This text is part of:
Search the Perseus Catalog for:
The supreme therefore and first Providence is the
understanding or (if you had rather) the will of the first
and sovereign God, doing good to every thing that is in
the world, by which all divine things have universally and
throughout been most excellently and most wisely ordained and disposed. The second Providence is that of
the second Gods, who go through the heaven, by which
temporal and mortal things are orderly and regularly generated, and which pertains to the continuation and preservation of every kind. The third may probably be called
the Providence and procuration of the Daemons, which, being placed on the earth, are the guardians and overseers
of human actions. This threefold Providence therefore
being seen, of which the first and supreme is chiefly and
principally so named, we shall not be afraid to say, although we may in this seem to contradict the sentiments
of some philosophers, that all things are done by Fate and
by Providence, but not also by Nature. But some are done
according to Providence,—these according to one, those
according to another,—and some according to Fate; and
Fate is altogether according to Providence, while Providence
is in no wise according to Fate. But let this discourse be
understood of the first and supreme Providence. Now
that which is done according to another, whatever it is,
is always posterior to that according to which it is done;
as that which is according to the law is after the law, and
that which is according to Nature is after Nature, so that
which is according to Fate is after Fate, and must consequently be more new and modern. Wherefore supreme
[p. 305]
Providence is the most ancient of all things, except him
whose will or understanding it is, to wit, the sovereign author, maker, and father of all things. ‘Let us
therefore,’ says Timaeus, ‘discourse for what cause the
Creator made and framed this machine of the universe.
He was good, and in him that is good there can never be
imprinted or engendered any envy against any thing. Being therefore wholly free from this, he desired that all
things should, as far as it is possible, resemble himself.
He therefore, who admits this to have been chiefly the
principal original of the generation and creation of the
world, as it has been delivered to us by wise men, receives
that which is most right. For God, who desired that all
things should be good, and nothing, as far as possibly might
be, evil, taking thus all that was visible,—restless as it was,
and moving rashly and confusedly,—reduced it from disorder to order, esteeming the one to be altogether better than
the other. For it neither was nor is convenient for him
who is in all perfection good, to make any thing that
should not be very excellent and beautiful.’
1 This, therefore, and all that follows, even to his disputation concerning human souls, is to be understood of the first Providence,
which in the beginning constituted all things. Afterwards
he speaks thus: ‘Having framed the universe, he ordained souls equal in number to the stars, and distributed
to each of them one; and having set them, as it were, in
a chariot, showed the nature of the universe, and appointed
them the laws of Fate.’
2 Who then will not believe, that
by these words he expressly and manifestly declares Fate
to be, as it were, a foundation and political constitution of
laws, fitted for the souls of men? Of which he afterwards renders the cause.
As for the second Providence, he thus in a manner explains it, saying: ‘Having prescribed them all these laws,
[p. 306]
to the end that, if there should afterwards happen any
fault, he might be exempt from being the cause of any of
their evil, he dispersed some of them upon the earth, some
into the moon, and some into the other instruments of
time. And after this dispersion, he gave in charge to the
young Gods the making of human bodies, and the making
up and adding whatever was wanting and deficient in
human souls; and after they had perfected whatever is
adherent and consequent to this, they should rule and
govern, in the best manner they possibly could, this mortal
creature, so far as it should not be the cause of its own
evils.’
3 For by these words, ‘that he might be exempt
from being the cause of any of their evil,’ he most clearly
signifies the cause of Fate; and the order and office of
the young Gods manifests the second Providence; and it
seems also in some sort to have touched a little upon the
third, if he therefore established laws and ordinances that
he might be exempt from being the cause of any of their
evil. For God, who is free from all evil, has no need of
laws or Fate; but every one of these petty Gods, drawn
on by the providence of him who has engendered them,
performs what belongs to his office. Now that this is true
and agreeable to the opinion of Plato, these words of the
lawgiver, spoken by him in his Book of Laws, seems to
me to give sufficient testimony: ‘If there were any man
so sufficient by Nature, being by divine Fortune happily
engendered and born, that he could comprehend this, he
would have no need of laws to command him. For there
is not any law or ordinance more worthy and powerful
than knowledge; nor is it fitting that Mind, provided it
be truly and really free by Nature, should be a subject or
slave to any one, but it ought to command all.’
4
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by. William W. Goodwin, PH. D. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. Cambridge. Press Of John Wilson and son. 1874. 5.
The National Endowment for the Humanities provided support for entering this text.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.