω, ‘let so much suffice by way of preface’; Top. A 8, 103 b 1, and 13, 105 a 21, διωρίσθω: et passim.

This notion of a completed, perfected, concluded, fixed and permanent, and sufficient action, belongs to the perfect tense in general, and appears, not only in the imperative of the passive, but also in the indicative, perfect and future (the paulo post futurum, on which see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 498). Of the indicative, instances are, Soph. Trach. 586, μεμηχάνηται τοὔργον, Philoct. 1280, πέπαυμαι, Eur. Hippol. 1457, κεκαρτέρηται τἀμά, my powers of endurance are exhausted, the play is played out, all my endurance and sufferings are over, and this is the end: compare πεπόνθασι γάρ, Rhet. II 8. 2; Aesch. Eum. 680, and Aesch. S. c. T. 1050, διατετίμηται (Paley's notes on both passages). Fragm. Phryx (Fr. Aesch. 263), διαπεφρούρηται βίος. Eur. Orest. 1203, and Phoen. 1019, εἴρηται λόγος. Plat. Phileb. 62 D, μεθεῖνται. Ar. Rhet. I 14 ult. II 5 ult. καὶ περὶ μὲν φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλέων εἴρηται, ‘so much for’, where the perf. ind. pass. in summing up at the end of the chapter, plainly differs only in form from the ordinary imperative. Troia fuit. Fuit Ilium.

Of the paulo post futurum a good instance occurs Theaet. 180 A, in the humorous description of the Heraclitean philosophers, ‘and if you look for an explanation of the meaning of the meaning of this, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξει καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ, you will be instantly shot with (lit. another phraselet, ῥηματίῳ) another brand new word coined for the occasion’, i. e. you will have been shot already, as it were; almost before you know where you are.

The observation on this use of the tense in Jelf's Gr. Gr. § 399, obs. 1, is quite inadequate, and not quite correct: Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 500, p. 841, is somewhat more satisfactory.