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In brief therefore I say (and what I say may justly
challenge the repute of an oracle rather than of advice),
that the one chief thing in this matter—which corn
priseth the beginning, middle, and end of all—is good
education and regular instruction; and that these two afford
great help and assistance towards the attainment of virtue
and felicity. For all other good things are but human and
of small value, such as will hardly recompense the industry
required to the getting of them. It is, indeed, a desirable
thing to be well descended; but the glory belongs to our
ancestors. Riches are valuable; but they are the goods of
Fortune, who frequently takes them from those that have
them, and carries them to those that never so much as
hoped for them. Yea, the greater they are, the fairer
mark are they for those to aim at who design to make our
bags their prize; I mean evil servants and accusers. But
[p. 13]
the weightiest consideration of all is, that riches may be
enjoyed by the worst as well as the best of men. Glory is
a thing deserving respect, but unstable; beauty is a prize
that men fight to obtain, but, when obtained, it is of little
continuance; health is a precious enjoyment, but easily impaired; strength is a thing desirable, but apt to be the
prey of diseases and old age. And, in general, let any man
who values himself upon strength of body know that he
makes a great mistake; for what indeed is any proportion
of human strength, if compared to that of other animals,
such as elephants and bulls and lions? But learning alone,
of all things in our possession, is immortal and divine. And
two things there are that are most peculiar to human
nature, reason and speech; of which two, reason is the
master of speech, and speech is the servant of reason, impregnable against all assaults of fortune, not to be taken
away by false accusation, nor impaired by sickness, nor
enfeebled by old age. For reason alone grows youthful
by age; and time, which decays all other things, increaseth
knowledge in us in our decaying years. Yea, war itself,
which like a winter torrent bears down all other things
before it and carries them away with it, leaves learning
alone behind. Whence the answer seems to me very remarkable, which Stilpo, a philosopher of Megara, gave to
Demetrius, who, when he levelled that city to the ground
and made all the citizens bondmen, asked Stilpo whether
he had lost any thing. Nothing, said he, for war cannot
plunder virtue. To this saying that of Socrates also is very
agreeable; who, when Gorgias (as I take it) asked him
what his opinion was of the king of Persia, and whether
he judged him happy, returned answer, that he could not
tell what to think of him, because he knew not how he was
furnished with virtue and learning,—as judging human
felicity to consist in those endowments, and not in those
which are subject to fortune.
[p. 14]
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by. William W. Goodwin, PH. D. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. Cambridge. Press Of John Wilson and son. 1874. 1.
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