Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 23
Frank Gardener Moore, Professor Emeritus in Columbia University, Ed.

Book XXIII

1. AFTER the battle of Cannae and the capture and¹ plunder of the camps, Hannibal had moved at once out of Apulia into Samnium, being invited into the land of the Hirpini by Statius Trebius, who promised that he would turn over Compsa to him. [2] Trebius was a Compsan of high rank among his people, but opposed by the party of the Mopsii, a family made powerful by the favour of the Romans. [3] After the news of the battle of Cannae, and when the coming of Hannibal had been made known by utterances of Trebius, since the Mopsii had left the city, it was handed over to the Carthaginians without resistance and a garrison admitted. [4] There Hannibal left all his booty and the baggage, divided his army, and ordered Mago either to take over such cities of that region as were deserting the Romans or to compel them to desert in case they refused. [5] He himself made his way through the Campanian region to the Lower Sea,² intending to attack Neapolis, that he might have a seaport. [6] On entering the territory of the [p. 5]Neapolitans, he stationed some of the Numidians in³ ambush, wherever he conveniently could (and most of the roads are deep-cut and the turnings concealed). Other Numidians he ordered to ride up to the gates, making a display of the booty they were driving along before them from the farms. [7] Against these men, because they seemed to be few in number and disorganized, a troop of cavalry made a sally, but being drawn into the ambush by the enemy's purposely retreating, it was overpowered. [8] And not a: man would have escaped if the proximity of the sea and the sight of vessels, chiefly of fishermen, not far from the shore had not given those who could swim a way of escape. [9] However a number of young nobles were captured or slain in that battle, among them, Hegeas, a cavalry commander, who fell as he rashly pursued the retreating. [10] From besieging the city the Carthaginian was deterred by the sight of walls such as by no means invited an attacker.

2. Hannibal then directed his march to Capua, which was pampered by its long-continued prosperity and the favour of fortune, but, along with the general corruption, especially from the licence of the common people, who enjoyed an unlimited freedom. [2] As for the senate, Pacuvius Calavius, a noble who was at the same time of the people's party, but had gained his influence by base arts, had made it subservient both to himself and to the common people. [3] He, being in their highest office,⁴ as is happened, in the year of the defeat at Lake Trasumennus, thought that the commons, long hostile to the senate, would use the opportunity of a revolution and dare to commit a great crime, namely, if Hannibal should come into the region with his victorious army, they would slay [p. 7]the senators and hand over Capua to the⁵ Carthaginians. [4] A bad man, but not utterly abandoned, he preferred to dominate a state still intact rather than one that had been wrecked, yet believed that none was intact if deprived of its deliberative body. He accordingly entered upon a scheme to save the senate and at the same time to make it submissive to himself and to the commons. [5] Summoning the senate he began by saying that, unless it should prove necessary, a plan to revolt from the Romans would by no means have his approval, since he had [6??] children by a daughter of Appius Claudius and had given a daughter in marriage to Marcus Livius at Rome. But, he went on to say, something much more serious and more to be dreaded was impending; [7] for the common people were not aiming to rid the state of the senate by a revolt, but by the massacre of the senate wished to hand over the republic, left helpless, to Hannibal and the Carthaginians. [8] From that danger he could free them if they should leave it to him, and, forgetting civil conflicts, trust him. When, overcome by fear, they unanimously left matters to him, “I will shut you up,” he said, “in the Senate House and, [9??] just as if I were myself a sharer in the crime intended, by approving plans which it would be vain for me to oppose, I will find a way to save you. For this accept a pledge, as you yourselves desire.” [10] Having given the pledge he went out, ordered the Senate House to be closed and left a guard before the entrance, that no one might be able to enter the Senate House or leave it without his order.

3. Then calling the people to an assembly he said: “You have often desired, Campanians, to have the power to exact punishment from a base and [p. 9]odious senate. That power you have, not by⁶ riotously storming, with great danger to yourselves, the houses of individuals who defend them with garrisons of clients and slaves, but you have the power secure and unrestricted. [2] As they are shut up there, every man of them, in the Senate House, seize them, left alone, unarmed! [3] And do nothing in haste or at haphazard. I will give you the right to decide their fate in each separate case, so that each shall pay the penalty he has deserved. [4] But above all things you should vent your wrath with due regard to the conviction that your safety and advantage are worth more than wrath. For it is these senators that you hate, I think; it is not your wish to have no senate at all. [5] In fact you must either have a king —save the mark! —or else a senate, the only deliberative body in a free state. And so you have two things to do at the same time —to do away with the old senate, and to choose a new one. [6] I will order the senators to be called one by one and will consult you as to their fate. Whatever is your opinion in each case shall be done, but before punishment is inflicted on the guilty one you will choose in his place a brave and active man as a new senator.” [7] He then sat down, and after the names had been placed in the urn, he ordered the first name drawn by lot to be called and the man himself to be led out of the Senate House. [8] On hearing the name every man shouted his loudest, that he was a bad man and base and deserved punishment. [9] Upon that Pacuvius said: “I see what your verdict is in this man's case; therefore in place of a bad man and base nominate a good and just senator.” [10] At first there was silence from their inability to suggest a better man. [11] Then when someone, [p. 11]overcoming his timidity, named a man, at once there was⁷ a much louder outcry, some saying they did not know him, others taunting him, now with shameful conduct, now with low rank and sordid poverty and the disreputable nature of his trade or business. [12] All the more was this done in the case of the second and third senator called. So it was clear that people were dissatisfied with the man himself, but had no one to put in his place. [13] For nothing was gained by once more naming the same men, who had been named only to be reviled. And the rest were much lower in rank and less known than those who first came to mind. [14] Accordingly men slipped away, saying that the most familiar evil is the most endurable, and bidding Pacuvius release the senate from confinement.

4. In this way Pacuvius, having made the senate much more subservient to himself than to the common people by saving their lives, ruled without arms, as all now gave way to him. [2] Thereafter the senators, forgetting their rank and freedom, flattered the common people, greeted them, invited them graciously, entertained them at well appointed feasts; [3] invariably undertook cases, appeared as counsel, or as jurors gave a verdict, only for that side which was the more popular and better suited to win favour with the populace. [4] Moreover, nothing was done in the senate otherwise than if a meeting of the common people was being held there. The state had always been inclined to luxury,⁸ not only from defects in character, but also from the abundant opportunity for indulgences and the beguilement of all the charms of sea and land. [5] But at that time, thanks to the servility of the leading men and the [p. 13]licence of the common people, they were so⁹ unrestrained that no limit was set to passion or to expense. [6] To their contempt for laws, the magistrates, the senate, there was now added, after the defeat at Cannae, their disparagement of the Roman power also, for which there used to be some respect. [7] All that held them back from at once revolting was that the long-established right of intermarriage had united many distinguished and powerful families with the Romans, and that, [8??] although a considerable number were serving on the Roman side, the strongest bond was the three hundred horsemen, noblest of the Campanians, who had been chosen to garrison Sicilian cities by the Romans and sent thither.¹⁰ 5. Their parents and relatives with difficulty carried their point, that representatives should be sent to the Roman consul.

These men found the consul not yet departed for Canusium, but with a few half-armed men at Venusia,¹¹ exciting the utmost pity in good allies, but contempt in the haughty and faithless, such as were the Campanians. [2] And the consul increased the contempt for his situation and for himself by needlessly uncovering and laying bare the disaster. [3] For when the delegation had reported that the senate and the Campanian people were distressed that any reverse had befallen the Romans, and were promising everything that might be needed for the war, he said: [4] “You, Campanians, have observed the customary manner of speaking to allies, in bidding me requisition whatever is needed for the war, rather than spoken conformably to the present state of our fortunes. [5] [p. 15]For what has been left to us at Cannae, so that, as if¹² we had something, we may wish what is lacking to be made up by the allies? Are we to requisition infantry from you, as though we had cavalry? Are we to say that money is lacking, as if that alone were lacking? Nothing has fortune left us, even to supplement. [6] Legions, cavalry, arms, standards, horses and men, money and supplies have vanished either in the battle or in the loss of two camps the next day. [7] And so you, Campanians, have not to help us in war, but almost to undertake the war in our stead. [8] Recall how, when your ancestors were once confined in alarm within their walls, dreading not only the Samnite enemy but also the Sidicinian,¹³ we took them under our protection and defended them at Saticula. Also how with varying fortunes we endured for almost a hundred years¹⁴ the war begun with the Samnites on your account. [9] Add to this that upon your submission we gave you a fair treaty and your own laws, and finally —and before the disaster at Cannae this was certainly the greatest privilege —our citizenship to a large number of you and shared it with you. [10] A share, then, Campanians, you should believe you have in this disaster which has befallen us, and should think that you must defend the country in which you have a share. [11] Not with the Samnite or Etruscan is the struggle to have the power which has been wrested from us nevertheless remain in Italy. A Carthaginian enemy, not even of African origin, is dragging after him from the farthest limits of the world, from the strait of Ocean and the Pillars of Hercules, soldiers who [p. 17]are unacquainted with any civilized laws and¹⁵ organization and, one may almost add, language too.¹⁶ [12] Ruthless and barbarous by nature and custom, these men have been further barbarized by the general himself, in making bridges and embankments of piled up human bodies, and by teaching them —horrible even to relate —to feed upon the bodies of men.¹⁷ [13] To see and have as our masters men who fatten upon these unspeakable feasts, men whom it is a crime even to touch, and to get our law from Africa and Carthage, and to allow Italy to be a province of the Numidians and the Mauri —who, if merely born in Italy, would not find that abominable? [14] It will be a glorious thing, Campanians, if the Roman power, brought low by disaster, shall have been maintained and restored by your loyalty and your resources. [15] Thirty thousand foot-soldiers and four thousand horsemen can be enrolled from Campania, I believe. Moreover you have sufficient money and grain. If you have a loyalty to match your prosperity Hannibal will not be aware of his victory, nor the Romans of their defeat.”

6. After this speech of the consul the legates were dismissed, and on their way home Vibius Virrius, one of them, said the time had come when the Campanians could not only recover the territory formerly taken from them unjustly by the Romans, but could also gain authority over Italy. For they would make a treaty with Hannibal on their own terms. [2] And there would be no doubt that, when Hannibal, upon the completion of the war, retired as victor to Africa and removed his army, authority over Italy would be left to the Campanians. [3] Having agreed unanimously with these words of Virrius, they [p. 19]made such a report of their embassy that the Roman¹⁸ name seemed to all to have been blotted out.¹⁹ [4] At once the populace and most of the senate were aiming to revolt. [5] But action was postponed for a few days by the weighty advice of the older men. Finally the view of the majority prevailed, that the same legates who had gone to the Roman consul should be sent to Hannibal. [6] Before they went to him and' before the plan to revolt was settled upon, I find in some of the annals that legates were sent to Rome by the Campanians with the demand that, if they wished' them to aid the Roman state, one of the consuls should be a Campanian;²⁰ [7] that resentment was aroused and the legates were ordered to be removed from the Senate House, and that a lictor was sent to lead them out of the city and bid them lodge that night outside of Roman territory. [8] Because there was once a suspiciously similar demand made by the Latins,²¹ and Coelius and other historians had not without reason omitted the matter, I have been afraid to set this down as established.

7. The legates came to Hannibal and made an alliance with him on these terms: that no general or magistrate of the Carthaginians should have any authority over a Campanian citizen, and that no Campanian citizen should be a soldier or perform any service against his will; [2] that Capua should have its own laws, its own magistrates; that the Carthaginian should give the Campanians three hundred of the Roman captives of their own choosing, with whom there should be an exchange of the Campanian [p. 21]horsemen who were serving in Sicily. [3] Such were the²² terms. In addition to what was agreed upon the Campanians perpetrated these misdeeds: the populace suddenly seized prefects of the allies and other Roman citizens, some of them employed in a military duty, some engaged in private business, and with the pretence of guarding them ordered them all to be confined in the baths, that there they might die a terrible death, being suffocated by the extreme heat.

[4] Such conduct and the sending of an embassy to the Carthaginian had been opposed to the utmost by Decius Magius, a man who lacked nothing for the attainment of the highest authority except sanity on the part of the citizens. [5] But when he heard that a garrison was being sent by Hannibal, recalling the haughty rule of Pyrrhus and the wretched servitude of the Tarentines as warning examples, he at first openly protested that the garrison should not be admitted; [6] then, after it had been admitted, either that it should be driven out, or, if they wished to atone for their evil action in having revolted from their oldest allies and men of the same blood by a brave and notable act, that they should slay the Punic garrison and return to their Roman allegiance. [7] When this was reported to Hannibal (for it was not done in secret), he first sent men to summon Magius to him at the camp. Then when the latter replied with spirit that he would not go, for Hannibal had no authority over a Campanian citizen, the Carthaginian was enraged and ordered the man to be seized and brought before him in chains. [8] Later, fearing that in the use of force some commotion, and in view of the excitement some unpremeditated conflict, might occur, he first sent word to Marius Blossius, the [p. 23]Campanian magistrate, that he would be in Capua the²³ next day, and then he set out from the camp with a small escort. [9] Marius, calling an assembly, ordered them to go out to meet Hannibal en masse with wives and children. This was done by all not only obediently but also eagerly, owing to the enthusiasm of the crowd as well and the desire to go and see a general already famous for so many victories. [10] Decius Magius neither went out to meet him nor remained in seclusion, by doing which he might show some fear due to conscience. He strolled idly in the market-place with his son and a few clients, although the whole city was astir to welcome and to see the Carthaginian. [11] Hannibal entered the city and at once demanded a session of the senate, and then when the leading Campanians begged him not to do any serious business that day, and that he should [12??] himself cheerfully and willingly honour the day gladdened by his coming, though he was naturally hot-tempered, still in order not to deny them anything at the start, he spent a large part of the day in seeing the city.

