[95]
This propriety, therefore, of which I am speaking belongs to each division of moral rectitude;
and its relation to the cardinal virtues is so close,
that it is perfectly self-evident and does not require
any abstruse process of reasoning to see it. For
[p. 99]
there is a certain element of propriety perceptible
in every act of moral rectitude; and this can be
separated from virtue theoretically better than it
can be practically. As comeliness and beauty of
person are inseparable from the notion of health,
so this propriety of which we are speaking, while
in fact completely blended with virtue, is mentally
and theoretically distinguishable from it.
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
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