All these philosophers likewise equally hold that the
soul neither derives its beginning from time nor is the product of generation, but that it is endued with several faculties and virtues, into which Plato, as it were, melting and
dissolving its substance for contemplation's sake, supposes
it in his discourse to have had its original from procreation and mixture.
The same was his opinion concerning the world; for he
knew it to be uncreated and without end, but not perceiving it so easy to apprehend how the structure was reared,
or by what order and government supported, unless by admitting its beginning and the causes thereto concurring, he
followed that method to instruct himself. These things
being thus generally by them laid down, Eudorus will
allow to neither side any share of probability; and indeed
to me they both seem to have wandered from the opinion
of Plato, if we intend to make the most likely rule our
[p. 329]
guide,—which is not to advance our own conceits, but to
come as close as we can to his sense and meaning. Now
as to this same mixture (as they call it) of the intelligible
and sensitive substance, no reason appears why it should be
more the original of the soul than of any other thing that
ye can name. For the whole world itself and every one of
its parts pretend to no other composition than of a sensitive
and an intelligible substance, of which the one affords matter and foundation, the other form and figure to the whole
mass. And then again, whate'er there is of material substance, framed and structured by participation and assimilation of the intelligible nature is not only to be felt but
visible to the eye; whenas the soul still soars above the
reach of all natural apprehension. Neither did Plato ever
assert the soul to be number, but a perpetually self-moving
nature, the fountain and principle of motion. Only he
embellished and adorned the substance of it with number,
proportion, and harmony; as being a subject capable of
receiving the most goodly form which those ornaments
could produce. So that I cannot believe it to be the same
thing to compose the soul according to number, and to affirm the soul to be number itself. Nor can it be said to be
harmony because harmoniously composed, as he has clearly
demonstrated in his Treatise of the Soul. But plain it is,
that those philosophers understood not the meaning of the
Same and the Other. For they tell us how the Same contributes rest, the Other motion toward the generation of
the soul. Though Plato himself, in his treatise entitled the
Sophist, disposes and distinguishes Essence, the Same, the
Other, together with Motion and Rest, as being five things
altogether differing one from another and void of mutual
affinity.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.