Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 27
Cyrus Evans, Ed.

42. Hannibal had not yet gone out of the camp, when he heard the shout of his troops engaged; and thus roused by the alarm, he hastily led his forces against the enemy. [2] Already had the Roman horse spread terror through the Carthaginian van; the first legion also of the infantry and the right wing were commencing the action, while the troops of the Carthaginians, in disorder, engaged just as chance threw each in the way of horse or foot. [3] The battle became more general by reinforcements, and the number of those who ran out to the combat. [4] Hannibal, amid the terror and confusion, would have drawn up his troops while fighting, (which would not have been an easy task unless to a veteran general with veteran soldiers,) had not the shouts of the cohorts and maniples, running down from the hills, which was heard in their rear, created an alarm lest they should be cut off from their camp. [5] After this they were seized with a panic, and a flight commenced in every part; but the number slain was less, because the nearness of the camp offered to the terrified troops a shorter distance to fly. [6] For the cavalry hung upon their rear, and the cohorts, running down the declivities of the hills by an unobstructed and easy path, charged them transversely in flank. [7] However, above eight thousand men were slain, above seven hundred made prisoners, and eight military standards taken. Of the elephants also, which had been of no use in such a sudden and irregular action, four were killed and two captured. [8] The conquerors lost about five hundred Romans and allies. The following day the Car- [p. 1149]thaginian remained quiet. The Roman having led out his troops into the field, when he saw that no one came out to meet him, gave orders that the spoils of those of the enemy who were slain should be collected, and that the bodies of his own men should be gathered into one place and buried. [9] After this, for several days following in succession, he came up so near the enemy's gates that he almost seemed to be carrying in his standards. [10] But at length Hannibal at the third watch, leaving a number of fires and tents in that part of the camp which faced the enemy, and also a few Numidians who might show themselves in the rampart and the gates, decamped and proceeded towards Apulia. [11] As soon as it dawned, the Roman army came up to the trenches, and the Numidians, according to the plan concerted, took care to show themselves for a little time on the rampart and in the gates; and having deceived the enemy for some time, rode off at full speed, and overtook their friends on their march. [12] The consul, when all was silence in the camp, and he could now no where see even the few who at break of day had walked up and down, sent two horsemen in advance to reconnoitre; [13] and after he had ascertained that all was safe enough, ordered his troops to march in; [14] and after staying there only while his men distributed themselves for plunder, sounded a retreat and led back his forces long before night. The next day he set out as soon as it was light, and following the rumour and the track of the enemy by forced marches, came up with them not far from Venusia. [15] Here also an irregular battle took place, in which two thousand of the Carthaginians were slain. [16] The Carthaginian quitting this place made for Metapontum, marching by night and over mountainous districts in order to avoid a battle. Thence Hanno, who commanded the garrison of that place, was sent into Bruttium with a small party to raise a fresh army. Hannibal, after adding his forces to his own, went back to Venusia by the same route by which he came, and proceeded thence to Canusium. [17] Nero had never quitted the enemy's steps, and when he himself went to Metapontum, had sent for Quintus Fulvius into Lucania, lest that region should be left without protection.