8. He lodged at the house of the Ninnii Celeres, the brothers Sthenius and Pacuvius, men distinguished for their rank and wealth. [2] To that house Pacuvius Calavius, of whom mention has been made above,²⁴ leader of the party which had drawn the state to the side of the Carthaginians, came bringing his young son. [3] He had got him away from the company of Decius Magius, with whom the son in the most confident spirit had stood up for the Roman alliance against a treaty with Carthage. And neither the decision of the state for the other side nor his father's high position had dislodged him from his opinion. [4] Such was the young man to whom his father, rather [p. 25]by pleading than by excusing, reconciled Hannibal,²⁵ and he, prevailed upon by the father's prayers and tears, even ordered that the son should be invited [5??] with the father to a dinner at which he was to have the company of no Campanian except his hosts and Vibellius Taurea, a distinguished soldier. [6] They began feasting by daylight, and the banquet was not according to Carthaginian custom or military regimen, but provided with all that tempts indulgence, as it was to be expected in a city, and a house as well, of wealth and luxury. [7] Calavius the son was the only one who could not be prevailed upon to drink either by the invitation of the owners or even, now and then, of Hannibal. He himself pleaded ill health as an excuse, while his father alleged distress of mind also, at which one could not wonder. [8] About sunset the son followed the elder Calavius coming out from the feast, and when they had reached a secluded spot —it [9] was a garden in the rear of the house —he said: “I propose a plan, father, by which we may not only gain pardon from the Romans for our offence in having revolted to Hannibal, but as Campanians may be in a position of much greater respect and favour than we should ever have been otherwise.” [10] When the astonished father asked what that plan was, the son throwing his toga off his shoulder bared his side girt with a sword. [11] “Presently,” he said, “I will ratify a treaty with the Romans by the blood of Hannibal. I wished you to know that in advance, in case you should prefer not to be there when the deed is being done.”

9. When the old man saw and heard that, he was beside himself with fear, as if he were already present at the execution of the plan of which he was [p. 27]being told, and said: [2] “I pray and implore you, my²⁶ son, by all the rights which link children to their parents, not to do and suffer all that is unutterable before the eyes of your father. [3] It is but a few hours since, with an oath by all the gods that exist and joining our right hands to his, we pledged our honour. Was it with the intention, as soon as we left the conference, to arm against him the hands hallowed by our plighted faith? [4] From the hospitable board, to which you were invited by Hannibal with but two other Campanians, do you rise with the intention of staining that very board with the blood of a guest? [5] Was I able as a father to reconcile Hannibal with my son, and can not reconcile my son with Hannibal? But assuming that there is nothing hallowed, no honour, no scruple, no filial devotion, dare to do unspeakable things, if they do not bring destruction to us as well as guilt. [6] Single-handed will you attack Hannibal? What of that crowd, so many free men and slaves? What of all men's eyes fixed upon one man? [7] What of so many sword-hands? Will they be paralysed in the moment of that mad deed? Will you withstand Hannibal's own countenance, which armed forces have been unable to withstand, which the Roman people dreads? Supposing that help from others is lacking, will you bring yourself to strike me, when I interpose my body in place of Hannibal's? And yet it is through my breast that you will have to attack him and run him through. [8] But allow yourself to be dissuaded here, rather than overpowered there. Let my prayers prove effectual with you, as they have proved this day for you.” [9] Seeing the young man in tears he threw his arms about his waist, and repeatedly kissing him he did [p. 29]not desist from entreaties until he had prevailed upon²⁷ him to put down his sword and give his pledge that he would do no such crime. [10] Then the young man said: “As for me, I will pay my father the debt of devotion which I owe to my country. [11] For you I am sorry, for you will have to meet the charge of thrice betraying your country, once when you took part in the revolt from the Romans, a second time when you advised peace with Hannibal, a third time today when you are an obstacle and a hindrance to restoring Capua to the Romans. [12] Do you, my country, take back the sword with which I had armed myself in your defence and entered this stronghold of the enemy; for my father wrests it from me.” [13] Having thus spoken, he threw the sword over the garden wall into a street, and, that his conduct might not be open to suspicion, himself returned to the banquet.

10. On the following day a full session of the senate was given to Hannibal. There his speech was at the outset very genial and kindly, thanking the Campanians for having preferred his friendship to a Roman alliance. [2] And among his other magnificent assurances he promised them that Capua should soon be the capital of all Italy, and that from it the Roman people along with the rest of the nations should derive its law. [3] He said that one man had no part in friendship with Carthage and the treaty made with himself, namely Magius Decius, a man who ought neither to be a Campanian nor to be so called; he demanded that the man be surrendered to him, and that in his own presence his case be brought up and a decree of the senate framed. [4] All voted for that proposal, although it seemed to many of them that the man did not deserve that misfortune; also [p. 31]that the right of liberty was being infringed by a first²⁸ act that was not insignificant. [5] Leaving the Senate House Hannibal took his seat on the tribune of the magistrates and ordered the arrest of Decius Magius, and that he be placed at his feet and make his defence. [6] While with undaunted spirit Magius was saying that by the terms of the treaty he could not be compelled to do that, chains were put upon him and he was ordered to be led to the camp with a lictor following. [7] So long as they led him with bare head, he kept haranguing as he went, shouting to the crowd all about him: “You have the freedom you wanted, Campanians. Through the middle of the market-place, in broad daylight, before your eyes, I, who am second to no one of the Campanians, am being hurried away in chains to my death. [8] What deed of greater violence could be done if Capua had been taken? Go to meet Hannibal, decorate your city and make the day of his coming a holiday, —that you may witness this triumph over your fellow-citizen.”

[9] As he was thus shouting and the populace seemed to be aroused, his head was covered and they were ordered to drag him more swiftly outside the gate. [10] Thus he was led into the camp, at once put on shipboard and consigned to Carthage, for fear, if there should be some outbreak at Capua in consequence of the shameful act, the senate also might regret having surrendered a leading man, and, when an embassy was sent to demand his return, Hannibal either must offend his new allies by refusing their first request, or by granting it be obliged to keep at Capua a fomenter of insurrection and riots. [11] A storm carried the ship to Cyrenae, which was then subject to kings.²⁹ On fleeing for refuge to the statue of [p. 33]King Ptolemy there, Magius was carried under guard³⁰ to Ptolemy at Alexandria. [12] And having informed him that he had been bound by Hannibal contrary to his treaty rights, he was freed from his chains and allowed to return to Rome or to Capua, as he might prefer. [13] Magius said that Capua was unsafe for him, and on the other hand, at a time when there was a war between the Romans and the Campanians, Rome would be the abode of a deserter rather than of a guest; that he had no wish to live elsewhere than in the land of a king in whom he found the giver and defender of his freedom.

11. While these things were going on, Quintus Fabius Pictor³¹ returned to Rome from his embassy to Delphi and read from a manuscript the response of the oracle. In it were indicated the gods and goddesses to whom offerings should be made, and in what manner. [2] It continued: “If you do thus, Romans, your situation will be better and easier, and your state will go on more in accordance with your desire, and the Roman people will have the victory in the war. [3] When you have successfully administered and preserved your state, from the gains made you shall send a gift to Pythian Apollo and do honour to him out of the booty, the profits and the spoils. [4] You shall keep yourselves from exulting.” After reading these words translated from the Greek verses, he went on to say that, on coming out of the oracle, he had at once made offerings to all those divinities with incense and wine; [5] also that he had been bidden by the high-priest of the temple, just as he had come to the oracle and also conducted the rite while wearing a garland of laurel, so also to wear the garland when he boarded the ship, and not to lay [p. 35]it aside until he should reach Rome. [6] Further, that³² he had carried out with the utmost scrupulosity and care all the instructions given him, and had then laid the wreath upon the altar of Apollo at Rome. [7] The senate decreed that at the first opportunity those rites should be duly observed with prayers.

While these things were happening at Rome and in Italy, Mago, the son of Hamilcar, had come to Carthage to report the victory at Cannae. He had not been sent by his brother directly from the battle, but had been detained for some time in taking over the Bruttian states which were revolting.³³ [8] Accorded a hearing in the senate, he set forth the achievements of his brother in Italy: that he had fought pitched battles with six high commanders, of whom four were consuls,³⁴ and two a dictator and a master of the horse,³⁵ in all with six consular armies; [9] that he had slain over 200,000 of the enemy and captured over 50,000;³⁶ that of the four consuls he had slain two;³⁷ of the other two one had fled wounded,³⁸ the other with barely fifty men, after losing his entire army;³⁹ that the master of the horse, whose power is that of a consul, had been routed and put to flight; [10] that the dictator was accounted an extraordinary general because he never ventured into battle-line; [11] that the Bruttians and Apulians and some of the Samnites and Lucanians had revolted to the Carthaginians; that [p. 37]Capua, which was the capital not only of Campania,⁴⁰ but, since the blow inflicted upon the Roman state by the battle of Cannae, of Italy also, had surrendered to Hannibal. [12] For these victories, so many and so great, it was proper, he said, that gratitude be expressed and felt toward the immortal gods.

12. Then in evidence of such successes he ordered the golden rings to be poured out at the entrance of the Senate House. And so great was the heap of them that, when measured, they filled, as some historians assert, three pecks and a half. [2] The prevailing report, and nearer the truth, is that there was not more than one peck. Then, that it might be proof of a greater calamity, he added in explanation that no one but a knight, and even of the knights only those of the higher class, wore that token. [3] The main point of his speech was that the nearer Hannibal came to realizing his hope of ending the war, the more necessary it was to help him by every means. For his campaigning was far from home, in the midst of the enemy's country. [4] A large amount of grain and money was being consumed, he said, and though so many battles had destroyed the enemy's armies, still they had considerably diminished the forces of the victor as well. [5] Therefore they must send reinforcements, they must send money to pay them and grain to soldiers who had deserved so well of the Carthaginian nation.

After these words of Mago, while all were rejoicing, Himilco, a man of the Barca party, thought it an opportunity to rebuke Hanno. [6] “Tell me, Hanno,” he-said, “is it still to be regretted that we undertook a war against the Romans? Order the surrender of Hannibal! [7] In the midst of such successes forbid the [p. 39]rendering of thanks to the immortal gods! Let us⁴¹ listen to a Roman senator in the Carthaginian 'Senate House.” [8] Thereupon Hanno said: “I should have remained silent to-day, members of the senate, for fear of saying something which in the universal rejoicing would bring less joy to you. [9] As it is, when a senator asks me whether it is still a matter of regret that we entered upon a war against the Romans, if I were to remain silent I should be thought either haughty or subservient, of which the one marks a man forgetful of another's independence, the other a man who forgets his own. [10] I should like to say in reply to Himilco,” he said, “that I have not ceased to regret the war, and will not cease to accuse your invincible commander until I shall see the war ended on some sufferable terms; nor will anything else than a new peace end my longing for the old peace. [11] And so those facts which Mago has just boastfully reported already give joy to Himilco and the other minions of Hannibal, and may give joy to me, since successes in war, if we are willing to make use of our good fortune, will give us a more favourable peace. [12] I mean that if we let slip this moment, when we may be considered as giving, rather than receiving, a peace, I fear that this joy also of ours may run to excess and come to nothing.⁴² [13] But even now what is it worth? ' I have slain armies of the enemy. Send me soldiers! ' What else would you ask for if you had been defeated? [14] ' I have captured two camps of the enemy,' full of booty and supplies, of course. ' Give me grain and money! [15] ' What else would you beg if you had been despoiled, if you had lost your camp? And, not to have all the amazement to myself —for it is right and proper for me too, having [p. 41]answered Himilco, to turn questioner, —I [16] should like⁴³ either Himilco or Mago to answer, in the first place, whether any state among the Latins has revolted to us, although the battle of Cannae meant the utter destruction of the Roman power, and it is known that all Italy is in revolt; in the second place, whether any man out of the thirty-five tribes has deserted to Hannibal.” [17] On Mago's negative answer to both Hanno said: "Accordingly there remains, to be sure, a very great number of the enemy. But what spirit, what hope that multitude has, I should like to know.' 13. As Mago said he did not know, “Nothing is easier to know,” said Hanno. “Have the Romans sent any emissaries to Hannibal suing for peace? Has it been reported to you that even any mention of peace has been made at Rome?” [2] The answer to this also being negative, “Therefore,” he said, “we have the war intact, as truly as we had on the day on which Hannibal crossed into Italy. [3] How often victory shifted in the previous Punic War⁴⁴ very many of us are alive to remember. Never have our fortunes seemed more favourable on land and sea than they were before the consulship of Gaius Lutatius and Aulus Postumius. But in the consulship of Lutatius and Postumius we were utterly defeated off the Aegates Islands.⁴⁵ [4] And if now also-may the gods avert the omen! —fortune shall shift to any extent, do you hope that at the time of our defeat we shall have a peace which no one gives us now when we are victorious? [5] For myself, if some one is about to bring up the question either of offering peace to the enemy or of accepting it, I know what opinion to express. But if you are raising the question of Mago's demands, I do not think it to the [p. 43]point to send those things to victors, and I think it⁴⁶ much less necessary to send them to men who are deluding us with a hope unfounded and empty.”

[6] Not many were moved by Hanno's speech. For the feud with the Barca family made his advice less weighty, and then minds filled with the joy of the moment would not listen to anything which made their rejoicing less well-founded. And they thought that, if they were willing to add a little to their efforts, the war would soon be finished. [7] Accordingly the senate with great unanimity decreed that four thousand Numidians should be sent to Hannibal as a reinforcement;⁴⁷ also forty elephants and . . . silver talents. [8] And . . . was sent in advance to Spain with Mago,⁴⁸ for the purpose of hiring twenty thousand infantry and four thousand horse, to reinforce the armies that were in Italy and those in Spain.

14. But, as usual in prosperous times, these measures were carried out without spirit and in leisurely fashion, while the Romans, in addition to their inborn activity, were prevented by misfortune also from delaying. [2] That is, the consul was not found wanting in anything which it was his to do, and the dictator, Marcus Junius Pera, after performing the religious rites, proposed to the people according to custom a bill allowing him to be mounted.⁴⁹ [3] And then, in addition to the two city legions which had been enrolled by the consuls at the beginning of the year, and the levy of slaves, also the cohorts raised from the Picene and Gallic districts, he stooped [p. 45]to that last defence of a state almost despaired of,⁵⁰ when honour yields to necessity: namely, he issued an edict that, if any men who had committed a capital offence, or were in chains as judgment debtors, should become soldiers under him, he would order their release from punishment or debt. [4] Six thousand such men he armed with Gallic spoils which had been carried in the triumph of Gaius Flaminius,⁵¹ and thus set out from the city with twenty-five thousand armed men.

