Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War
Thomas Hobbes, Ed.

THE FOURTH BOOK

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

• The Athenians take and fortify Pylus in Messenia.
-- The Lacedaemonians, to recover it, put over four hundred of their best men into the island Sphacteria, whom the Athenians, having overcome the Lacedaemonian fleet, do there besiege. -- The Athenians and Syracusans fight in the Strait of Messana. -- Cleon engageth himself rashly to take or kill the Lacedaemonians in Sphacteria within twenty days and by good fortune performeth it. -- The sedition ceaseth in Corcyra. -- Nicias invadeth Peloponnesus. -- The Sicilians, agreeing, take from the Athenians their pretence of sailing upon that coast with their fleet. -- The Athenians take Nisaea, but fail of Megara. -- The overthrow of the Athenians at Delium. -- The cities on the confines of Thrace, upon the coming of Brasidas, revolt to the Lacedaemonians. -- Truce for a year. -- And this in three years more of the same war.

2. About the same time of the spring, and before corn was at full growth, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, invaded Attica, and there lay and wasted the country about. [2] And the Athenians sent forty galleys into Sicily, the same which they had provided before for that purpose, and with them the other two generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles. For Pythodorus, who was the third in that commission, was arrived in Sicily before. [3] To these they gave commandment also to take order, as they went by, for the state of those Corcyraeans that were in the city and were pillaged by the outlaws in the mountain; and threescore galleys of the Peloponnesians were gone out to take part with those in the mountain, who, because there was a great famine in the city, thought they might easily be masters of that state. [4] To Demosthenes also, who ever since his return out of Acarnania had lived privately, they gave authority, at his own request, to make use of the same galleys, if he thought good so to do, about Peloponnesus.

3. As they sailed by the coast of Laconia and had intelligence that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra already, Eurymedon and Sophocles hasted to Corcyra; but Demosthenes willed them to put in first at Pylus, and when they had done what was requisite there, then to proceed in their voyage. But whilst they denied to do it, the fleet was driven into Pylus by a tempest that then arose by chance. [2] And presently Demosthenes required them to fortify the place, alleging that he came with them for no other purpose, and showing how there was great store of timber and stone and that the place itself was naturally strong and desert, both it and a great deal of the country about. For it lieth from Sparta about four hundred furlongs in the territory that, belonging once to the Messenians, is called by the Lacedaemonians Coryphasion. [3] But they answered him that there were many desert promontories in Peloponnesus, if they were minded to put the city to charges in taking them in. But there appeared unto Demosthenes a great difference between this place and other places, because there was here a haven, and the Messenians, the ancient inhabitants thereof, speaking the same language the Lacedaemonians did, would both be able to annoy them much by excursions thence and be also faithful guardians of the place.

4. When he could not prevail, neither with the generals nor with the soldiers, having also at last communicated the same to the captains of companies, he gave it over, till at last, the weather not serving to be gone, there came upon the soldiers lying idle a desire, occasioned by dissension, to wall in the place of their own accord. [2] And falling in hand with the work, they performed it, not with iron tools to hew stone, but picked out such stones as they thought good and afterwards placed them as they would severally fit. And for mortar, where it was needed, for want of vessels they carried it on their backs, with their bodies inclining forward so as it might best lie, and their hands clasped behind to stay it from falling, making all possible haste to prevent the Lacedaemonians and to finish the most assailable parts before they came to succour it. [3] For the greatest part of the place was strong by nature and needed no fortifying at all.

5. The Lacedaemonians were [that day] celebrating a certain holiday, and when they heard the news did set lightly by it, conceiving that whensoever it should please them to go thither, they should find them either already gone or easily take the place by force. [2] Somewhat also they were retarded by reason that their army was in Attica. The Athenians, having in six days finished the wall to the land and in the places where was most need, left Demosthenes with five galleys to defend it and with the rest hastened on in their course for Corcyra and Sicily.

6. The Peloponnesians that were in Attica, when they were advertised of the taking of Pylus, returned speedily home; for the Lacedaemonians and Agis, their king, took this accident of Pylus to concern their own particular. And the invasion was withal so early, corn being yet green, that the most of them were scanted with victual. The army was also much troubled with the weather, which was colder than for the season. [2] So as for many reasons it fell out that they returned sooner now than at other times they had done, and this invasion was the shortest, for they continued in Attica in all but fifteen days.

7. About the same time, Simonides, an Athenian commander, having drawn a few Athenians together out of the garrisons and a number of the confederates of those parts, took the city of Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendaeans, that was their enemy, by treason, but was presently again driven out by the Chalcideans and Bottiaeans that came to succour it, and lost many of his soldiers.

