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[110]
“But,” they argued against Regulus, “an oath1
extorted by force ought not to have been binding.”
As if force could be brought to bear upon a brave
man!
“Why, then, did he make the journey to the
senate, especially when he intended to plead against
the surrender of the prisoners of war?”
Therein you are criticizing what is the noblest
feature of his conduct. For he was not content to
stand upon his own judgment but took up the case,
in order that the judgment might be that of the
senate; and had it not been for the weight of his
pleading, the prisoners would certainly have been
restored to the Carthaginians; and in that case,
Regulus would have remained safe at home in his
country. But because he thought this not expedient
for his country, he believed that it was therefore
morally right for him to declare his conviction and
to suffer for it.
When they argued also that what is highly expedient 2 may prove to be morally right, they ought
rather to say not that it “may prove to be” but that
[p. 391]
it actually is morally right. For nothing can be expedient which is not at the same time morally right;
neither can a thing be morally right just because it
is expedient, but it is expedient because it is morally
right.
From the many splendid examples in history,
therefore, we could not easily point to one either
more praiseworthy or more heroic than the conduct
of Regulus.
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
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