[5] Hannibal, after gaining possession of Capua and vainly trying, partly by hope, partly by fear, to work for the second time upon the feelings of the Neapolitans, led his army over into the territory of Nola. [6] Though this was not at first with hostile intent, since he did not despair of a voluntary surrender, still he was ready, if they baulked his hope, to omit none of the things which they might suffer or fear to suffer. The senate and especially its leading members stood loyally by the alliance with Rome. [7] But the common people, as usual, were all for a change of government and for Hannibal; and they called to mind the fear of devastation of their lands and the many hardships and indignities they must suffer in case of a siege. And men were not lacking to propose revolt. [8] Accordingly the senators, now obsessed by the fear that, if they should move openly, there could be no resisting the excited crowd, found a way to postpone the evil by pretending agreement. [9] For they pretend that they favour revolt to Hannibal, but that there is no agreement as to the terms on which they may go over to a new alliance and friendship. [10] Thus gaining time, they send emissaries in haste to the Roman praetor, Marcellus Claudius, who [p. 47]was at Casilinum⁵² with his army, and inform him in⁵³ what danger the Nolan state is placed; that its territory is in the hands of Hannibal and the Carthaginians, and that the city will be so at once, if help be not given; [11] that the senate, by conceding to the common people that they would revolt whenever the people wished, had prevented their making haste to revolt. [12] Marcellus, after warmly praising the men of Nola, bade them postpone matters by the same pretence until his arrival; in the meantime to conceal the dealings they had had with him and all hope of Roman aid. [13] He himself went from Casilinum to Caiatia, and thence, after crossing the river Volturnus, made his way to Nola through the territory of Saticula and that of Trebia, above Suessula and through the mountains.⁵⁴

15. Upon the arrival of the Roman praetor the Carthaginian left the territory of Nola and came down to the sea near Neapolis, desiring to gain possession of a coast town to which ships might have a safe passage from Africa. [2] But on learning that Neapolis was held by a Roman prefect —it was Marcus Junius Silanus, who had been called in by the Neapolitans themselves —he turned aside from Neapolis also, as he had from Nola, and made for Nuceria. [3] He had besieged that city for some time, often attacking, often attempting in vain to win over the populace, and at another time the leading citizens, when at last by starving them he gained their surrender, stipulating that they leave unarmed and with one garment only. [4] And then, as from the beginning he had wished to be thought merciful to all Italians except the Romans, he promised rewards and honours to any who remained and would serve under [p. 49]him. [5] And yet he did not hold anyone by that hope.⁵⁵ They all dispersed, wherever hospitality or impulse happened to carry them, among the cities of Campania, especially Nola and Neapolis. [6] A group of some thirty senators, and as it chanced all the most prominent, came to Capua, and being refused admission because they had closed their gates to Hannibal, went to Cumae. At Nuceria the booty was given to the soldiers, the city sacked and burned.

As for Nola, Marcellus held it not more by confidence in his force than by the good-will of the leading citizens. [7] He was apprehensive of the common people and above all of Lucius Bantius, who was impelled by the consciousness of an attempted revolt and by fear of the Roman praetor, now to betray his native city, now, if fortune should not favour him in that, to desert. [8] He was a young man of spirit and at that time almost the best-known horseman among the allies. He had been found half-dead at Cannae in a pile of the slain; and Hannibal, after nursing him kindly, had sent him home, even adding gifts. [9] Out of gratitude for that service Bantius had wished to put the state of Nola under the authority and rule of the Carthaginian. And the praetor saw that he was troubled and tormented by his desire for a revolution. But since he had either to be restrained by punishment or else won over by kindness, Marcellus preferred rather to gain for himself a brave and energetic ally than merely to take such a man away from the enemy, and [10??] summoning him addressed him kindly. [11] It was easy, he said, to judge that he had among his countrymen many who envied him, and this from the fact that no citizen of Nola had told the speaker how many were his [p. 51]brilliant feats of arms. [12] But to a man who had served⁵⁶ in the Roman camp his bravery could not be unknown. Many who had been in the service with Bantius were telling the speaker what a man he was, and what dangers he had incurred for the safety and honour of the Roman people, and how often; [13] also how at the battle of Cannae he had not ceased fighting until, almost lifeless, he had been overwhelmed by the mass of men, horses and arms that fell upon him. “And so,” he said, “all honour to your courage! [14] Under me you will have every advancement and every reward, and the more constantly you are with me, the more you will feel that it is a distinction and an advantage to you.” [15] The youth was delighted with the promises, and Marcellus gave him a fine horse and ordered the quaestor to pay him five hundred denarii.⁵⁷ The lictors were bidden to allow him access to the commander whenever he wished. 16. By this kindliness on the part of Marcellus the high spirit of the young man was so tempered that thereafter none of the allies more bravely and loyally aided the Roman cause.

[2] While Hannibal was at the gates —for he again moved his camp from Nuceria to Nola —and [3] the common people of Nola were making fresh plans to revolt, Marcellus, upon the arrival of the enemy, withdrew within the walls, not fearing for his camp, but lest he give the great number who were impatient for it an opportunity to betray the city. [4] Then on both sides they began to form their battle-lines, the Romans before the walls of Nola, the Carthaginians in front of their camp. Thereupon there were small engagements with varying results in the space between the city and the camp, since the commanders [p. 53]wished neither to forbid small numbers who rashly⁵⁸ challenged the enemy, nor to give the signal for a general engagement. [5] During this daily guard-duty of the two armies leading citizens of Nola reported to Marcellus that conferences between the common people and the Carthaginians were taking place by night; [6] and that it had been settled that, when the Roman force should be outside the gates and in line, they would plunder their baggage-train and their packs, then close the gates and take possession of the walls, so that, having the control of their affairs and the city in their own hands, they would then admit the Carthaginian instead of the Roman. [7] This being reported to Marcellus, he warmly praised the senators of Nola and resolved to try the fortune of battle before there should be any movement in the city. [8] At the three gates facing the enemy he drew up his army in three sections. He ordered the baggage to bring up the rear, the camp-servants and sutlers and incapacitated soldiers to carry stakes. At the middle gate he posted the pick of the legionaries with the Roman cavalry, at the two gates to right and left the recruits, light-armed and cavalry of the allies. [9] The men of Nola were forbidden to approach the walls and gates, and the forces to be used as reserves were assigned to the baggage, in order to prevent an attack upon it while the legions were fighting. [10] In this formation they were standing inside the gates.

Hannibal, who remained in battle-line under the standards until late in the day, as he had done for several days, at first wondered that the Roman army did not come out of the gate and that there was not one armed man on the walls. [11] Then, supposing [p. 55]the conferences to have been betrayed, and that⁵⁹ inaction was the result of fear, he sent part of his soldiers back to the camp, with orders to bring up in haste to the front line all the equipment for besieging the city. [12] He was quite confident that, if he should press the hesitating, the common people would stir up some outbreak in the city. While they were scattering to their several duties and hastening to the first standards, and the line was advancing to the walls, the gate suddenly opened and Marcellus ordered the trumpets to be sounded and a shout raised; that infantry at first, and then cavalry should sally out against the enemy with all the dash possible. [13] They had carried sufficient panic and confusion into the centre, when Publius Valerius Flaccus and Gaius Aurelius, his lieutenants, sallied out of the two gates on this side and that, to attack the enemy's wings. [14] Sutlers and camp-servants raised another shout, as did the rest of the crowd stationed to guard the baggage so that the shouting gave the sudden impression of a very large army to the Carthaginians, who particularly despised their small numbers. [15] I should hardly venture to assert, what some have affirmed, that 2800 of the enemy were slain, while not more than 500 of the Romans were lost. [16] But whether the victory was on such a scale or less, a very great thing, I rather think the greatest in that war, was accomplished that day. For not to be defeated by Hannibal was a more difficult thing than it was later to defeat him.

17. Now that Hannibal had lost hope of gaining Nola and had retired to Acerrae, Marcellus at once closed the gates, stationed guards to prevent anyone from leaving, and carried on in the forum an [p. 57]investigation of those who had been in secret⁶⁰ conferences with the enemy. [2] Over seventy having been condemned as traitors, he beheaded them and ordered that their possessions should be public property of the Roman people. [3] And setting out with his whole army, after turning over the government to the senate, he pitched camp and established himself above Suessula. [4] The Carthaginian first tried to entice Acerrae into a voluntary surrender; then, seeing them steadfast, prepared to blockade and attack them. But the men of Acerrae had more courage than resources. [5] Accordingly they gave up hope of defending the city, and when they saw that their walls were being encircled, before the enemy's works should be made continuous, they slipped away in the dead of night through the gaps in the earthworks and through neglected guard-posts. [6] Making their way along the roads and where there were none, just as prudence or chance guided the wanderer, they fled for refuge to those cities of Campania of which it was known that they had not changed sides.

[7] After plundering and burning Acerrae, when word had come from Casilinum that the Roman dictator and fresh legions were being summoned, Hannibal led his army to Casilinum, in order to prevent any uprising at Capua also, while the enemy's camp was so near. [8] Casilinum was at that time held by five hundred Praenestines, with a few Romans and Latins, whom the news of the disaster at Cannae had brought thither. [9] As the levy at Praeneste was not completed at the proper date, they had been late in setting out from home, and had reached Casilinum before the news of the defeat. And joined by others, Romans and allies, they set out from Casilinum and, as [p. 59]they were proceeding in a fairly large column, the⁶¹ report of the battle of Cannae turned them back again to Casilinum. [10] There, being suspected by the Campanians and apprehensive, they spent some days in alternately guarding against plots and hatching them. When credibly informed that the revolt of Capua and Hannibal's entry were being negotiated, they slew townspeople in the night and seized that part of the city which is on this side⁶² of the Volturnus —for it is divided by that river; and this was the garrison the Romans had at Casilinum. [11] It was joined by a cohort from Perusia, four hundred and sixty men, who had been driven to Casilinum by the same news as the Praenestines a few days before. [12] And there were quite enough men to defend so small a walled city, bounded on one side by the river. But the lack of grain made it seem that there were even too many men.

18. Hannibal, being now not far away, sent his Gaetulians ahead under a prefect named Isalcas.. And he ordered him, if there should be an opportunity for a conference, at first by kind words to entice them to open the gates and admit a garrison; but if they persisted in their obstinacy, to use force and see if at some point he could make his way into the city. [2] When they approached the walls, because of the stillness they thought them deserted. And the barbarian, supposing the garrison had withdrawn in alarm, was preparing to force the gates and break open the bars, when suddenly [3??] the gates were opened and the two cohorts, drawn up inside for that very purpose, sallied out with a mighty uproar, and wrought havoc among the enemy. [4] The first troops being thus beaten back, Maharbal, who had been [p. 61]sent with a larger number of picked men, was⁶³ likewise unable to withstand the sally of the cohorts. [5] Finally Hannibal pitched his camp directly before the walls and prepared to assault the small city and small garrison with the greatest violence and with all his forces. And while he was pressing the attack, the walls being completely encircled by his men, he lost a considerable number, the most active at that, being hit by missiles from the wall and the towers. [6] When they actually sallied out once, he almost cut off their retreat by sending a column of elephants⁶⁴ against them, and drove them in alarm into the city, after a good number, for so small a force, had been slain. [7] More would have fallen if night had not interrupted the battle. On the next day all were fired to make the assault, especially after a mural crown of gold⁶⁵ was displayed to them, and the general himself kept making their spiritless attack upon a fort on level [8??] ground a reproach to the captors of Saguntum,⁶⁶ reminding them singly and collectively of Cannae and Trasumennus and Trebia. Then they began to push forward their sheds also and mines. [9] And to meet the different attempts made by the enemy no kind of activity, no ingenuity, proved lacking to the allies of the Romans. They set up defences to meet the sheds; by transverse mines they intercepted the enemy's mines; they forestalled his attempts both visible and invisible, until shame helped to divert Hannibal from his undertaking. [10] And after fortifying his camp and posting a small garrison, that the attempt might not appear to have been abandoned, he retired into winter-quarters at Capua.

There he kept under roofs for the greater part of [p. 63]the winter troops that had been hardened long and⁶⁷ repeatedly against all human hardships, but had no experience or familiarity with comforts. [11] And so those whom no severe hardship had conquered were ruined by excess of comfort and immoderate pleasures and the more completely ruined the more eagerly they in their inexperience had plunged into them. [12] For sleep and wine, and feasts and harlots, and baths and idleness, which habit made daily more seductive, so weakened their bodies and spirits that it was their past victories rather than their present strength which thereafter protected them; and this was regarded among the military experts as a more serious failure in their commander than that he had not led his men from the field of Cannae forthwith to the city of Rome. [13] For that delay could be regarded as having merely retarded the victory, this mistake as having robbed him of the power to win. [14] And so in fact, just as if he were setting out from Capua with a different army, not a trace of the old-time morale survived. [15] For they came back most of them ensnared by harlots, and also as soon as they began to be quartered in tents, and the march and other tasks of the soldier followed, they would give out both in body and in spirit after the manner of recruits. [16] And afterwards through the whole season of summer camps a great many kept slipping away from their standards without furloughs; and deserters had no hiding-places other than Capua.⁶⁸

19. But when winter was now growing mild, Hannibal led his troops out of winter quarters and returned to Casilinum. [2] There, although they had been making no more attacks, an uninterrupted [p. 65]blockade had nevertheless brought townspeople⁶⁹ and garrison to extreme want. [3] The Roman camp was commanded by Tiberius Sempronius, since the dictator had gone to Rome to take new auspices.⁷⁰ [4] Marcellus, who was likewise eager to bring aid to the besieged, was held back both by a flood of the river Volturnus and by entreaties of the men of Nola and Acerrae,⁷¹ who feared the Campanians if the Roman garrison should withdraw. [5] Gracchus, merely remaining near Casilinum, because it was the dictator's order that he take no action in his absence, made no move, although facts which would easily pass all endurance were being reported from Casilinum. [6] For it was established that some, unable to endure hunger, had thrown themselves from the wall, and that men stood unarmed on the walls exposing unprotected bodies to wounds from missile weapons. [7] Gracchus, though indignant at this, did not dare to engage the enemy without the dictator's order, and saw that, if he should try openly to carry in grain, he must fight. [8] As there was also no hope of carrying it in secretly, he filled many huge jars with spelt brought from the farms all around, and sent word to the magistrate at Casilinum that they should catch up the jars which the river was bringing down. [9] In the following night, while all were intent upon the river and the hope aroused by the Roman messenger, the jars set adrift in midstream floated down, and the grain was evenly divided among them all. This was done the next day also and the third day. [10] It was night when they were set adrift and when they arrived. [11] In that way they escaped the notice of the enemy's guards. After that the stream, now swifter than usual because of incessant rains, forced [p. 67]the jars by a cross current to the bank guarded by⁷² the enemy. There, caught among the willows growing on the banks, they were seen and it was reported to Hannibal. And thereafter by a closer watch they saw to it that nothing sent down the Volturnus to the city should escape notice.⁷³ [12] However nuts which were poured out from the Roman camp, as they floated down the middle of the river to Casilinum, were caught by wattled hurdles.

