13. Refitation may be understood in two senses.
For the duty of the defence consists wholly in
refutation, while whatever is said by our opponents
must be rebutted, whether we are speaking for the
defence or the prosecution. It is in this sense that
refutation is assigned the fourth place
1 in pleadings,
but the methods required in either case are identical.
For the principles of argument in refutation can
only be drawn from the same sources as those used
in proof, while topics and thoughts, words and figures
will all be on the same lines.
[
2]
As a rule no strong
appeal to the emotions is made in refutation.
It is not, however, without reason that, as Cicero
so often testifies,
2 the task of defence has always been
considered harder than that of prosecution. In the
first place accusation is a simpler task: for the charge
is put forward in one definite form, but its refutation
may take a number of different forms, since as a rule
it is sufficient for the accuser that his charge should
be true, whereas counsel for the defence may deny
[p. 313]
or justify the facts, raise the question of competence,
3
make excuses, plead for mercy, soften, extenuate,
or divert the charge, express contempt or derision.
The task of the accuser is consequently straightforward and, if I may use the phrase, vociferous; but
the defence requires a thousand arts and stratagems.
[
3]
Moreover the prosecutor generally produces a speech
which he has prepared at home, while the counsel
for the defence has frequently to deal with quite
unexpected points. The prosecutor brings forward
his witnesses, while counsel for the defence has to
refute the charge by arguments drawn from the case
itself. The prosecutor draws his material from the
odium excited by the charges, even though it have
no justification, denouncing parricide, sacrilege, or
treason, whereas counsel for the defence can only
deny them. Consequently quite moderate speakers
have proved adequate in prosecution, while no one
can be a good counsel for the defence unless he
possesses real eloquence. In a word, it is just so
much easier to accuse than to defend as it is easier
to inflict than to heal a wound.
[
4]
The nature of the arguments put forward by our
opponent and the manner in which he produces them
will, however, make an enormous difference to our
task. We must therefore first consider what it is to
which we have to reply, whether it is part and parcel
of the actual case or has been introduced from circumstances lying outside the case. For in the former
case we must deny or justify the facts or raise the
question of competence: for these are practically
the sole methods of defence available in the courts.
Pleas for mercy,
4
[
5]
which are not in any sense a
method of actual defence, can rarely be used, and
[p. 315]
only before judges who are not limited to some
precise form of verdict.
5 Even those speeches delivered before Gaius Caesar
6 and the triumvirs on
behalf of members of the opposite party, although
they do employ such pleas for mercy, also make use
of the ordinary methods of defence. For I think
you will agree with me that the following passage
contains arguments of a strongly defensive character
7: “What was our object, Tubero, save that
we might have the power that Caesar has now”
But if,
[
6]
when pleading before the emperor or any
other person who has power either to acquit or condemn, it is incumbent on us to urge that, while our
client has committed an offence that deserves the
death penalty, it is still the duty of a merciful judge
to spare him despite his sins, it must be noted in
the first place that we have to deal, not with our
adversary, but with the judge, and secondly that we
shall have to employ the deliberative rather than the
forensic style. For we shall urge the judge to fix
his desire rather on the glory that is won by
clemency than on the pleasure that is given by
vengeance.
[
7]
On the other hand, when we are
pleading before judges who have to give their
verdict in accordance with the prescriptions of law,
it would be absurd to give them advice as to how
they should deal with a criminal who admits his
guilt. Consequently, when it is impossible either to
deny the facts or to raise the question of competence, we must attempt to justify the facts as
best we can, or else throw up the case. I have
pointed out that there are two ways in which a fact
can be denied: it can be denied absolutely, or it
may be denied that a fact is of the nature alleged.
[p. 317]
When it is impossible to plead justification or to
raise the question of competence,
8 we must deny the
facts, and that not merely when a definition of the
facts will serve our case, but even when nothing
except an absolute denial is left for us.
[
8]
If witnesses are produced, there is much that may be said
to discredit them; if a document is put forward,
we may hold forth on the similarity of the handwritings. In any case there can be no worse course
than confession of guilt. When denial and justification are both impossible, we must as a last resort
base our defence on the legal point of competence.
[
9]
Still, there are some cases in which none of these
three courses is possible. “She is accused of adultery on the ground that after a widowhood of twelve
months she was delivered of a child.” In this case
there is no ground for dispute. Consequently I regard as the height of folly the advice that is given
in such cases, that what cannot be defended should
be ignored and passed over in silence, at any rate if
the point in question is that on which the judge has
to give his decision.
