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8. The second class of proofs are wholly the
work of art and consist of matters specially adapted
to produce belief. They are, however, as a rule almost
entirely neglected or only very lightly touched on
by those who, avoiding arguments as rugged and
repulsive things, confine themselves to pleasanter
regions and, like those who, as poets tell, were bewitched by tasting a magic herb in the land of the
Lotus-eaters or by the song of the Sirens into preferring pleasure to safety, follow the empty semblance
of renown and are robbed of that victory which is the
aim of eloquence.
[2]
And yet those other forms of
eloquence, which have a more continuous sweep and
flow, are employed with a view to assisting and
embellishing the arguments and produce the appearance of super inducing a body upon the sinews, on
which the whole case rests; thus if it is asserted
[p. 193]
that some act has been committed under the influence of anger, fear or desire, we may expatiate
at some length on the nature of each of these
passions. It is by these same methods that we
praise, accuse, exaggerate, attenuate, describe, deter,
complain, console or exhort.
[3]
But such rhetorical
devices may be employed in connexion with matters
about which there is no doubt or at least which we
speak of as admitted facts. Nor would I deny that
there is some advantage to be gained by pleasing
our audience and a great deal by stirring their
emotions. Still, all these devices are more effective,
when the judge thanks he has gained a full knowledge
of the facts of the case, which we can only give him
by argument and by the employment of every other
known means of proof.
[4]
Before, however, I proceed to classify the various
species of artificial proof, I must point out that there
are certain features common to all kinds of proof.
For there is no question which is not concerned
either with things or persons, nor can there be any
ground for argument save in connexion with matters
concerning things or persons, which may be considered
either by themselves or with reference to something
else;
[5]
while there can be no proof except such as is
derived from things consequent or things opposite,
which must be sought for either in the time preceding, contemporaneous with or subsequent to the
alleged fact, nor can any single thing be proved save
by reference to something else which must be
greater, less than or equal to it.
[6]
As regards arguments, they may be found either in the questions
raised by the case, which may be considered by themselves quite apart from any connexion with individual
[p. 195]
things or persons, or in the case itself, when anything is discovered in it which cannot be arrived at
by the light of common reason, but is peculiar to the
subject on which judgment has to be given. Further,
all proofs fall into three classes, necessary, credible,
and not impossible.
[7]
Again there are four forms of
proof. First, we may argue that, because one thing
is, another thing is not; as It is day and therefore not
night. Secondly, we may argue that, because one
thing is, another thing is; as The sun is risen, thereit is day. Thirdly, it may be argued that because one
thing is not, another thing is; as It is not night, therefore it is day. Finally, it may be argued that, because
one thing is not, another thing is not; as He is not a
reasoning being, therefore he is not a man. These
general remarks will suffice by way of introduction
and I will now proceed to details.
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