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But, forasmuch as philosophers do not make all virtue
to consist in a mediocrity nor call it moral, to show the
difference more clearly, it will be necessary to take our
rise a little farther off. For of all things then in the universe, some do exist absolutely, simply, and for themselves only; others again relatively, for and with regard to
us. Among those things which have an absolute and
simple existence are the earth, the heavens, the stars, and
the sea; and of such things as have their being relatively,
with respect to us, are good and evil, things desirable and
to be avoided, and things pleasant and hurtful. And seeing that both are the proper objects of reason,—while it
considers the former, which are absolutely and for themselves, it is scientifical and contemplative; and when the
other, which have reference to us, it is deliberative and
practical. And as the proper virtue in the latter case is
prudence, in the former it is science. And between the one
and the other, namely, between prudence and science, there
is this difference. Prudence consists in a certain application and relation of the contemplative faculties of the soul to
those which are practical, for the government of the sensual and irrational part, according to reason. To which
purpose prudence has often need of Fortune; whereas
neither of that nor of deliberation has science any occasion or want to attain its ends, forasmuch as it has nothing
to consider but such things as remain always the same.
For as a geometrician never deliberates about a triangle,
whether all its three angles be equal to two right angles,
because of that he has a clear and distinct knowledge
(and men use to deliberate about such things only as are
sometimes in one state or condition and sometimes in
[p. 470]
another, and not of those which are always firm and immutable), so the mind, when merely contemplative, exercising itself about first principles and things permanent,
such as retaining the same nature are incapable of mutation, has no room or occasion for deliberation. Whereas
prudence, descending to actions full of error and confusion,
is very often under the necessity of encountering with fortuitous accidents, and, in doubtful cases, of making use
of deliberation, and, to reduce those deliberations into practice, of calling also to its assistance even the irrational
faculties, which are (as it were) forcibly dragged to go
along with it, and by that means to give a certain vigor or
impetus to its determinations. For its determinations do
indeed want something which may enliven and give them
such an impetus. And moral virtue it is which gives an
impetus or vigor to the passions; but at the same time
reason, which accompanies that impetus, and of which it
stands in great need, does so set bounds thereunto, that
nothing but what is moderate appears, and that it neither
outruns the proper seasons of action, nor yet falls short of
them.
For the sensual faculties, where passions are seated, are
subject to motions, some over-vehement, sudden, and quick,
and others again too remiss, and more slow and heavy
than is convenient. So that, though every thing we do can
be good but in one manner, yet it may be evil in several;
as there is but one single way of hitting the mark, but to
miss it a great many, either by shooting over, or under, or
on one side. The business therefore of practical reason,
governing our actions according to the order of Nature, is
to correct the excesses as well as the defects of the passions, by reducing them to a true mediocrity. For as,
when through infirmity of the mind, effeminacy, fear, or
laziness, the vehemence and keenness of the appetites are
so abated that they are ready to sink and fall short of the
[p. 471]
good at which they are aimed and directed, there is then
this practical reason at hand, exciting and rousing and
pushing them onward; so, on the other hand, when it
lashes out too far and is hurried beyond all measure, there
also is the same reason ready to bring it again within compass and put a stop to its career. And thus, prescribing
bounds and giving law to the motions of the passions, it
produces in the irrational part of the soul these moral
virtues (of which we now treat), which are nothing else
but the mean between excess and defect. For it cannot
be said that all virtue consists in mediocrity; since wisdom
or prudence (one of the intellectual virtues), standing in
no need of the irrational faculties,—as being seated in
that part of the soul which is pure and unmixed and free
from all passions,—is of itself absolutely perfect, the
utmost extremity and power of reason, whereby we attain
to that perfection of knowledge which is itself most divine
and renders us most happy. Whereas moral virtue, which
because of the body is so necessary to us, and, to put
things in practice, stands in need of the instrumental ministry of the passions (as being so far from promoting the
destruction and abolition of irrational powers, as to be
altogether employed in the due regulation thereof), is, with
respect to its power or quality, the very top and extremity
of perfection; but, in respect of the proportion and quantity which it determines, it is mediocrity, in that it takes
away all excess on the one hand, and cures all defects on
the other.
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by. William W. Goodwin, PH. D. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. Cambridge. Press Of John Wilson and son. 1874. 3.
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