[
10]
On the other hand, if the
allegation is irrelevant to the actual case and no
more than accessory, I should prefer simply to state
that it has nothing to do with the question at issue,
that it is not worth our attention, and that it has not
the importance given to it by our opponent, though
in such a case I should be prepared to pardon a
policy of ignoring the charge such as I have just
mentioned. For a good advocate ought not to be
afraid of incurring a trivial censure for negligence,
if such apparent negligence is likely to save his
client.
[
11]
We must further consider whether we should
[p. 319]
attack our opponent's arguments
en masse or dispose
of them singly. We shall adopt the former course
if the arguments are so weak that they can be overthrown simultaneously, or so embarrassing that it
would be inexpedient to grapple with them individually. For in such a case we must fight with all
the force at our disposal and make a frontal attack.
Sometimes,
[
12]
if it is difficult to refute the statements
made by our opponents, we may compare our arguments with theirs, at least if by such a procedure it
is possible to prove the superiority of our own. On
the other hand, those arguments which rely on their
cumulative force must be analysed individually, as
for example in the case which I cited above: “You
were the heir, you were poor and were summoned
by your creditors for a large sum: you had offended
him and knew that he intended to change his will.”
[
13]
The cumulative force of these arguments is damaging. But if you refute them singly, the flame
which derived its strength from the mass of fuel will
die down as soon as the material which fed it is
separated, just as if we divert a great stream into a
number of channels we may cross it where we will.
We shall therefore adapt our method of refutation
to the exigencies of our case, now dealing with individual arguments and now treating them in bulk.
[
14]
For at times we may include in a single proposition
the refutation of an argument which our opponent
has constructed of a number of different points.
For instance, if the accuser allege that the accused
had a number of motives for committing a crime,
we may make a general denial of the fact without
dealing singly with each alleged motive, because the
fact that a man has had a motive for committing a
[p. 321]
crime does not prove that he has actually committed
it.
[
15]
It will however as a rule be expedient for the
prosecution to employ massed arguments, and for
the accused to refute them in detail.
We must, however, also consider the manner in
which we should refute the arguments of our
opponent. If his statements be obviously false, it
will be sufficient to deny them. This is done by
Cicero in the
pro Cluentio,9 where he denies that
the man alleged by the accuser to have fallen dead
on the spot after drinking the contents of the cup,
died on the same day.
[
16]
Again, it requires no skill
to rebut arguments which are obviously contradictory, superfluous or foolish, and consequently I
need give no examples nor instructions as to the
method to be employed. There is also the type
of charge which is known as obscure, where it is
alleged that an act was committed in secret without
witnesses or any evidence to prove it: this suffers
from an inherent weakness, since the fact that our
opponent can produce no proof is sufficient for our
purpose: the same applies to arguments which are
irrelevant to the case.
[
17]
It is, however, sometimes an
orator's duty to make it appear that some argument
of his opponent is contradictory or irrelevant or
incredible or superfluous or really favourable to his
own client. Oppius
10 is charged with having embezzled the supplies intended to feed the troops.
It is a serious charge, but Cicero shows that it
contradicts other charges, since the same accusers
also charged Oppius with desiring to corrupt the
army by bribes.
[
18]
The accuser of Cornelius offers to
produce witnesses to show that he read out the law
when tribune
11: Cicero makes this argument
[p. 323]
superHuous by admitting it. Quintus Caecilius demands
to be entrusted with the task of accusing Verres on
the ground that he had been the latter's quaestor:
Cicero actually makes this argument tell in his own
favour.
12
[
19]
As regards other charges, they may all be
dealt with by very similar methods. For they may
be demolished either by conjecture, when we shall
consider whether they are true, by definition, when
we shall examine whether they are relevant to the
case, by quality, when we shall consider whether
they are dishonourable, unfair, scandalous, inhuman,
cruel, or deserve any other epithet coming under
the head of quality.
[
20]
Such questions have to be
considered, not merely in connection with the statement of the charges or the reasons alleged, but with
reference to the nature of the case in its entirety.
For instance, the question of cruelty is considered
with regard to the charge of high treason brought
against Rabirius
13 by Labienus; of inhumanity in the
case of Tubero who accused Ligarius when he was
an exile and attempted to prevent Caesar from
pardoning him; of arrogance as in the case of the
charge brought against Oppius
14 on the strength of
a letter of Cotta.