8. When the Peloponnesians were returned out of Attica, they of the city of Sparta and of other the neighboring towns went presently to the aid of Pylus; but [the rest of] the Lacedaemonians came slowlier on, as being newly come from the former expedition. [2] Nevertheless they sent about to the cities of the Peloponnesus to require their assistance with all speed at Pylus, and also to their threescore galleys that were at Corcyra, which, transported over the isthmus of Leucas, arrived at Pylus unseen of the Athenian galleys lying at Zacynthus. And by this time their army of foot was also there. [3] Whilst the Peloponnesian galleys were coming toward Pylus, Demosthenes sent two galleys secretly to Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, in all haste, to tell them that they must come presently to him for as much as the place was in danger to be lost. [4] And according as Demosthenes' message imported, so the fleet made haste. The Lacedaemonians in the meantime prepared themselves to assault the fort both by sea and land, hoping easily to win it, being a thing built in haste and not many men within it. [5] And because they expected the coming of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus, they had a purpose, if they took not the fort before, to bar up the entries of the harbour. [6] For the island called Sphacteria, lying just before and very near to the place, maketh the haven safe and the entries straight, one of them, nearest to Pylus and to the Athenian fortification, admitting passage for no more but two galleys in front; and the other, which lieth against the other part of the continent, for not above eight or nine. The island, by being desert, was all wood and untrodden, in bigness, about fifteen furlongs over. Therefore they determined with their galleys thick set, and with the beak-heads outward, to stop up the entries of the haven. [7] And because they feared the island, lest the Athenians [putting men into it] should make war upon them from thence, they carried over men of arms into the same and placed others likewise along the shore of the continent. [8] For by this means the Athenians at their coming should find the island their enemy, and no means of landing in the continent. For the coast of Pylus itself without these two entries, being to the sea harbourless, would afford them no place from whence to set forth to the aid of their fellows; and they in all probability might by siege, without battle by sea or other danger, win the place, seeing there was no provision of victual within it and that the enemy took it but on short preparation. [9] Having thus resolved, they put over into the island their men of arms out of every band by lot. Some also had been sent over before by turns; but they which went over now last and were left there, were four hundred and twenty, besides the Helotes that were with them. And their captain was Epitadas, the son of Molobrus.

9. Demosthenes, when he saw the Lacedaemonians bent to assault him both from their galleys and with their army by land, prepared also to defend the place. And when he had drawn up his galleys, all that were left him, to the land, he placed them athwart the fort and armed the mariners that belonged to them with bucklers, though bad ones, and for the greatest part made of osiers. For they had no means in a desert place to provide themselves of arms. Those they had they took out of a piratical boat of thirty oars and a light-horseman of the Messenians, which came by chance. And the men of arms of the Messenians were about forty, which he made use of amongst the rest. [2] The greatest part therefore, both of armed and unarmed, he placed on the parts of the wall toward the land which were of most strength and commanded them to make good the place against the land-forces if they assaulted it. And he himself, with sixty men of arms chosen out of the whole number and a few archers, came forth from the fort to the sea-side in that part where he most expected their landing, which part was of troublesome access and stony and lay to the wide sea. But because their wall was there the weakest, he thought they would be drawn to adventure for that. For neither did the Athenians think they should ever have been mastered with galleys, which caused them to make the place [to the seaward] the less strong; [3] and if the Peloponnesians should by force come to land, they made no other account but the place would be lost. [4] Coming therefore in this part to the very brink of the sea, he put in order his men of arms and encouraged them with words to this effect:

10. ‘You that participate with me in the present danger, let not any of you in this extremity go about to seem wise and reckon every peril that now besetteth us, but let him rather come up to the enemy with little circumspection and much hope and look for his safety by that. For things that are come once to a pinch, as these are, admit not debate, but a speedy hazard. [2] And [yet] if we stand it out, and betray not our advantages with fear of the number of the enemy, I see well enough that most things are with us. [3] For I make account, the difficulty of their landing makes for us, which, as long as we abide ourselves, will help us; but if we retire, though the place be difficult, yet when there is none to impeach them they will land well enough. For whilst they are in their galleys, they are most easy to be fought withal; and in their disbarking, being but on equal terms, their number is not greatly to be feared; [4] for though they be many, yet they must fight but by few for want of room to fight in. And for an army to have odds by land is another matter than when they are to fight from galleys, where they stand in need of so many accidents to fall out opportunely from the sea. So that I think their great difficulties do but set them even with our small number. [5] And for you, that be Athenians and by experience of disbarking against others know that if a man stand it out and do not fear of the sowsing of a wave or the menacing approach of a galley give back of himself, he can never be put back by violence; I expect that you should keep your ground and by fighting it out upon the very edge of the water preserve both yourselves and the fort.’

