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It now remains, that we treat of Fortune and casual
adventure, and whatever else is to be considered with them.
It is therefore certain that Fortune is a cause. Now of
causes, some are causes by themselves, and others by accident. Thus for example, the proper cause by itself of an
house or a ship is the art of the mason, the carpenter, or
the shipwright; but causes by accident are music, geometry, and whatever else may happen to be joined with the
art of building houses or ships, in respect either of the
body, the soul, or any exterior thing. Whence it appears,
that the cause by itself must needs be determinate and
one; but the causes by accident are never one and the
same, but infinite and undetermined. For many—nay, infinite—accidents, wholly different one from the other, may
be in one and the same subject. Now the cause by accident, when it is found in a thing which not merely is done
[p. 302]
for some end but has in it free will and election, is then
called Fortune; as is the finding a treasure while one is
digging a hole to plant a tree, or the doing or suffering
some extraordinary thing whilst one is flying, following, or
otherwise walking, or only turning about, provided it be
not for the sake of that which happens, but for some other
intention. Hence it is, that some of the ancients have declared Fortune to be a cause unknown, that cannot be foreseen by the human reason. But according to the Platonics,
who have approached yet nearer to the true reason of it,
it is thus defined: Fortune is a cause by accident, in those
things which are done for some end, and which are of our
election. And afterwards they add, that it is unforeseen
and unknown to the human reason; although that which
is rare and strange appears also by the same means to be
in this kind of cause by accident. But what this is, if it
is not sufficiently evidenced by the oppositions and disputations made against it, will at least most clearly be seen
by what is written in Plato's Phaedo, where you will find
these words:
PHAED. Have you not heard how and in what manner the judgment passed? ECH. Yes indeed; for there
came one and told us of it. At which we wondered very
much that, the judgment having been given long before,
it seems that he died a great while after. And what,
Phaedo, might be the cause of it? PHAED. It was a fortune which happened to him, Echecrates. For it chanced
that, the day before the judgment, the stern of the galley
which the Athenians send every year to the isle of Delos
was crowned.1
In which discourse it is to be observed, that the expression happened to him is not simply to be understood by
was done or came to pass, but it much rather regards
what befell him through the concurrence of many causes
[p. 303]
together, one being done with regard to another. For the
priest crowned the ship and adorned it with garlands for
another end and intention, and not for the sake of Socrates; and the judges also had for some other cause condemned him. But the event was strange, and of such a
nature that it might seem to have been effected by the
providence of some human creature, or rather of some
superior powers. And so much may suffice to show with
what Fortune must of necessity subsist, and that there must
be first some subject of such things as are in our free
will: its effect is, moreover, like itself called Fortune.
But chance or casual adventure is of a larger extent
than Fortune; which it comprehends, and also several
other things which may of their own nature happen sometimes one way, sometimes another. And this, as it appears by the derivation of its name, which is in Greek
αὐτόματον, chance, is that which happens of itself, when that
which is ordinary happens not, but another thing in its
place; such as cold in the dog-days seems to be; for it
is sometimes then cold. ... Once for all, as ‘that which
is in our power’ is a part of the contingent, so Fortune is
a part of chance or casual adventure; and both the two
events are conjoined and dependent on the one and the
other, to wit, chance on contingent, and Fortune on ‘that
which is in our power,’—and yet not on all, but on what
is in our election, as we have already said. Wherefore
chance is common to things inanimate, as well as to those
which are animated; whereas Fortune is proper to man
only, who has his actions voluntary. And an argument of
this is, that to be fortunate and to be happy are thought
to be one and the same thing. Now happiness is a certain well-doing, and well-doing is proper only to man, and
to him perfect.
1 Plato, Phaedo, p. 58 A.
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