[
21]
Similarly, it may be shown that
charges are hasty, insidious or vindictive. The
strongest argument, however, which can be brought
against a charge is that it involves peril to the
community or to the judges themselves; we find an
example of the former in the
pro Tullio,15 where
Cicero says “Who ever laid down such a principle as
this, or who could be allowed, without grave peril
to the community, to kill a man, just because he
asserts that he feared that he himself might be
[p. 325]
killed by him?” An instance of the latter occurs
in the
pro Oppio, where Cicero warns the judges at
some length not to permit such an action to be
brought against the equestrian order.
16
[
22]
On the other
hand there are certain arguments which at times
may best be treated with contempt, as being trivial
or irrelevant. This course is frequently pursued by
Cicero, indeed this affectation of indifference is sometimes carried so far that we trample disdainfully
under foot arguments which we should never succeed in refuting by counter-argument.
[
23]
Since, however, the majority of such arguments
are based on similarity, we must make diligent
search to discover if any discrepancy is to be found
in what is put forward. It is easy to do this where
points of law are concerned. For the law was drafted
to cover cases quite other than the present, and
consequently it is all the easier to show the difference
between case and case. As to parallels drawn from
dumb animals or inanimate objects, they are easy to
make light of.
[
24]
Examples drawn from facts, if damaging to our case, must be treated in various ways: if
they are ancient history, we may call them legendary,
while if they are undoubted, we may lay stress on
their extreme dissimilarity. For it is impossible for
two cases to be alike in every detail. For instance,
if the case of Ahala,2 by whom Maelius was killed,
is quoted to justify Nasica for the slaying of Tiberius
Gracchus, we may argue that Maelius was endeavouring to make himself king, while all that Gracchus
had done was to bring forward laws in the interest
of the people, and that while Ahala was Master of
the Horse, Nasica was a private citizen. In the last
resort, if all else prove unavailing, we must see if
[p. 327]
we can show that the action adduced as a parallel
was itself unjustifiable. These remarks as to examples apply also to previous decisions in the courts.
[
26]
With regard to my statement that the manner in
which the accuser stated his charges was of importance, I would point out in this connexion that if
he has spoken but feebly, we may repeat his actual
words; while, if he has used bitter and violent
language, we may restate the facts in milder terms,
as Cicero does in the
pro Cornelio, where he says,
“He put his hand to the tablet containing the
law”
17:
[
25]
and we may do this in such a way as to
defend our client; for instance, if our client is
addicted to luxury, we may say, “He has been
charged with living in a somewhat too liberal style.”
So, too, we may call a mean man thrifty and a
slanderous tongue free.
18
[
27]
But we must never under
any circumstances repeat our opponent's charges
together with their proofs, nor emphasise any of his
points by amplifying them, unless we do so with a
view to making light of them, as for instance in the
following passage
19: “You have been with the army,
he says, and have not set foot in the forum for so
many years, and do you now on returning after so
long an interval seek to compete for a post of high
dignity with those who have made the forum their
home?”
[
28]
Again, when we are replying to the
accuser we may sometimes set forth the whole
charge, as Cicero does in the
pro Scauro with reference to the death of Bostar,
20 where he virtually
parodies the speech of his opponent, or we may take
a number of points raised in the course of the
accusation and put them together as in the
pro
Vareno:
21 “They have asserted that, when he was
[p. 329]
journeying with Pompulenus through a lonely stretch
of country, he fell in with the slaves of Ancharius, that
Pompulenus was then killed and Varenus imprisoned
on the spot until such time as this man should indicate what he wished to be done with him.” Such a
procedure is useful, if the sequence of facts alleged
by the prosecution is incredible, and likely to lose
its force by restatement. Sometimes, on the other
hand, we may destroy the cumulative force of a
number of statements by refuting them singly; in
fact this is generally the safest course. Sometimes,
again, the different portions of our reply will be
independent of one another, a case which requires
no illustration.
[
29]
Common arguments
22 are readily appropriated, not
merely because they can be used by either party,
but because they are of greater service to the
speaker who is replying; for I shall not scruple to
repeat the warning which I have often given already;
the speaker who is first to employ such an argument makes it tell against himself.
