[101]
Now we find that the essential activity of the1
spirit is twofold: one force is appetite (that is, ὁρμή,
in Greek), which impels a man this way and that;
the other is reason, which teaches and explains
what should be done and what should be left undone.
The result is that reason commands, appetite obeys.
29. Again, every action ought to be free from
undue haste or carelessness; neither ought we to
do anything for which we cannot assign a reasonable
motive; for in these words we have practically a
definition of duty.
1 (2) subject appetite to reason.
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
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