[13] Finally they reached such a pitch of distress that they tried, after softening them by hot water, to chew thongs and the hides stripped off of shields; and they did not abstain from rats and other animals, and dug out every kind of plant and root from the bank beneath the wall. [14] And when the enemy had ploughed up all the grassy ground outside the wall, the garrison sowed turnips,⁷⁴ so that Hannibal exclaimed “Am I to sit before Casilinum until those seeds come up?” [15] And the man who had never before listened to any terms now at last allowed them to treat with him in regard to ransoming the free men. Seven-twelfths of a pound of gold was agreed upon as the price per man.⁷⁵ [16] On receiving his promise they surrendered. They were kept in chains until all the gold was paid, then with strict regard for his promise they were released. [17] This is the more correct version than that they were slain by a charge of cavalry as they departed. The majority were Praenestines. Of the five hundred and seventy who were in the garrison sword and starvation carried off less than half. The rest returned safe to Praeneste with their commander Marcus Anicius, who had [p. 69]formerly been a clerk. [18] As evidence there formerly⁷⁶ stood in the forum of Praeneste a statue of the man, wearing a cuirass and draped in a toga, with his head covered. It had an inscription on a bronze plate, stating that Marcus Anicius had paid his vow on behalf of the soldiers who were in the garrison at Casilinum. The same inscription was placed beneath three images of gods set up in the Temple of Fortune. 20. The town of Casilinum was restored to the Campanians and defended by a garrison of seven hundred men from the army of Hannibal, that the Romans might not attack it when the Carthaginian should withdraw. [2] To the Praenestine soldiers the Roman senate voted double pay and exemption from service for five years. Though rewarded for their courage with the gift of Roman citizenship, they made no change.⁷⁷ [3] As to the fate of the Perusians the report is less clear, since no light has been thrown upon it either by any record of their own or by a decree of the Romans.

[4] At the same time the Petelini,⁷⁸ who alone among the Bruttians had remained in the friendship of Rome, were being attacked not only by the Carthaginians, who were holding the region, but also by the rest of the Bruttians for not making common cause with them. [5] Unable to withstand these dangers, the Petelini sent legates to Rome to ask for a garrison. The prayers of the legates and their tears —for when ordered to shift for themselves they gave way to tearful complaints before the entrance of the Senate House —stirred great compassion among senators and people. [6] And when consulted a second time by Marcus Aemilius, a praetor,⁷⁹ the senators, after surveying all the resources of the empire, were [p. 71]compelled to admit that they themselves no longer⁸⁰ had any means to protect distant allies. They ordered them to return home, and having fulfilled their obligation to the last, to shift for themselves for the future as best the situation permitted. [7] When this outcome of the embassy was reported at Petelia, such dejection and fear unexpectedly seized their senate that some proposed to flee, each taking any possible road, and to [8??] abandon the city, while others, since they had been deserted by their old allies, proposed to join the rest of the Bruttians and through them to surrender to Hannibal. [9] But those who thought nothing should be done hastily or rashly, and that they should deliberate again, prevailed. [10] When the matter was brought up in less excitement the following day, the optimates carried their point, that they should bring in everything from the farms and strengthen the city and the walls.⁸¹

21. About the same time letters from Sicily and Sardinia were brought to Rome. [2] First to be read in the senate were those from Sicily and Titus Otacilius, the propraetor, reporting that Publius Furius, the praetor, had come with his fleet from Africa to Lilybaeum; that Furius himself had been seriously wounded and his life was in the utmost danger; [3] that neither pay nor grain was being furnished to the [4??] soldiers and the crews at the proper date, and they had no means of doing so; [5] that he strongly urged that both be sent as soon as possible, and that they send a successor chosen, if they saw fit, from the number of the new praetors. [6] Much the same facts in regard to pay and grain were reported from Sardinia by Aulus Cornelius Mammula, the propraetor. To each the reply was that there [p. 73]was nothing on hand to send, and they were ordered⁸² to provide for their own fleets and armies. [7] Titus Otacilius sent legates to Hiero, the mainstay of the Roman people,⁸³ and received what money was needed for pay, and grain for six months. In Sardinia the allied states made generous contributions to Cornelius. [2] And at Rome besides, on account of the lack of money, three bank-commissioners were named in accordance with a bill of Marcus Minucius, a tribune of the plebs, namely, Lucius Aemilius Papus, who [3??] had been consul and censor, and Marcus Atilius Regulus, who had been consul twice, and Lucius Scribonius Libo, who was at that time a tribune of the plebs. And Marcus Atilius and Gaius Atilius, elected duumvirs, dedicated a temple of Concord,⁸⁴ which Lucius Manlius had vowed in his praetorship. [4] And three pontiffs, Quintus Caecilius Metellus and Quintus Fabius Maximus and Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, were elected⁸⁵ in place of Publius Scantinius, deceased, and of Lucius Aemilius Paulus, the consul, and Quintus Aelius Paetus, both of whom had fallen in the battle- of Cannae.

XXII. After making good, in so far as they could accomplish it by human wisdom, the other losses fortune had caused by a series of disasters, the fathers at last had regard for themselves as well and for the desolate Senate House and the small number that came to the council of state. [5] For since the censorship of Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Flaminius the list of the senate had not been revised, although the defeats and in addition the fate of individuals [p. 75]had in the five years carried off so large a number⁸⁶ of senators. Marcus Aemilius, the praetor, raised that question, as all demanded that he should, since the dictator had already gone to the army after the loss of Casilinum. [6] Thereupon Spurius Carvilius, after complaining in a long speech, not of the lack of senators only, but also of the small number of citizens from whom [7??] men might be chosen into the senate, said that for the sake of recruiting the senate and of linking the Latins more closely with the Roman people, he strongly urged that citizenship be bestowed upon two senators from each of the Latin states, to be selected by the Roman fathers; and that from this number men be chosen into the senate in place of the deceased members. [8] The fathers gave no more favourable hearing to this proposal than they had given to a former demand of the Latins themselves.⁸⁷ There was a murmur of indignation everywhere in the hall, and in particular Titus Manlius said that there still lived a man of the family to which belonged the consul who on the Capitol had once threatened that he would slay with his own hand any Latin he should see in the Senate House.⁸⁸ [9] Upon that Quintus Fabius Maximus said that never had anything been mentioned in the senate at a more unfavourable moment than this had been broached, in the midst of such unsettled feeling and wavering loyalty among the allies, only to stir them up the more; that that rash utterance of a single man should be drowned by silence on the part of them all; and that, if there was ever any hallowed secret to be left unmentioned [p. 77]in the senate, this above all others must be covered,⁸⁹ concealed, forgotten, considered unsaid. [10] So mention of the matter was suppressed.

It was decided that as dictator, to draw up the list of the senate, a man should be appointed who had previously been censor and was senior to all the other living ex-censors. [11] And they ordered that Gaius Terentius,⁹⁰ the consul, be summoned that he might name a dictator. He returned to Rome by long stages from Apulia, leaving a garrison there; and that night, as was the custom, in accordance with the decree of the senate he named Marcus Fabius Buteo dictator for six months without master of the horse. 23. Fabius mounted the Rostra with his lictors and said that he did not approve of two dictators at the [2??] same time, an unprecedented thing,⁹¹ nor of a dictator without master of the horse, nor of conferring a censor's power upon one man, and in fact to the same man a second time, nor of giving the full military authority for six months to a dictator not appointed for the conduct of affairs. He said that he would set a limit to such possible irregularities as the crisis and necessity had occasioned. [3] For he would not eject from the senate any of those whom Gaius Flaminius and Lucius Aemilius as censors had chosen into the senate, but would order their names merely [4??] to be copied and read out, that judgment and decision in regard to the reputation and character of a senator might not rest with one man. And in place of the deceased he would make his choice in such a way that rank should obviously have been preferred to rank, not man to man. [5] After reading the list of the old senate, he chose in place of the deceased first those who since the censorship of Lucius Aemilius [p. 79]and Gaius Flaminius⁹² had held a curule office and had⁹³ not yet been chosen into the senate,⁹⁴ in each case in the order of his election. [6] Then he chose those who had been aediles,⁹⁵ tribunes of the people or quaestors; then, from the number of those who had not held offices, the men who had spoils of the enemy affixed to their houses or had received the civic wreath.⁹⁶ [7] Having thus chosen a hundred and seventy-seven into the senate with great approval, he at once abdicated his office and came down from the Rostra a private citizen, after ordering his lictors to leave him. [8] And he mingled with the crowd of those engaged in private business, deliberately killing time, in order not to draw the people away from the forum for the purpose of escorting him. Yet men's attention was not relaxed by that delay, and so in large numbers they escorted him home. [9] The consul returned that night to the army without informing the senate, for fear of being detained in the city to conduct the elections.

24. On the next day the senate, presided over by Marcus Pomponius, the praetor, decreed that the dictator should be informed by letter that, if he thought it to the public interest, he should come with the master of the horse and the praetor, Marcus Marcellus, for the election of consuls, in [2??] order that from them in person the fathers could learn what was the condition of the state and make their plans in accordance with the facts. All of those summoned came, leaving their lieutenants to command the legions. [3] The dictator spoke briefly and [p. 81]modestly of himself, and then diverted a large share⁹⁷ of the glory⁹⁸ to the master of the horse, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus; and he ordered the elections at which these consuls were named: Lucius Postumius for the third time, then absent with Gaul as his sphere of action, and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who was at that time master of the horse and curule aedile. [4] Then the following men were elected as praetors: Marcus Valerius Laevinus for the second time, Appius Claudius Pulcher, Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, Quintus Mucius Scaevola. [5] The dictator, after the election of magistrates, returned to the army and the winter quarters at Teanum,⁹⁹ leaving the master of the horse at Rome, in order that he, inasmuch as he was to enter upon office a few days later, might advise with the fathers in regard to enrolling and providing armies for the year.

[6] Just as these measures were being taken, a fresh disaster was reported —for fortune was piling one upon another for that year —namely, that the consul designate, Lucius Postumius, had perished, himself and his army, in Gaul. There was a huge forest,¹⁰⁰ called Litana by the Gauls, by way of which he was about to lead his army. [7] In that forest the Gauls hacked the trees to right and left of the road in such a way that, if not disturbed, they stood, but fell if pushed slightly. [8] Postumius had two Roman legions, and had enlisted from the coast of the Upper Sea¹⁰¹ such numbers of allies that he led twenty-five thousand armed men into the enemy's territory. [9] The Gauls had surrounded the very edge of the forest, [p. 83]and when the column entered a defile¹⁰² they pushed¹⁰³ against the outermost of the trees that had been hacked near the ground. As these fell, each upon the next tree, which was in itself unsteady and had only a slight hold, piling up from both sides they overwhelmed arms, men and horses, so that hardly ten men escaped. [10] For after very many had been killed by tree-trunks and broken branches, and the rest of the troops were alarmed by the unforeseen calamity, the Gauls under arms, surrounding the whole defile¹⁰⁴ slew them, while but few out of so many were captured, —the men who were making their way to a bridge over a river, but were cut off, since the bridge had by that time been occupied by the enemy. [11] There Postumius fell fighting with all his might to avoid capture. Spoils taken from his body and the severed head of the general were carried in triumph by the Boians to the temple which is most revered in their land. [12] Then after cleaning the head they adorned the skull with gold according to their custom. And it served them as a sacred vessel from which to pour libations at festivals and at the same time as a drinking cup for the priests and keepers of the temple. [13] The booty also meant no less to the Gauls than the victory. For although a large part of the cattle had been crushed by fallen trees, still everything else was found strewn the whole length of the column of the slain, since nothing was scattered by flight.

25. When this disaster was reported, the city was for many days in such alarm that, in view of the stillness, like that of night, produced [p. 85]throughout the city by the closing of the shops, the¹⁰⁵ senate charged the aediles with the duty of going about the city and ordering that shops be opened and the appearance of public mourning removed from the city. [2] And then Tiberius Sempronius held a session of the senate;¹⁰⁶ and he comforted the fathers, and urged that men who had not given way to the catastrophe at Cannae should not lose heart in the face of lesser disasters. [3] So far as concerned the Carthaginian enemy and Hannibal, he said that, if only coming events should prove favourable, as he hoped, a Gallic war could be both safely neglected and postponed, and punishment for that treachery would be in the power of the gods and of the Roman people. [4] It was in regard to the Carthaginian enemy and the armies with which to carry on that war that they must deliberate and debate. [5] He himself first stated what number of infantry and cavalry, of citizens and allies, were in the dictator's army. Then Marcellus set forth the total of his forces. [6] As to what troops were in Apulia with the consul Gaius Terentius, those who knew were questioned; and no method of making up consular armies strong enough for so great a war was found. And so, although righteous indignation goaded them, it was decided that Gaul should be left out of account that year. The dictator's army was assigned to the consul. [7] As for the army of Marcus Marcellus, it was voted that those of them who were survivors of the rout at Cannae should be transported to Sicily and serve there so long as there should be war in Italy; [8] also that from the dictator's legions all the least efficient soldiers should be sent away to the same province, with no definite term of service except that of the campaigns [p. 87]fixed by law. [9] The two city legions were assigned to¹⁰⁷ the other consul, to be elected in place of Lucius Postumius; and it was voted that he be elected as soon as possible with due regard to the auspices; [10] further, that two legions be summoned as soon as might be from Sicily, and that from them the consul to whom the city legions fell should take as many soldiers as he needed; [11] also that the command of Gaius Terentius, the consul, should be extended¹⁰⁸ for one year and no reduction made in the army which he had for the defence of Apulia.