[
30]
For an argument
must needs tell against a speaker if it be one which
his opponent can use with effect. “But, you say, it
is not probable that a crime of this magnitude was
designed by Marcus Cotta. Is it probable then that
a crime of this magnitude was attempted by
Oppius?” On the other hand it is a task for a real
artist to discover inconsistencies, real or apparent,
in the speech of his opponent, though such inconsistencies are sometimes evident from the bare facts,
as for instance in the case of Caelius,
23 where Clodia
asserts on the one hand that she lent Caelius money,
which is an indication of great intimacy, and on the
other hand that he got poison to murder her, which
[p. 331]
is a sign of violent hatred. Tubero similarly
24
[
31]
accuses Ligarius of having been in Africa, and complains that Ligarius refused to allow him to land
in Africa. At times, however, some ill-advised
statement by our opponent will give us an opportunity of demolishing his arguments. This is
specially likely to occur with speakers who have a
passion for producing impressive thoughts: for the
temptation to air their eloquence is such that they
take no heed of what they have said already, being
absorbed by the topic immediately before them to
the detriment of the interests of the case as a
whole.
[
32]
What is there likely to tell so heavily
against Cluentius as the stigma inflicted by the
censors? What can be more damaging than the fact
that Egnatius disinherited his son on the ground
that lie had been bribed to give a false verdict in
the trial in which Cluentius secured the condemnation of Oppianicus? But Cicero
25
[
33]
shows that the
two facts tell against one another. “But, Attius, I
would urge you to give the closest consideration to
the following problem. Which do you desire to carry
the greater weight—the judgment of the censors, or
of Egnatius? If the latter, you regard the judgment of the censors in other cases as counting for
little, since they expelled this same Gnaeus Egnatius, on whose authority you lay such stress, from
his place in the senate. On the other hand, if you
attach most weight to the judgment of the censors,
I must point out that the censors retained the
younger Egnatius, whom his father disinherited by
an act resembling a censorial decision, in his position
as senator, although they had expelled his father.”
As regards errors such as the following,
[
34]
the folly
[p. 333]
shown in their commission is out of all proportion to
the skill required to deal with them: I refer to
mistakes such as advancing a disputable argument
as indisputable, a controversial point as admitted, a
point common to a number of cases as peculiar to
the case in hand, or the employment of trite,
superfluous, or incredible arguments. For careless
speakers are liable to commit a host of errors: they
will exaggerate a charge which has still got to be
proved, will argue about an act when the question is
who committed it, will attempt impossibilities, drop
an argument as if it were complete, whereas it is
scarcely begun, speak of the individual in preference
to the case,
[
35]
and attribute personal faults to circumstances, as for instance if a speaker should attack the
decemvirate instead of Appius. They will also contradict what is obvious, speak ambiguously, lose
sight of the main issue of the case, or give replies
which have no relation to the charges made. This
latter procedure may, it is true, be occasionally employed when we have a bad case which requires to
be supported by arguments drawn from matters
foreign to the case. The trial of Verres provides an
example; when accused of peculation it was alleged
that he had shown courage and energy in his defence
of Sicily against the pirates.
[
36]
The same rules apply to objections which we may
have to meet. But there is one point which requires
special attention, since in such cases many speakers
fall into two very different faults. For some even
in the courts will pass by such objections when
raised by their opponents as troublesome and vexatious details, and, contenting themselves with the
arguments which they have brought ready-made
[p. 335]
from their study, will speak as if their opponent did
not exist. This error is of course far more common
in the schools, for there objections are not merely
disregarded, but the subjects for declamation are
generally framed in such a way that there is nothing
to be said on the opposite side.
[
37]
On the other hand
there are some who surfer from excess of zeal,
and think it their duty to reply to every word
and even every trifling reflexion, a task which is
at once endless and superfluous. For it is not the
case. but the pleader, whom they are refuting. Personally I should always prefer that a speaker should
reveal his eloquence in such a way that, if what he
says advances his case, the credit will be given to his
talent and not to the nature of his case, while if
what he says damages his case the blame will attach
to the case and not to his powers.
[
38]
Consequently
when we come across denunciations such as that
directed against Rullus for the obscurity of his
language,
26 or against Piso for his utter incapacity as
a speaker,
27 or against Antony
28 for his lack of taste
and his complete ignorance both of words and
things, we shall give then our sanction as reasonable
concessions to passion and just resentment, and as
useful in stirring up hatred against those whom it is
desired to render unpopular.
