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We ought in the next place to consider and treat of
[p. 298]
mutual relation and affection; that is, what reference and
respect Fate has to divine Providence, what to Fortune,
what also to ‘that which is in our power,’ what to contingent and other such like things; and furthermore we are
to determine, how far and in what it is true or false that
all things happen and are done by and according to Fate.
For if the meaning is, that all things are comprehended
and contained in Fate, it must be granted that this proposition is true; and if any would farther have it so understood, that all things which are done amongst men, on
earth, and in heaven are placed in Fate, let this also pass
as granted for the present. But if (as the expression seems
rather to imply) the ‘being done according to Fate’ signifies not all things, but only that which is an immediate
consequent of Fate, then it must not be said that all things
happen and are done by and according to Fate, though all
things are so according to Fate as to be comprised in it.
For all things that the law comprehends and of which it
speaks are not legal or according to law; for it comprehends treason, it treats of the cowardly running away from
one's colors in time of battle, of adultery, and many other
such like things, of which it cannot be said that any one
of them is lawful. Neither indeed can I affirm of the performing a valorous act in war, the killing of a tyrant, or
the doing any other virtuous deed, that it is legal; because that only is proper to be called legal, which is commanded by the law. Now if the law commands these
things, how can they avoid being rebels against the law
and transgressors of it, who neither perform valiant feats
of arms, kill tyrants, nor do any other such remarkable
acts of virtue? And if they are transgressors of the law,
why is it not just they should be punished? But if this
is not reasonable, it must then be also confessed that these
things are not legal or according to law; but that legal
and according to law is only that which is particularly prescribed
[p. 299]
and expressly commanded by the law, in any action
whatsoever. In like manner, those things only are fatal
and according to Fate, which are the consequences of
causes preceding in the divine disposition. So that Fate
indeed comprehends all things which are done; yet many
of those things that are comprehended in it, and almost all
that precede, should not (to speak properly) be pronounced
to be fatal or according to Fate.
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by. William W. Goodwin, PH. D. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. Cambridge. Press Of John Wilson and son. 1874. 5.
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