26. During these operations and these preparations in Italy the war in Spain was no less active, but up to that time more successful¹⁰⁹ for the Romans. [2] Publius and Gnaeus Scipio had divided the forces between them, so that Gnaeus should carry on the war on land, Publius with the fleet; and Hasdrubal, commander-in-chief of the Carthaginians, since he could not fully depend upon either arm of his forces, remained far from the enemy, being protected by distance and position, until, in answer to pleas urgent and long-continued, four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry were sent from Africa to reinforce him.¹¹⁰ [3] Then, with hopes at last renewed, he moved his camp nearer to the enemy, and he too ordered that a fleet should be built and equipped, in order to protect the islands and the sea-coast. [4] In the very flush of renewed operations he met a blow in the desertion of the commanders of his ships, who, being severely reprimanded after their abandonment of the fleet at the Hiberus in their fright,¹¹¹ had never [p. 89]since been entirely loyal either to the general or to¹¹² the cause of Carthage. These deserters had made trouble in the tribe of the Tartesii, and at their instigation a number of cities had rebelled. One city had even been stormed by them.

[5] It was against this tribe that the war was now diverted from the [6??] Romans, and Hasdrubal, having entered the territory of the enemy with a hostile army, resolved to attack a noble in command of the Tartesii, Chalbus, who with a strong army was keeping to his camp before the walls of a city captured a few days before. [7] Therefore Hasdrubal, sending the light-armed in advance, to draw out the enemy to battle, scattered part of his cavalry over the farms to ravage them and to capture stragglers. There was confusion at the camp and at the same time flight and slaughter in the country around. [8] Then, after they had made their way from all sides back to the camp by different roads, fear was so suddenly banished from their hearts that they had sufficient spirit not only to defend the fortifications but also to attack the enemy. Accordingly they sallied out of the camp in a column, dancing, as is their custom; and their sudden boldness inspired alarm in the enemy, who a little before had been the aggressor. [9] And so Hasdrubal likewise led his forces up a very steep hill, further defended by a river in front. [10] Also he got back the light-armed who had been sent ahead and the scattered cavalry to the same position. Unable to put sufficient confidence in either the hill or the river, he strongly fortified his camp with an earthwork. [11] While fear was shifting thus from one side to the other, a number of engagements took place, and the Numidian horseman was no match for the [p. 91]Spaniard, nor the Moorish dart-thrower for the man¹¹³ with the wicker shield, the Spaniard in both cases being an equal in speed and quite superior in spirit and strength.

27. After the Tartesii had repeatedly failed to draw the Carthaginian out to battle by facing his camp, and it was also not easy to assault the camp, they took by storm the city of Ascua, to which Hasdrubal, on entering the land of the enemy, had brought grain and other supplies; [2] and they gained possession of all the country around. [3] And they could no longer be restrained by any authority either on the march or in camp. Hasdrubal, perceiving that this carelessness came, as usually happens, from success, exhorted his soldiers to attack the enemy while dispersed and in no formation, and coming down from the hill he proceeded to their camp in battle order. [4] When his approach was reported by messengers fleeing wildly from the watch-towers and guard-posts, they shouted “To arms!” [5] Snatching up arms, each man for himself, without commanders, without orders, in no units or formations, they dashed into battle. Already the first men had engaged, while some charged in separate masses and others had not yet left the camp. [6] Nevertheless they at first frightened the enemy by sheer audacity. Then, as stragglers advancing against dense ranks, finding no safety in small numbers, they looked to one another for help; and, beaten back from every side, they formed a circle. [7] And as they crowded bodies against bodies and touched arms to arms, they were forced into close quarters. Having hardly room enough to move their weapons, they were encircled by the enemy, and the slaughter continued until late in the [p. 93]day. [8] A very small part of them sallied out and made¹¹⁴ for the woods and the mountains. In no less alarm the camp was abandoned, and on the next day the whole tribe surrendered.

Yet not for long did the tribe abide by the agreement. [9] For soon came the order from Carthage that Hasdrubal should at the first opportunity lead his army into Italy. And the spreading of this news throughout Spain made nearly all incline to the side of the Romans.¹¹⁵ [10] Accordingly Hasdrubal at once sent a letter to Carthage, showing what a loss the mere report of his departure had caused; that if he were actually to leave the country, Spain would belong to the Romans before he should cross the Hiberus.¹¹⁶ [11] For besides the lack of both an army and a general to leave in his place, so able were the Roman generals that they could scarcely be resisted if the forces were evenly matched. [12] And so, if they had any regard for Spain, they should send him a successor with a strong army. Even if all should go well, that man would still find it no peaceful province.

28. Though this letter at first greatly stirred the senate, nevertheless, since concern for Italy was older and stronger, no change was made either in regard to Hasdrubal or to his forces. [2] But Himilco was sent with a complete army and an enlarged fleet to hold and defend Spain by land and sea. [3] After transporting his land and naval forces, Himilco fortified a camp, beached his ships and surrounded them with an earthwork. Then he himself with picked horsemen, making his way with all possible speed, and with equal alertness through the [p. 95]wavering and the hostile tribes, reached Hasdrubal.¹¹⁷ [4] After setting forth the decrees and instructions of the senate, and being himself informed in turn how the war in Spain must be conducted, he went back to his own camp, being protected by his quickness more than anything else, since he had left each place before the enemy could agree upon action. [5] Hasdrubal, before breaking camp, exacted money from all the tribes under his rule, knowing well that Hannibal had repeatedly bought the right of passage, and that he had Gallic auxiliaries only by hiring them; [6] but that if he had set out on so long a march without funds, he would scarcely have made his way to the Alps. [7] Therefore he exacted money in haste and came down to the Hiberus.

When news of the decrees of the Carthaginians and Hasdrubal's expedition reached the Roman commanders, both dropped everything, and uniting their forces prepared to meet and resist his efforts, thinking [8??] that if Hannibal, who was himself an enemy Italy could scarcely endure, should be joined by Hasdrubal as a general and by an army from Spain, that would be the end of the Roman power. [9] Troubled by these apprehensions, they concentrated their troops at the Hiberus, crossed the river, and after protracted deliberation, whether to pitch camp near that of the enemy or to be satisfied with keeping him from his projected march by attacking [10??] allies of the Carthaginians, they prepared to attack a city which had its name Hibera from the river near by, the richest city of the region at that time. [11] On learning this Hasdrubal, instead of bringing aid to his allies, proceeded likewise to attack a city which had recently surrendered to the Romans. [12] Thus the siege [p. 97]already begun was abandoned by the Romans and¹¹⁸ the war directed against Hasdrubal himself.

29. They had their camps five miles apart for a few days, not without skirmishes, but without drawing up lines of battle. [2] Finally on one and the same day, as though by agreement, the signal for battle was raised on both sides and with all their forces they went down into the plain. The Roman line stood in triple ranks. [3] Some of the light-armed were posted in the intervals between the maniples in advance of the standards, some placed behind the standards. [4] Cavalry covered the wings. Hasdrubal made a strong centre of Spanish troops; on the right wing he placed Carthaginians, on the left Africans and mercenary auxiliaries. Of the cavalry he stationed the Numidians on the wing of the Carthaginian infantry, the rest on that of the Africans. [5] And not all of his Numidians were placed on the right wing, but only those who, taking two horses apiece¹¹⁹ after the manner of performers, had the custom of leaping armed from the tired horse to the fresh, often in the very heat of battle; such was the agility of the men, and so well-trained their breed of horses. [6] While they were standing in this array, the hopes of the generals on the two sides were fairly balanced; for there was also not much superiority for the one army or the other either in the number or the type of its soldiers. [7] But the spirit of the soldiers was far from being matched. For the Romans, although fighting far from their country, had been easily persuaded by their generals that they were fighting in defence of Italy and the city of Rome. And so, as men whose return to their native land would depend upon the issue of that battle, they had made up their [p. 99]minds to win or die. [8] The other battle-line had men¹²⁰ less firmly resolved. For the majority were Spaniards, who preferred to be vanquished in Spain, rather than as victors to be dragged to Italy. [9] Therefore at the first clash, when they had barely hurled their javelins, the centre fell back, and, as the Romans advanced with a great charge, retreated. On the wrings, however, there was more spirited fighting. [10] On the one hand the Carthaginians pressed them hard, on the other hand the Africans; and it was a double conflict against men presumed to have been surrounded. [11] But, although the whole Roman line had by this time crowded into the centre, it had sufficient strength to force apart the wings of the enemy. [12] Thus there were two battles in opposite directions. In both the Romans were unquestionably victorious, since, once the centre had been routed, they were superior both in the numbers and in the strength of their men. [13] A great number of men¹²¹ were slain there, and if the Spaniards had not fled in such confusion when the battle had scarcely begun, very few out of that entire line would have survived. [14] The cavalry were not engaged at all, since, as soon as the Mauri and the Numidians saw the centre giving way, they at once abandoned the wings, exposed by their wild flight as they drove the elephants also before them. [15] Hasdrubal, after waiting for the final outcome of the battle, escaped with a few men out of the midst of the slaughter. His camp the Romans captured and plundered. [16] That battle brought to the Roman side all that still wavered in Spain, and Hasdrubal had left to him no hope, not only of leading his army over into Italy, but not even of remaining with any safety in Spain. [17] When these facts were generally known [p. 101]at Rome through the letter of the Scipios, people¹²² rejoiced, not so much over the victory, as that Hasdrubal's crossing into Italy had been prevented.¹²³

30. While these things were going on in Spain, Petelia,¹²⁴ in the land of the Bruttii, was taken by Himilco, Hannibal's prefect, some months after the siege began. [2] That victory cost the Carthaginians much blood and many wounds, and starvation¹²⁵ more than any assault overpowered the besieged. [3] For after they had consumed their food-supply in cereals and flesh, the familiar and the unfamiliar, of four-footed beasts of every kind, they finally lived on hides and grasses and roots and tender bark and leaves stripped off. [4] And they were not overpowered until they had no strength left to stand on the walls and bear arms. [5] Having taken Petelia, the Carthaginian led his troops across to Consentia, and as it was less obstinately defended, he received its surrender within a few days. [6] About the same time an army of the Bruttians also besieged Croton,¹²⁶ a Greek city formerly rich in arms and men, but even then so crushed by many great disasters that, including all ages, less than two thousand citizens remained. [7] And so the enemy easily gained possession of the city bereft of its defenders. Only the citadel was still held, and to it some, in the uproar of a captured city, made their escape out of the midst of slaughter. [8] And Locri went over to the Bruttians and Carthaginians, the populace having been betrayed by the leading men. [9] Regium alone in that region remained loyal to the Romans and to the very last independent. [p. 103]The same trend of feeling reached Sicily also, and¹²⁷ even the house of Hiero did not hold aloof entirely from the revolt. [10] For Gelo, the eldest son, scorning both the old age of his father and [11??] the Roman alliance since the disaster at Cannae, went over to the Carthaginians.¹²⁸ [12] And he would have caused an uprising in Sicily, had not death, so timely as to besmirch even his father with suspicion, carried him off as he was arming the populace and trying to gain allies. [13] Such were the checkered events of that year in Italy, in Africa, in Sicily, in Spain.¹²⁹

At the end of the year Quintus Fabius Maximus requested of the senate that he be permitted to dedicate the Temple of Venus of Eryx¹³⁰ which he had vowed in his dictatorship. [14] The senate decreed that Tiberius Sempronius, consul designate, as soon as he entered upon his office should propose to the people that they order that Quintus Fabius should be a duumvir for the purpose of dedicating the temple. [15] And in honour of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, who had been consul twice and augur, his three sons, Lucius, Marcus, Quintus, gave funeral games for three days and showed twenty-two pairs of gladiators in the Forum.¹³¹ [16] The curule aediles, Gaius Laetorius and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, consul designate, who in his aedileship had been master of the horse, celebrated the Roman Games, and on three of the days they were repeated. The Plebeian Games of the aediles, Marcus Aurelius Cotta and Marcus Claudius Marcellus, were repeated three times.

[17] [p. 105] The third year of the Punic War being at an end,¹³² Tiberius Sempronius entered upon office as consul on the Ides of March. [18] Of the praetors Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, who had previously been consul¹³³ and censor, had by lot his assignment as judge between citizens, Marcus Valerius Laevinus had his as judge in the cases of strangers, while to Appius Claudius Pulcher Sicily was allotted, and Sardinia to Quintus Mucius Scaevola. [19] That Marcus Marcellus should have full military authority as proconsul was ordered by the people, because he alone of the Roman commanders since the disaster at Cannae had met with success in Italy.

31. The senate on the first day on which it was in session on the Capitol, decreed that a double tax should be imposed that year and the normal tax collected at once; [2] that from it pay should be given in cash to all the soldiers except those who had been soldiers at Cannae. [3] As for the armies, they decreed that Tiberius Sempronius, the consul, should set for the two city legions a date for mobilization at Cales; that these legions should be led thence to the Claudian Camp¹³⁴ above Suessula; that the legions already there —it [4] was chiefly the army of Cannae —should be taken over into Sicily by Appius Claudius Pulcher, the praetor, and that those which were in Sicily should be brought to Rome. [5] Marcus Claudius Marcellus was sent to the army for which a date of mobilization at Cales had been set; and he was ordered to conduct the city legions to the Claudian Camp. [6] To take over the old army and conduct it thence to Sicily, Appius Claudius sent his lieutenant, Tiberius Maecilius Croto.