[
39]
The method of reply
to our opponent's counsel should be on different
lines. Sometimes however we are justified in attacking, not merely their manner of speaking, but
also their character, their appearance, their gait or
bearing. Indeed, in his attack on Quintius, Cicero
29
does not confine himself to these topics, but even
attacks his purple-bordered toga that goes trailing
to his heels: for Quintius had caused Cluentius grave
[p. 337]
embarrassment by his turbulent harangues.
[
40]
Sometimes, in order to dispel the unpopularity excited by
bitter criticism, the latter may be disposed of by a
jest, as for example Cicero disposes of Triarius.
For to the allegation that the pillars destined for the
house of Scaurus were carried on waggons through
the city streets he replied,
30 “I got my pillars
from the quarries of Alba, and had them brought in
panniers!” Such tactics are more readily allowed
against an accuser, for the duties of counsel for the
defence sometimes force him to make such personal
attacks.
[
41]
On the other hand there is no objection to
complaining of the conduct of the advocates on
either side, so long as our complaint follows accepted
practice and does not overstep the limits imposed by
good manners; I refer to complaints such as that
our opponents have abridged, obscured or postponed
the discussion of some point, or with deliberate
cunning have avoided discussing it at all.
[
42]
A change
in the tactics of defence is also often selected for
censure. For example, Attius
31 in his speech against
Cluentius complains that Cicero insists on the letter
of the law, and Aeschines
32 in his speech against
Ctesiphon complains that Demosthenes refuses to
consider the legal aspect of the case.
It is however necessary to issue a special warning
to declaimers that they should not put forward
objections that can easily be met or assume that
their opponent is a fool. As it is, owing to our
tendency to think that the subject-matter of our
speech may be drawn from our own fancy, florid
commonplaces and epigrams designed to bring down
the house occur to our minds with the utmost
[p. 339]
readiness, with the result that we should do well to
bear in mind the lines:
A shrewd retort! Could it be otherwise?
A foolish question makes for smart replies.
Origin unknown.
[
43]
But such a practice will be fatal in the courts,
where we have to answer our opponent and not
ourselves. It is said that Accius, when asked why
he did not turn advocate in view of the extraordinary
skill in making apt replies which his tragedies
revealed, replied that in his plays the characters said
what he himself wanted them to say, whereas in the
courts his adversaries would probably say just what
he least wanted them to say.
[
44]
It is therefore
ridiculous in exercises which prepare the student
for the actual courts to consider what answer can be
made before ever giving a thought to what the
opposing counsel is likely to say. And a good teacher
should commend a pupil no less for his skill in
thinking out arguments that may be put forward
for the opposite side than in discovering arguments
to prove his own case.
[
45]
Again, there is another
practice which is always permissible in the schools,
but rarely in the courts. For when we speak first
as claimants in a real case, how can we raise objections, seeing that our opponent has so far said
nothing?
[
46]
Still, many fall into this error either
because they have acquired the habit in declamation
or simply owing to a passion for hearing their own
voice, thereby affording fine sport to those who
reply: for sometimes the latter will remark sarcastically that they never said anything of the kind and
have no intention of saying anything so idiotic, and
sometimes that they are grateful for the admirable
[p. 341]
warnings so kindly given by their opponent: but
most often they will say, and this is the strongest
line that they can take, that their opponent would
never have replied to objections which had never
been raised had he not realised that these objections
were justified and been driven to admit it by his
consciousness of the fact.
[
47]
We may find an example
of this in the
pro Cluentio33 of Cicero: “You have
frequently asserted that you are informed that I
intend to base my defence on the letter of the law.
Really! I suppose that my friends have secretly betrayed me, and that there is one among those whom
I believe to be my friends who reports my designs to
my opponent. Who gave you this information?
Who was the traitor? And to whom did I ever
reveal my design? No one, I think, is to blame.
It must have been the law itself that told you.”
But there are some who,
[
48]
not content with raising
imaginary objections, develop whole passages on such
themes, saying that they know their opponents will
say this and will proceed to argue thus and thus. I
remember that Vibius Crispus in our own day disposed of this practice very neatly, for he was a
humorous fellow with a very pretty wit: “I do not
make those objections which you attribute to me,” he
said, “for what use would it be to make them twice?”
[
49]
Sometimes however it may be possible to put forward something not unlike such objections, if some
point included by our opponent in the depositions
which he produces has been discussed among his advocates
34: for then we shall be replying to something
which they have said and not to an objection which
has been invented by ourselves; or again, this will
be possible if the case is of such a nature that we
[p. 343]
are in a position to state certain definite objections
which are absolutely essential to our opponent's case:
for instance, if stolen goods have been discovered
in a house, the accused must of necessity allege
either that they were brought there without his
knowledge or deposited with him or given to him
and we may therefore answer all these points even
although they have not been put forward.
[
50]
On the
other hand, in the schools we are quite justified in
answering both statements and imaginary objections; for by these means we shall train ourselves
at one and the same time for speaking either first or
second. Unless we do this, we shall have no chance
of employing objections, since there is no adversary
to whom we can reply.
[
51]
There is another serious fault into which pleaders
fall: the anxious over-elaboration of points. Such
a procedure makes his case suspect to the judges,
while frequently arguments which, if stated without
more ado, would have removed all doubt, lose their
force owing to the delay caused by the elaborate
preparations made for their introduction, due to the
tact that the advocate thinks that they require
additional support. Our orator must therefore adopt
a confident manner, and should always speak as if he
thought his case admirable. This quality, like all
other good qualities, is particularly evident in Cicero.
[
52]
For the extraordinary care which he takes gives the
impression of confidence and carries such weight
when lie speaks that it does not permit us to feel
the least doubt and has all the force of genuine
proof. Further, the advocate who knows what are
the strongest points in his own and his opponent's
case will easily be able to decide what points it
[p. 345]
will be most necessary for him to emphasise or to
counter.
[
53]
As regards order, there is no part of a case which
involves less trouble. For, if we are prosecuting,
our first duty will be to prove our own case, our
second to refute the arguments brought against it.
If, on the other hand, we are defending, we must
begin by refutation.
[
54]
But from our answers to
objections fresh objections will arise, a process
which may be carried to some length. The
strokes35
of gladiators provide a parallel. If the first stroke
was intended to provoke the adversary to strike, the
second will lead to the third, while if the challenge
be repeated it will lead to the fourth stroke, so that
there will be two parries and two attacks. And tile
process may be prolonged still further.
[
55]
But refutation also includes that simple form of proof, which
I described above,
36 based on an appeal to the
emotions and mere assertion; for an example see
the words of Scaurus which I have already quoted.
37
Nay, I am not sure that this form of proof is not
actually of more frequent occurrence when something is denied. It is, however, specially important
for both parties that they should see where the
main issue lies. For it often happens that the points
raised in pleading are many, although those on
which a decision is given are few.
[
56]
Such are the elements of the methods of proof
and refutation, but they require to be embellished
and supported by the powers of the speaker. For
although our arguments may be admirably adapted
to express what we desire, they will none the less
be slight and weak unless the orator makes a special
effort to give them life.
[
57]
Consequently the
[p. 347]
commonplaces on the subject of witnesses, documentary
evidence, arguments and the like make a great
impression on the minds of the judges, as also do
those topics which are peculiar to the case, those I
mean in which we praise or blame any action or
show that it is just or unjust, or make it seem more
or less important or more or less harsh than it
really is. Of these topics some are adapted to the
comparison of individual arguments, others to the
comparison of a number, while others may serve to
influence the success or failure of the whole case.
[
58]
Some again prepare the mind of the judge, while
others confirm it in opinions already formed. But
such preparation or confirmation will sometimes
apply to the whole case, sometimes only to particular portions, and must therefore be employed with due regard to circumstances.
[
59]
I am
consequently surprised that there should be a
violent dispute between the leaders of two opposite
schools as to whether such commonplaces should be
applied to individual questions (which is the view of
Theodorus), or whether the judge should be instructed in the facts before any appeal is made to
his feelings (the latter being the view of Apollodorus), as though no middle course were possible and
no regard were to be had to the exigencies of the
case itself. Those who lay down such rules have no
experience of speaking in the actual courts, the
result being that text-books composed in the calm
leisure of the study are sadly upset by the necessities of forensic strife.
[
60]
For practically all those
who have set forth the law of speaking as though it
were a profound mystery,
38 have tied us down not
merely to fixed topics for argument, but to definite
[p. 349]
rules as to how we should draw our conclusions.
[
61]
propose after making a few preliminary remarks on
the subject to give a frank expression of my own
views, or in other words to set forth what I perceive
to have been the practice of the most distinguished
orators.