At first men had been waiting in silence for the [p. 107]consul to preside over an election for the naming of¹³⁵ his colleague. [7] Then, when they saw that Marcus Marcellus, whom they particularly desired to have elected consul for that year, on account of remarkable successes in his praetorship, had been sent away, apparently on purpose, murmurs began to be heard in the Senate House. [8] Noting this the consul said: “Both acts were to the advantage of the state, fellow-senators, that Marcus Claudius should be sent to Campania to make the change of armies, and that the coming election should not be proclaimed until he, after accomplishing the task which was assigned him, should return thence, so that you might have the consul whom the critical situation in the state requires and whom you particularly desire.” So until Marcellus returned, nothing was said about an election. [9] Meanwhile Quintus Fabius Maximus and Titus Otacilius Crassus were made duumvirs for the dedication of temples, Otacilius for that of Mens, Fabius for that of Venus of Eryx. Both are on the Capitol,¹³⁶ separated by a single water-channel. [10] And in regard to the three hundred Campanian knights 2 who, after loyally serving their terms in Sicily, had come to Rome, a bill was brought before the people that they should be Roman citizens; further, that they should be townsmen of Cumae from the day before that on which the Campanian people had revolted from the Roman people.¹³⁷ [11] What had chiefly prompted the making of this proposal was that they said they did not themselves know with whom they belonged, having given up their old home-city, and not being enrolled as yet in the city to which they had returned. After Marcellus returned from the army, an election to name one consul in place of Lucius [p. 109]Postumius was ordered by edict. [12] With great¹³⁸ unanimity Marcellus was elected, to assume office at once. [13] Just as he was entering upon his consulship it thundered, and thereupon the augurs, being summoned, declared that there seemed to be a defect in his election. And the fathers widely circulated the statement that it did not meet the approval of the gods that two plebeians had then for the first time been elected consuls. [14] In place of Marcellus, after he had abdicated, Quintus Fabius Maximus was substituted as consul for the third time.

The sea was aflame in the course of that year. [15] At Sinuessa a cow gave birth to a colt. At the Temple of Juno Sospita at Lanuvium images of the gods dripped blood, and it rained stones around the temple —a shower on account of which there were ceremonies, as usual, for nine days. And the rest of the portents were duly expiated.¹³⁹

32. The consuls divided the armies between them. To Fabius fell the army at Teanum, formerly commanded by Marcus Junius, the dictator; to Sempronius the slave volunteers¹⁴⁰ who were at that place and twenty-five thousand of the allies. [2] To Marcus Valerius, the praetor, were assigned the legions which had returned from Sicily. Marcus Claudius was sent as proconsul to the army which was above Suessula, in order to guard Nola. The praetors set out for Sicily and Sardinia. [3] The consuls issued an edict that, whenever they might call a meeting of the senate, the senators and any who had the right to give an opinion in the senate¹⁴¹ should assemble at the [p. 111]Porta Capena.¹⁴² [4] The praetors who had judicial duties¹⁴³ set up their tribunals at the Piscina Publica.¹⁴⁴ That place should be named —so they ordered —in recognizances,¹⁴⁵ and there justice was rendered that [5] year.

Meanwhile Carthage, from which Mago,¹⁴⁶ Hannibal's brother, was on the point of transporting into Italy twelve thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry, twenty elephants and a thousand talents of silver, with a convoy of sixty warships, received the news that in Spain operations [6??] had failed and nearly all the tribes in that province had revolted to the [7] Romans. There were some who, neglecting Italy, were ready to divert Mago to Spain with that fleet and those forces, when there suddenly appeared a ray of hope of recovering [8] Sardinia. It was reported that the Roman army there was small; that the old praetor, Aulus Cornelius, who was well acquainted with the province, was retiring, and a new praetor [9] expected; further, that the Sardinians were now weary of the long continuance of Roman rule, and in the previous year had been ruled with harshness and greed; that they were burdened by a heavy tribute and an unfair requisition of grain; that nothing was lacking but a leader to whom they might go [10] over. Such was the report of a secret embassy sent by the leading men at the special instigation of Hampsicora, who at that time was far above the rest in prestige and [11] wealth. By such news they were almost at the [p. 113]same moment dejected and encouraged, and sent¹⁴⁷ Mago with his fleet and his forces to [12] Spain. For Sardinia they chose Hasdrubal as general, and voted him about the same number of troops as to Mago.

[13] And at Rome the consuls did what had to be done in the city, and were now bestirring themselves for the [14] war. Tiberius Sempronius set his soldiers a date for mobilization at Sinuessa, and Quintus Fabius, after first consulting the senate, gave orders that all should bring their grain crops¹⁴⁸ from the farms into fortified cities before the next Kalends of June; that if any man should fail to do so, he would lay waste his farm, sell his slaves at auction and burn the farm [15] buildings. Not even those praetors who had been appointed to administer justice¹⁴⁹ were granted exemption from the conduct of the [16] war. It was decided that Valerius, the praetor, should go to Apulia, to take over the army from Terentius; that when the legions should arrive from Sicily, he should chiefly use these troops for the defence of that region; that Terentius' army should be sent to Tarentum under some one of the [17] lieutenants. And twenty-five ships were given him, that with them he might be able to defend the coast between Brundisium and [18] Tarentum. An equal number of ships was assigned by decree to Quintus Fulvius, the city praetor, for the defence of the shore near the [19] city. Gaius Terentius as proconsul was given the task of conducting a levy of troops in the Picene territory and defending that [20] region. And Titus Otacilius Crassus, after dedicating the Temple of Mens on the Capitol, was sent with full authority to Sicily, where he was to command the fleet.

[p. 115] 33. To this conflict of the two richest peoples¹⁵⁰ in the world all kings and nations had turned their attention, among them [2??] Philip, king of the Macedonians, all the more since he was nearer to Italy and separated from it only by the Ionian Sea. [3] On first learning by report that Hannibal had crossed the Alps, although he had rejoiced at the outbreak of war between the Romans and the Carthaginians, still, as their resources were not yet known, he had wavered, uncertain which of the two peoples he wished to have the victory. [4] Now that a third battle, a third victory, favoured the Carthaginians, he inclined to the side of success and sent ambassadors to Hannibal. These avoided the ports of Brundisium and Tarentum, because they were kept guarded by Roman ships, and landed at the Temple of Lacinian Juno.¹⁵¹ [5] Making their way thence toward Capua by way of Apulia, they encountered the centre of the Roman forces and were brought before Valerius Laevinus, the praetor, whose camp was near Luceria. [6] There Xenophanes, the leader of the embassy, boldly said that he had been sent by King Philip to negotiate a friendly alliance with the Roman people; that he had communications for the consuls and for the senate and the Roman people. [7] The praetor, who in the midst of the revolts of old allies was greatly delighted by a new alliance with so famous a king, hospitably received enemies as guests. [8] He furnished men to escort them, to indicate the roads carefully, and what positions and what passes were held either by the Romans or by the enemy. [9] Xenophanes made his way through the Roman forces into [p. 117]Campania and thence by the shortest road to the¹⁵² camp of Hannibal, and arranged a treaty of friendship with him on the following terms: that King Philip with the largest possible fleet —and [10] it was thought that he would make it two hundred ships —should cross to Italy and ravage the coast, and should carry on the war on land and sea with all his might; [11] that after the war was over all Italy with the city of Rome itself should belong to the Carthaginians and Hannibal, and all the booty fall to Hannibal; [12] that after the complete subjugation of Italy they should sail to Greece and wage war with such enemies as the king might choose; and that such states on the mainland and such islands as face Macedonia should belong to Philip and be a part of his kingdom.

34. On terms such as these a treaty was made between the Carthaginian general and the ambassadors of the Macedonians. [2] And Gisgo and Bostar and Mago, who were sent with them as ambassadors, to reassure the king himself, reached the same place, the Temple of Juno Lacinia, where a ship lay in a hidden anchorage. [3] Setting out thence and making for the open sea, they were sighted by the Roman fleet which was defending the coasts of Calabria. [4] And Valerius Flaccus sent light craft to pursue the ship and bring her back; whereupon the king's ambassadors at first attempted to flee. Then, when they saw that they were being outstripped in speed, they surrendered to the Romans and were brought before the admiral of the fleet. [5] When he asked who they were and whence, and whither they were bound, Xenophanes at first set up the false pretence which had been quite successful once before: that, being sent by Philip to the Romans, he had made his way [p. 119]to Marcus Valerius, the one man to whom there was¹⁵³ a safe road; that he had been unable to get across Campania, which was blocked by the enemy's forces. [6] Then, when Carthaginian dress and appearance cast suspicion on Hannibal's ambassadors, upon being questioned they were betrayed by their speech. [7] Thereupon their attendants were led aside and frightened by threats; and a letter also from Hannibal to Philip was found, along with agreements between the king of the Macedonians and the Carthaginian general. [8] So much being established, it seemed best to send the captured men and their attendants as soon as possible to the senate at Rome, or else to the consuls, wherever they might be. [9] For that purpose five very swift ships were selected and Lucius Valerius Antias was sent to command them. And instructions were given him to distribute the ambassadors among all his ships, to be separately guarded; and he was to see to it that there should be no conversation among them or any interchange of plans.

[10] About the same time at Rome Aulus Cornelius Mammula, on retiring from his province of Sardinia, reported what was the condition of affairs in the island: [11] that all were aiming at war and rebellion; that Quintus Mucius, his successor, upon arriving was affected by the unwholesome climate and bad water, and having contracted an illness not so dangerous as protracted, would for a long time be useless for the performance of war duties; [12] also that the army there, while strong enough to garrison a peaceful province, was not so for the war which seemed on the point of breaking out. [13] The senate thereupon decreed that Quintus Fulvius Flaccus should enlist five thousand [p. 121]infantry and four hundred cavalry, and should see¹⁵⁴ to it that that legion should be transported to Sardinia at the first opportunity; [14] also that he should send whomever he thought best with full authority, to carry on the war until Mucius should recover. [15] For that duty Titus Manlius Torquatus was sent, a man who had been consul twice and censor, and in his consulship had conquered the Sardinians.¹⁵⁵ [16] About the same time a fleet which had been sent from Carthage also to Sardinia, under command of the Hasdrubal who was surnamed Calvus, was damaged by a terrible storm and driven to the Balearic Islands. [17] And there the ships were beached, to such an extent had not only the rigging but also the hulls been injured; and while undergoing repairs they caused a considerable loss of time.

35. In Italy, while the war was less active after the battle of Cannae, since the resources of one side had been broken and the spirit of the other sapped, the Campanians attempted without assistance to reduce the state of Cumae to subjection, at first tempting them to revolt from the Romans. [2] When that failed, they contrived a ruse to entrap them. [3] All the Campanians had a regular sacrifice at Hamae.¹⁵⁶ To it they informed the men of Cumae that the Campanian senate would come, and requested that the senate of Cumae should come thither to deliberate together, so that both peoples might have the same allies and enemies. They said they would have an armed guard there, lest there be any danger from the Roman or the Carthaginian. [4] The Cumaeans, though they had suspected guile, made no objections, thinking that a ruse of their own¹⁵⁷ to outwit them could thus be concealed.

[5] [p. 123] Meanwhile Tiberius Sempronius, the Roman consul,¹⁵⁸ after reviewing his army at Sinuessa, at which place he had announced a date for mobilization, crossed the river Volturnus and pitched camp near Liternum. There, since the permanent camp lacked occupation, he required the soldiers to manœuvre frequently, that the recruits —they [6] were most of the slave-volunteers —might learn to follow the standards and to recognize their own ranks in the battle-line. [7] In this it was the commander's greatest care, and he had instructed the lieutenants and tribunes to the same effect, that no reproach of any man's previous lot should sow strife between the different classes of soldiers; that the old soldier should allow himself to be rated with the recruit, the freeman with the slave-volunteer; that they should consider all to whom the Roman people had entrusted its arms and standards as sufficiently honoured and well-born. [8] He said that the same fortune which had compelled them to do so now compelled them to defend what had been done. [9] These injunctions were not given with greater care by the commanders than that with which they were followed by the soldiers. And soon they were all united in a harmony so great that it was almost forgotten from what status each man had been made a soldier.

[10] While Gracchus was thus employed, legates from Cumae reported to him on what mission an embassy had come a few days before from the Campanians, and what answer they had themselves given them; [11] that the festival was to be three days later, and not only would the whole senate be there, but a camp also and a Campanian army. [12] Gracchus, having ordered the Cumaeans to bring everything from the [p. 125]farms into the city and to remain inside the walls,¹⁵⁹ moved his own camp to Cumae the day before the Campanians had their regular sacrifice. Hamae is three miles distant. Already the Campanians in large numbers had gathered there according to agreement. [13] And in concealment, not far from there, Marius Alfius, the medix tuticus,¹⁶⁰ that is, the chief magistrate of the Campanians, had his camp, with fourteen thousand armed men, he being decidedly more intent upon preparing the sacrifice and contriving treachery during the same than upon fortifying his camp or upon any task of the soldier. [14] The sacrifice took place at night, but it was to be finished before midnight. [15] Gracchus, thinking he must be in waiting for that moment, placed guards at the gates, that no one might be able to carry away news of his undertaking. [16] And having assembled his soldiers as early as the tenth hour of the day, he ordered them to get themselves in condition and take care to sleep, so that, as soon as it was dark, they might come together at the signal; and at about the first watch he ordered that the standards be taken up. [17] And setting out with a silent column, he reached Hamae at midnight and entered the Campanian camp by all its gates at once; for, as was to be expected in view of the vigil, it was carelessly guarded. [18] Some they slew as they lay asleep, others as they were returning unarmed after the rite had been completed. [19] More than two thousand men were slain in that affray by night, including Marius Alfius, the commander himself. Captured were . . . thousand men¹⁶¹ and thirty-four military standards.

[p. 127] 36. Gracchus, having captured the camp of¹⁶² the enemy with the loss of less than a hundred soldiers, hastily withdrew to Cumae in fear of Hannibal, who had his camp on Mount Tifata above Capua. And he was not mistaken in his forecast. [2] For as soon as the defeat was reported at Capua, Hannibal, thinking he would find the army of recruits, largely slaves, at Hamae gloating for once over a success, spoiling the defeated and driving off the booty, rushed his column with all speed past Capua, and ordered that those of the fleeing [3??] Campanians whom he met should be furnished with an escort and led to Capua, and the wounded carried on wagons. [4] As for himself, he found at Hamae a camp deserted by the enemy, and nothing except the traces of recent slaughter and corpses of his allies scattered everywhere. Some advised him to lead his troops away forthwith to Cumae and to attack the city. [5] Although Hannibal was very eager to do so, in order that he might [6??] have Cumae at least as a seaport, since he had been unable to gain one at Neapolis, nevertheless, as his soldiers in their rapidly moving column had brought out nothing but their arms with them, he withdrew again to his campon Tifata. [7] Moved by the importunities of the Campanians, he returned thence on the following day to Cumae with all the equipment for besieging the city, and after ravaging the territory of Cumae, pitched his camp a mile from the city. [8] Meanwhile Gracchus, ashamed to desert allies in such straits and begging for his help and that of the Roman people, rather than because he had full confidence in his army, had remained there. [9] Nor did the other consul, Fabius, who had his camp at Cales, venture to lead his army across the river Volturnus, being [p. 129]employed at first in taking new auspices and then¹⁶³ with the portents which were being reported one after another. [10] And as he was making expiation, the soothsayers kept repeating their opinion that it was not easy to obtain favourable omens.

37. While these reasons detained Fabius, Sempronius was blockaded and already beset by siege-works. [2] As a defence against a great wooden tower which was moved up to the city, the Roman consul reared from the wall itself another tower considerably higher. For he had used the wall, which in itself was quite high, as a base, shoring it up with stout timbers. [3] From that tower the defenders first held the wall and the city by hurling stones and stakes and every other missile. [4] Finally, seeing that the enemy's tower had been pushed close against the wall, they hurled a vast amount of fire all at once from their blazing torches. [5] While great numbers of armed men, alarmed by the fire, were leaping down from the tower, a sally out of two gates of the town at the same time routed the enemy's guards and sent them in flight to the camp, so that on that day the Carthaginian resembled a besieged army more than a besieger. [6] About one thousand and three hundred were slain and fifty-nine captured alive of the Carthaginians, who were relaxing and idling along the walls and [7??] at guard-posts, and, having feared anything rather than a sally, had unexpectedly been overpowered. [8] Gracchus, before the enemy could recover from their sudden fright, gave the signal for the recall and withdrew his men inside the walls. On the next day Hannibal, supposing that the consul, elated by success, would engage in a regular battle, drew up his line between the camp and the city. [9] [p. 131]But on seeing that no one stirred from the usual¹⁶⁴ defence of the city and that nothing was entrusted to a rash hope, he returned with nothing accomplished to Tifata.

[10] At the same time that the siege of Cumae was raised, Tiberius Sempronius, surnamed Longus,¹⁶⁵ also fought successfully in Lucania, near Grumentum, with Hanno the Carthaginian. [11] He slew above two thousand men, and captured two hundred and eighty soldiers and some forty-one military standards. Driven out of Lucanian territory, Hanno withdrew into the land of the Bruttians. [12] And three towns of the Hirpini, Vercellium, Vescellium and Sicilinum, which had revolted from the Roman people, were forcibly recovered by Marcus Valerius, the praetor, and those who had advised revolt were beheaded. [13] Over five thousand captives were sold at auction; the rest of the booty was given over to the soldiers, and the army led back to Luceria.

38. While these things were going on in Lucania and among the Hirpini, the five ships which were carrying to Rome the captured ambassadors of the Macedonians and the Carthaginians cruised along nearly the whole coast of Italy from the Upper Sea to the Lower.¹⁶⁶ [2] And when they were passing Cumae under sail, and it was uncertain whether they belonged to enemies or friends, Gracchus sent ships from his fleet to meet them. [3] When in the course of questioning on both sides it was learned that the consul was at Cumae, the ships put in at Cumae and the prisoners were brought before the consul and the letters handed over to him. [4] The consul, after reading the letters of Philip and Hannibal, sent everything under seal by land to the senate, and ordered the [p. 133]ambassadors to be carried on the ships. [5] Letters¹⁶⁷ and ambassadors arrived at Rome on about the same day, and upon enquiry their words and the texts were in agreement. Thereupon the senators were at first gravely concerned, seeing how serious a war with Macedonia threatened, at a time when they could scarcely endure that with the Carthaginians. [6] However, they were so far from giving way to that concern that they at once discussed how by actual aggressive warfare they might keep the enemy away from Italy. [7] The prisoners were ordered put in chains, their attendants were sold at auction, and it was decreed that, in addition to the twenty-five ships which Publius Valerius Flaccus commanded as admiral, twenty-five others should be made ready. [8] The latter being now ready and launched, with the addition of the five ships which had brought the ambassadors as captives, thirty ships sailed from Ostia for Tarentum. [9] And Publius Valerius was ordered to put on board the soldiers who had been Varro's, and at Tarentum were commanded by Lucius Apustius, the lieutenant, and then with a fleet of fifty-five¹⁶⁸ ships not merely to defend the coast of Italy, but to get information in regard to the Macedonian war. [10] If the designs of Philip should agree with the letters and with the statements of the ambassadors, then he was to inform Marcus Valerius, the praetor, by letter; [11] and Valerius, after placing his lieutenant, Lucius Apustius, in command of the army, was to proceed to the fleet at Tarentum, and as soon as possible to cross into Macedonia and take steps to keep Philip within his kingdom. [12] For the maintenance of the fleet and for the Macedonian war there was voted the money which had been sent to Appius Claudius in Sicily, to [p. 135]be repaid to king Hiero.¹⁶⁹ This money was carried¹⁷⁰ to Tarentum by Lucius Antistius, the lieutenant. [13] At the same time two hundred thousand pecks of wheat and a hundred thousand of barley were sent by Hiero.

39. While the Romans were engaged in these preparations and activities, the one captured ship escaped while under weigh from those which had been sent to Rome,¹⁷¹ and returned to Philip. [2] Thus it became known that the ambassadors had been captured with the letter. And so the king, not knowing what had been agreed upon between his ambassadors and Hannibal, and what message the latter's ambassadors were to have brought to him, sent another embassy with the same instructions. [3] As ambassadors to Hannibal there were sent Heraclitus, surnamed Scotinus,¹⁷² and Crito, the Boeotian, and Sositheus, of Magnesia. [4] These succeeded in carrying and in bringing back instructions; but the summer was over before the king could make any active preparations. So effectual was the capture of a single ship and ambassadors in postponing a war which threatened the Romans.

[5] Also in the vicinity of Capua both consuls were carrying on the war, now that Fabius, after finally making atonement for the prodigies,¹⁷³ had crossed the Volturnus. [6] The cities of Combulteria and Trebula and Austicula, which had revolted to the Carthaginian, were forcibly taken by Fabius, and in them Hannibal's garrisons and very many Campanians were captured. [7] And at Nola, just as in the previous year, the senate sided with the Romans, the common people with Hannibal, and secret plans were being formed for the [p. 137]murder of the leading men and the betrayal of the¹⁷⁴ city. [8] That their undertaking should go no farther, Fabius led his army between Capua and the camp of Hannibal, which was on Tifata, and established himself above Suessula in the Claudian Camp.¹⁷⁵ From there he sent Marcus Marcellus, the propraetor,¹⁷⁶ with the forces which he had to Nola, to serve as a garrison.

40. And in Sardinia under the direction of Titus Manlius, the praetor¹⁷⁷ the operations which had been neglected ever since Quintus Mucius, the praetor, was attacked by a serious malady, were resumed. [2] Manlius, after beaching his warships at Carales and arming their crews,¹⁷⁸ in order to wage war on land, and receiving an army from the praetor, made up a total of twenty-two thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry. [3] With these cavalry and infantry forces he set out for the enemy's territory and pitched camp not far from the camp of Hampsicora. At that time Hampsicora, as it happened, had gone to the region of the Skin-clad Sardinians,¹⁷⁹ to arm their young men, in order to enlarge his forces. His son named Hostus was in command of the camp. [4] He with the overconfidence of youth rashly went into battle, was routed and put to flight. About three thousand Sardinians were slain in that battle, some eight hundred taken alive. [5] The rest of the army, at first wandering in flight through the farms and woods, then fled to the place to which it was reported that the commander had fled, a city named Cornus, the capital of that region. [6] And the war in Sardinia would have been ended by that battle, had not the [p. 139]Carthaginian fleet commanded by Hasdrubal, which¹⁸⁰ had been carried by a storm to the Balearic Islands, arrived at the right moment to revive hopes for the rebellion. [7] Manlius, when the arrival of the Punic fleet was reported, withdrew to Carales. By so doing he gave Hampsicora the opportunity to unite with the Carthaginian. [8] Hasdrubal, after landing his forces and sending the fleet back to Carthage, set out with Hampsicora as his guide to lay waste the lands of allies of the Roman people. And he would have reached Carales, had not Manlius by confronting him with an army restrained him from his widespread devastation. At first camp faced camp at no great distance. [9] Then charges led to skirmishes with varying results. Finally they went into line of battle. With standards against standards they fought a regular engagement for four hours. [10] For a long time the Carthaginians made the issue uncertain, while the Sardinians were used to being easily defeated. Finally, when the slain and the fleeing Sardinians had covered the whole field, the Carthaginians also were routed. [11] But when they tried to flee, the Roman general hemmed them in by a flank movement of the wing with which he had beaten back the Sardinians. [12] It was a slaughter after that, rather than a battle. Twelve thousand of the enemy were slain, Sardinians and Carthaginians reckoned together. About three thousand seven hundred were captured, and twenty-seven military standards.

41. What more than all made it a famous and memorable battle was the capture of Hasdrubal, the commander, and Hanno and Mago, Carthaginian nobles, Mago being of the Barca [2??] family and nearly related to Hannibal, while Hanno had advised the [p. 141]Sardinians to rebel and had undoubtedly fomented¹⁸¹ that war. And the Sardinians' generals made the battle no less notable by their deaths. [3] For Hostus, the son of Hampsicora, fell in battle, and also Hampsicora as he fled with a few horsemen, on hearing, not of [4??] the defeat only, but also of the death of his son, took his own life, doing this at night, that no one might come upon him and interfere with his attempt. [5] For all the rest the same city of Cornus was a place of refuge, as before. Manlius with his victorious army attacked it and took it within a few days. [6] Then other cities also which had revolted to Hampsicora and the Carthaginians gave hostages and surrendered. From these cities Manlius exacted tribute and grain in proportion to the resources of each or its guilt, and led his army back to Carales. [7] There he launched his warships, took on board the soldiers he had brought with him, sailed for Rome, and reported to the senate the complete subjugation of Sardinia. He also turned over the tribute to the quaestors, the grain to the aediles, the captives to Quintus Fulvius, the praetor.

[8] About the same time Titus Otacilius, the praetor,¹⁸² sailed with his fleet from Lilybaeum across to Africa, and after laying waste the country about Carthage, was steering thence toward Sardinia, to which it was reported that Hasdrubal had recently crossed from the Balearic Islands, when he encountered the fleet returning to Africa; [9] and in a slight engagement fought in open water he captured seven of their ships together with their crews. The rest were widely scattered by their fear quite as much as they had been by the storm.

[10] [p. 143] About the same time, moreover, as it happened,¹⁸³ Bomilcar arrived at Locri with the soldiers sent as reinforcements from Carthage and with elephants and supplies. [11] In order to take him unawares Appius Claudius, with the pretence of making the round of his province, led his army in haste to Messana, and with wind and current in his favour crossed over to Locri. [12] Already Bomilcar had left that place, to join Hanno among the Bruttii, and the Locrians closed their gates against the Romans. Appius, having accomplished nothing by his great effort, returned to Messana.

[13] The same summer Marcellus from Nola, which he held with a garrison, made frequent raids into the country of the Hirpini and the Samnites about Caudium and laid waste the whole [14??] region with fire and sword so completely that he revived the Samnites' memory of their old disasters.¹⁸⁴ 42. Accordingly ambassadors were sent at once to Hannibal from both tribes, and they addressed the Carthaginian thus:¹⁸⁵ [2] “We were enemies of the Roman people, Hannibal, at first by ourselves, so long as our arms and our resources were able to defend us. When we had lost confidence in these, we attached ourselves to Pyrrhus, the king. [3] Abandoned by him we accepted an inevitable peace, and have remained in that peace for about fifty years, down to the time when you came to Italy. [4] It is not more your courage and success than your singular kindness and consideration toward our citizens, whom you captured and then sent back to us, that so won us over to you that, so long as you were a friend safe and sound, we not only did not fear the Roman people, but not even the anger of the gods, if it is right to say so. [5] But in fact, [p. 145]while you are not merely safe and victorious, but also¹⁸⁶ here present, although you could almost hear the wailing of our wives and children and could see the blazing houses, we have been so ravaged several times this summer that Marcus Marcellus, not Hannibal, appears to have been the victor at Cannae, and the Romans are boasting that you, having strength for but a single stroke, are inactive, as if you had spent your sting. [6] For a hundred years we waged war with the Roman people, unaided either by commander or army from abroad, except that for two years Pyrrhus did not so much defend us with his resources as enlarge these by adding our soldiers. [7] I shall not boast of our successes, that two consuls and two consular armies were sent under the yoke by us, nor of any other events which have brought us either joy or fame. But the hardships and defeats which then befel us we can relate with less indignation than the things that are happening today. [8] Great dictators¹⁸⁷ and masters of the horse, two consuls and two consular armies, used each time to enter our territory. [9] After first reconnoitring and posting reserves, and in regular array they would lead out for a raid. But now we are the prey of a single propraetor¹⁸⁸ and a small garrison assigned to the defence of Nola. [10] Already they roam over our whole territory, not even in maniples, but after the manner of brigands, with less caution than if they were wandering in the country around Rome. [11] The reason moreover is this: that you are not defending us, and at the same time our young men, who would be protecting us if they were at home, are all serving under your standards. [12] I should be unacquainted both with you and your army if I were not to hold [p. 147]it easy for one who, I know, has routed and laid low¹⁸⁹ so many Roman battle-lines to surprise our scattered plunderers, roaming without their standards wherever a man is drawn by even the vain hope of booty. [13] To a few Numidians they will in any case fall a prey, and you will have sent us troops and at the same time will have rid Nola of its garrison, if only men whom you have considered worthy to be your allies are not judged by you unworthy to be taken under your protection and defended.”

43. To this Hannibal replied that the Hirpini and Samnites were doing everything at once, reporting their losses, and asking for troops, and complaining that they were undefended and neglected. [2] But they ought first to have reported, then asked for protection, finally, if this was not obtained, they should then, and not sooner, have complained that help had been besought in vain. [3] He would lead his army, not into the territory of the Hirpini or the Samnites, in order not to be another burden, but into the nearest lands of allies of the Roman people. By devastating these he would satisfy his own army and drive the frightened enemy to a distance from them. [4] As for the Roman war, if the battle of Lake Trasumennus was more celebrated than that of the Trebia, if Cannae than Trasumennus, he would overshadow the memory even of Cannae by a greater and more famous victory.

[5] With this answer and also with ample gifts he sent the ambassadors away. He himself set out, leaving a moderate force on Tifata, and proceeded with the rest of his army to Nola. [6] Hanno also came thither from the land of the Bruttii with reinforcements brought from Carthage and with the elephants. [p. 149]Having pitched his camp not far away, Hannibal¹⁹⁰ found on enquiry that everything was very different from what he had heard from the legates of his allies. [7] For Marcellus had not done anything in such a way that it could be said to have been left to fortune or rashly left to the enemy. After reconnoitring, having strong forces and a safe refuge, he had gone out to forage, and every possible precaution had been taken, as though against Hannibal in person. [8] Then on learning of the approach of the enemy, he kept his troops inside the walls. He ordered the senators of Nola to walk up and down on the walls, and to observe everything that went on among the enemy all around. [9] Hanno, having come close to the wall, called out from their number Herennius Bassus and Herius Pettius to a conference, and when they came out with Marcellus' permission, he addressed them through an interpreter. [10] He lauded Hannibal's courage and success. [11] He belittled the majesty of the Roman people, as wasting away along with their resources. And if these qualities were evenly matched, he said, as once they had been, nevertheless those who had found out how burdensome was Roman rule to the allies, how great had been Hannibal's indulgence even to all captives who called themselves Italians, these were bound to prefer Carthaginian alliance and friendship to Roman. [12] If both consuls were at Nola with their armies, still they would be no more a match for Hannibal than they had been at Cannae; much less could one praetor with a few raw soldiers defend Nola. [13] It was their own concern more than Hannibal's whether he took Nola by capture or by surrender. For he would take it, as he had taken Capua and Nuceria. But what a difference [p. 151]there was between the lot of Capua and that of¹⁹¹ Nuceria the men of Nola themselves knew, being situated about half-way between them. [14] He did not wish to forecast what would happen to the city if captured, but assured them instead that if they surrendered Marcellus and Nola with the garrison, no one but themselves should name the terms on which they might enter alliance and friendship with Hannibal.

44. To this Herennius Bassus replied that for many years there had been friendship between the Roman people and that of Nola; that down to that time neither party regretted it, and for themselves, if with altered fortune they ought to have changed their loyalty, it was now too late to change. [2] If they were going to surrender to Hannibal, had they needed to send for a Roman garrison? With the men who had come to defend them they had allied themselves in everything, and it would be so to the end.

[3] This conference deprived Hannibal of the hope of getting Nola by treachery. And so he completely invested the town, in order to attack the walls from all sides at once. [4] Marcellus, on seeing that Hannibal had approached the walls, drew up his line inside the gate and sallied out with a great uproar. Not a few were terrified by the first attack and slain. Then, when they had charged the attacking force and brought up equal numbers, the battle began to be a fierce one, and would have been among the most memorable, if a downpour of rain in heavy squalls had not separated the combatants. [5] That day, after beginning an engagement of no importance and merely inflaming their passions, they withdrew, the Romans into the city, the Carthaginians to the camp. For of [p. 153]the Carthaginians not more than thirty,¹⁹² who were¹⁹³ terrified by the first sally, fell, of the Romans fifty. [6] The rain continued incessantly throughout the night to the third hour of the next day. And so, although both sides were eager for the fray, they nevertheless kept within their fortifications that day.

On the third day Hannibal sent a part of his forces into the country about Nola to plunder. [7] On observing this Marcellus at once drew up his troops in line. And Hannibal did not refuse battle. There was about a mile between the city and the camp. In that space —and there is only a plain around Nola —they met each other. [8] A shout raised on both sides recalled to a battle already begun the nearest men of the cohorts which had gone out to the farms for booty. [9] And the men of Nola reinforced the Roman line. Marcellus praised them and ordered them to keep their place among the reserves and to carry off the wounded from the field; to refrain from fighting unless they should receive a signal from him. 45. The battle was doubtful. The generals were doing their utmost in cheering on their men, the soldiers in fighting. Marcellus bids them attack men defeated two days before, driven from Cumae in flight a few days earlier, beaten back from Nola the previous year by himself, the same commander, and other soldiers. [2] Not all of the enemy, he said, were in the line of battle; the booty-hunters were roaming about the country, and those who were fighting were weakened by Campanian luxury, exhausted by wine and harlots and every kind of dissipation the whole winter through. [3] Gone was that force and energy, lost the strength of body and spirit with which they had crossed the ranges of the Pyrenees and the Alps. [p. 155]Remnants only of those men were fighting, scarcely¹⁹⁴ able to hold up their weapons and their limbs. [4] Capua had been Hannibal's Cannae. It was there that warlike courage had been extinguished, there the discipline of the soldier, there the past reputation, there the hope for the future. [5] While by thus reviling the enemy Marcellus was raising the spirits of his soldiers, Hannibal was uttering much more serious reproaches; [6] he recognized the same arms and standards which he had seen and had at the Trebia and Trasumennus, finally at Cannae; but as for the soldier, he had certainly led one man into winter quarters at Capua, and out of them a different man. [7] “Are you,” he said, “hardly able with great effort to hold out against a mere Roman lieutenant,¹⁹⁵ and an engagement with a single legion and its auxiliaries —you, whom two consular armies combined have never withstood? [8] Marcellus with recruits and with reserves from Nola is now attacking us for the second time with impunity! Where is that soldier of mine who pulled Gaius Flaminius, the consul, down from his horse and carried away his head?¹⁹⁶ Where the man who slew Lucius Paulus at Cannae?¹⁹⁷ Is the sword now blunted? Or are your right hands benumbed? [9] Or is it some other portent? You who, though few, were wont to defeat larger numbers, now in larger numbers with difficulty resist the few? You used to boast, brave men in speech, that if some one led you, you would take Rome by storm. [10] Look you, in a less difficult situation, here and now I wish to test your might and courage. Take Nola by storm, a city of the plain, not fenced by a river nor by the sea. From this place, a city of such wealth, I will either lead you, laden with booty and [p. 157]spoils, or I will follow you whithersoever you shall¹⁹⁸ desire.”

46. Neither encouragement nor reproaches had any effect in steadying their spirits. [2] Since they were everywhere beaten back, while the Romans' courage rose, as not only the general exhorted them, but the men of Nola also kindled their ardour for battle by shouting as evidence of their support, the Carthaginians retreated and were forced back into the camp. [3] The Roman soldiers were eager to assault the camp, but Marcellus led them back to Nola, in the midst of great rejoicing and congratulation on the part of the common people as well, who had previously been more inclined to the Carthaginians. [4] Of the enemy more than five thousand were slain that day, six hundred captured alive, and nineteen military standards and two elephants were taken, four killed in battle. Of the Romans less than a thousand were slain. [5] The next day they spent under a tacit armistice, burying those slain in the battle on both sides. [6] Marcellus burned the spoils of the enemy, paying a vow to Vulcan. Two days later in anger on some account, I suppose, or in the hope of a more generous service, two hundred and seventy-two horsemen, partly Numidians, partly Spaniards, deserted to Marcellus. Their brave and loyal services were repeatedly employed by the Romans in that war. [7] As a reward for their courage farm land was given after the war to the Spaniards in Spain, to the Numidians in Africa.

[8] Hannibal, sending Hanno back from Nola into the country of the Bruttii with the forces with which he had come, himself sought winter quarters in Apulia and established himself near Arpi. [9] Quintus Fabius, [p. 159]on hearing that Hannibal had gone into Apulia,¹⁹⁹ brought in grain from Nola and Neapolis to the camp above Suessula, strengthened the fortifications, and left a garrison which was strong enough to hold the place through the winter season. [10] He then moved his camp nearer to Capua and ravaged the Campanian territory with fire and sword, until the Campanians, who had no confidence at all in their own resources, were compelled to come out of the gates and fortify a camp in the open before the city. They had six thousand armed men, infantry unfit for war; but in cavalry they were more effective. [11] Accordingly they kept harassing the enemy by cavalry battles.

Among the many distinguished Campanian horsemen was Cerrinus Vibellius, surnamed Taurea. [12] A citizen of that state, he was far the bravest horseman of all the Campanians, so much so that while he served with the Romans only one Roman, Claudius Asellus, rivalled him in reputation as a cavalryman. [13] At this time Taurea, looking all around again and again, rode up to the squadrons of the enemy's cavalry and, when silence was at last obtained, asked where Claudius Asellus was, and why, since he had been in the [14??] habit of disputing with him about their courage, did he not settle the matter with the sword and, if vanquished, give, or if victorious, take, the splendid spoils.²⁰⁰

47. When this was reported to Asellus in the camp, he waited only to ask the consul whether he might fight out of the ranks against an enemy who [p. 161]challenged him. [2] With the consul's permission he at²⁰¹ once took up his arms, and riding out in front of the guard-posts he addressed Taurea by name and bade him engage wherever he pleased. [3] Already the Romans had gone out in crowds to that spectacle of a combat, and the Campanians who looked on had filled not only the earthwork of the camp but also the walls of the city. First calling attention to the affair by high-spirited words, they levelled spears and spurred their horses. [4] Then, dodging each other in the open space, they prolonged the bloodless fray. [5] Then the Campanian said to the Roman: “This will be a contest of horses, not of horsemen, unless we let our horses go down from the open field into this deep-cut road. There, with no room to avoid each other, we shall fight hand to hand.” Almost sooner than said Claudius put his horse into the road. [6] Taurea, more spirited in words than in action, said: “Never a nag, please, into a ditch!”²⁰² —words which have come down from that time as a farmer's parable. [7] Claudius rode a long way on that road, and then riding back to the field without meeting any enemy, returned as victor to the camp, reviling the cowardice of his enemy in the midst of great rejoicing and congratulations. [8] To this combat of horsemen some annals add what is certainly marvellous —how true, it is for everyone to judge —that, as Claudius was pursuing Taurea fleeing to the city, he rode in through the enemy's open gate and, while they were spellbound in amazement, escaped unharmed by the opposite gate.

[p. 163] 48. Thereafter the winter quarters were²⁰³ undisturbed, and the consul moved his camp back again, that the Campanians might do their sowing.²⁰⁴ And he did not ravage the Campanian country until the growing grain in the fields was tall enough to furnish fodder. [2] This he transported to the Claudian Camp above Suessula and there built winter barracks. He ordered Marcus Claudius, the proconsul, to keep at Nola only the garrison needed to defend the city, and to send away the rest of the soldiers to Rome, lest they be a burden to the allies and an expense to the state. [3] And Tiberius Gracchus, after leading his legions from Cumae to Luceria in Apulia, sent thence Marcus Valerius, the praetor, to Brundisium with the army which he had had at Luceria, and ordered him to defend the coast of the Sallentine region²⁰⁵ and to take measures concerning Philip and the Macedonian war.

[4] At the end of the summer in which occurred the events I have described, there came a letter from Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, reporting how great and how successful had been their operations in Spain;²⁰⁶ but that money for pay, also clothing and grain, were lacking for the army, and for the crews everything. So far as pay was concerned, if the treasury was empty, they would find some method of getting it from the Spaniards. [5] Everything else, they said, must in any case be sent from Rome, and in no other way could either the army or the province be kept. After the reading of the letter, there was no one among them all²⁰⁷ who did not admit that the statements were true and the demands fair. [6] But they reflected what great forces on land and sea they were maintaining, and how large a new fleet must soon be made ready [p. 165]if a Macedonian war should begin; that Sicily and²⁰⁸ Sardinia, which before the war had paid taxes in kind, were hardly feeding the armies that garrisoned those provinces; [7] that necessary expenses were met only by the property tax;²⁰⁹ that the number of those who paid that particular tax had been diminished by such great losses of troops at Lake Trasumennus and also at Cannae; that if the few who survived should be burdened by a much greater levy, they would perish by another malady. [8] And so they thought that, unless support should be found in credit, the [9??] state would not be sustained by its assets; [10] that Fulvius, the praetor, must go before the assembly, inform the people of the public needs and exhort those who by contracts had increased their property to allow the state, the source of [11??] their wealth, time for payment, and to contract for furnishing what was needed for the army in Spain, on the condition that they should be the first to be paid, as soon as there was money in the treasury. [12] To this effect the praetor addressed the people, and named a date on which he would let the contracts for furnishing clothing and grain to the army in Spain and whatever else was needed for the crews. 49. When that day came, three companies of nineteen members presented themselves to take the contracts. [2] And their demands were two: one, that they should be exempt from military duty so long as they were in that public service, the other, that the cargoes which they shipped should be at the risk of the state, so far as concerned the violence of enemies and of storms. [3] Both demands being obtained, they contracted, and the state was carried on by private funds. Such character and such love of country pervaded all the classes virtually without [p. 167]exception. [4] As all the supplies were magnanimously²¹⁰ contracted for, so they were delivered with great fidelity, and nothing was furnished to the soldiers less generously than if they were being maintained, as formerly, out of an ample treasury.

[5] When these supplies arrived, the town of Iliturgi,²¹¹ because of its revolt to the Romans, was being besieged by Hasdrubal and Mago and Hannibal, the son of Bomilcar. [6] Between these three camps of the enemy the Scipios made their way into a city of their allies with great effort and great loss to those that opposed them. [7] And they brought grain, of which it had no supply, and encouraged the townspeople to defend their walls with the same spirit with which they had seen the Roman army fighting for them. [8] Then they led their troops to an attack upon the largest camp, which Hasdrubal commanded. To it also came the other two generals and two armies of the Carthaginians, seeing that the whole issue was at stake there. [9] Accordingly a sally from the camp opened the battle. Sixty thousand of the enemy were in the battle that day, about sixteen thousand on the Roman side. [10] Yet so far was the victory from being uncertain that [11??] the Romans slew more than their own number, captured more than three thousand men, a little less than a thousand horses, fifty-nine military standards, seven elephants, five having been slain in battle. And they took the three camps that day. [12] The siege of Iliturgi having been raised, the Carthaginian armies were led over to attack Intibili,²¹² while their forces were recruited from a province which, more than any [p. 169]other, was eager for war, if only there was booty or²¹³ pay, and at that time was well supplied with young men. [13] A second time there was a battle in regular line, with the same result for each side. Over thirteen thousand of the enemy were slain, over two thousand captured, with forty-two standards and nine elephants. [14] Then indeed nearly all the peoples of Spain revolted to the Romans, and there were much greater achievements that summer in Spain than in Italy.