11. Upon this exhortation of Demosthenes the Athenians took better heart and went down and arranged themselves close by the sea. [2] And the Lacedaemonians came and assaulted the fort, both with their army by land and with their fleet, consisting of three-and-forty galleys, in which was admiral Thrasymelidas, the son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he made his approach where Demosthenes had before expected him. [3] So the Athenians were assaulted on both sides, both by sea and by land. The Peloponnesians, dividing their galleys into small numbers because they could not come near with many at once and resting between, assailed them by turns, using all possible valour and mutual encouragement to put the Athenians back and gain the fort. Most eminent of all the rest was Brasidas. [4] For having the command of a galley and seeing other captains of galleys and steersmen (the place being hard of access), when there appeared sometimes possibility of putting ashore, to be afraid and tender of breaking their galleys, he would cry out unto them, saying, ‘They did not well for sparing of wood to let the enemy fortify in their country.’ And [to the Lacedaemonians] he gave advice to force landing with the breaking of their galleys and prayed the confederates that in requital of many benefits they would not stick to bestow their galleys at this time upon the Lacedaemonians and, running them ashore, to use any means whatsoever to land and to get into their hands both the men [in the isle] and the fort.

12. Thus he urged others; and having compelled the steersman of his own galley to run her ashore, he came to the ladders, but attempting to get down was by the Athenians put back, and after he had received many wounds, swooned; and falling upon the ledges of the galley, his buckler tumbled over into the sea. Which brought to land, the Athenians took up, and used afterwards in the trophy which they set up for this assault. [2] Also the rest endeavoured with much courage to come aland; but the place being ill to land in, and the Athenians not budging, they could not do it. [3] So that at this time fortune came so much about, that the Athenians fought from the land, Laconique land, against the Lacedaemonians in galleys; and the Lacedaemonians from their galleys fought against the Athenians, to get landing in their own now hostile territory. For at that time there was an opinion far spread, that these were rather landmen and expert in a battle of foot, and that in maritime and naval actions the other excelled.

13. This day then and a part of the next, they made sundry assaults and after that gave over. And the third day they sent out some galleys to Asine for timber wherewith to make engines, hoping with engines to take that part of the wall that looketh into the haven, which, though it were higher, yet the landing to it was easier. [2] In the meantime arrive the forty Athenian galleys from Zacynthus; for there were joined with them certain galleys of the garrison of Naupactus and four of Chios. [3] And when they saw both the continent and the island full of men of arms and that the galleys that were in the haven would not come forth, not knowing where to cast anchor they sailed for the present to the isle Prote, being near and desert, and there lay for that night. The next day, after they had put themselves in order, they put to sea again with purpose to offer them battle if the other would come forth into the wide sea against them; if not, to enter the haven upon them. [4] But the Peloponnesians neither came out against them nor had stopped up the entries of the haven, as they had before determined, but lying still on the shore manned out their galleys and prepared to fight, if any entered, in the haven itself, which was no small one.

14. The Athenians, understanding this, came in violently upon them at both the mouths of the haven, and most of the Lacedaemonian galleys, which were already set out and opposed them, they charged and put to flight; and in following the chase, which was but short, they brake many of them and took five, whereof one with all her men in her; and they fell in also with them that fled to the shore. And the galleys which were but in manning out were torn and rent before they could put off from the land. Others they tied to their own galleys and towed them away empty. [2] Which the Lacedaemonians perceiving, and extremely grieved with the loss, because their fellows were hereby intercepted in the island, came in with their aid [from the land], and entering armed into the sea took hold of the galleys with their hands to have pulled them back again, every one conceiving the business to proceed the worse wherein himself was not present. [3] So there arose a great affray about the galleys, and such as was contrary to the manner of them both. For the Lacedaemonians, out of eagerness and out of fear, did (as one may say) nothing else but make a sea-fight from the land; and the Athenians, who had the victory and desired to extend their present fortune to the utmost, made a land-fight from their galleys. [4] But at length, having wearied and wounded each other, they fell asunder; and the Lacedaemonians recovered all their galleys, save only those which were taken at the first onset. [5] When they were on both sides retired to their camps, the Athenians erected a trophy, delivered to the enemy their dead, and possessed the wreck, and immediately went round the island with their galleys, keeping watch upon it as having intercepted the men within it. The Peloponnesians, in the meantime, that were in the continent and were by this time assembled there with their succours from all parts of Peloponnesus, remained upon the place at Pylus.

15. As soon as the news of what had passed was related at Sparta, they thought fit, in respect the loss was great, to send the magistrates down to the camp to determine, upon view of the state of their present affairs there, what they thought requisite to be done. [2] These, when they saw there was no possibility to relieve their men and were not willing to put them to the danger either of suffering by famine or of being forced by multitude, concluded amongst themselves to take truce with the Athenian commanders, as far as concerned the particulars of Pylus, if they also would be content, and to send ambassadors to Athens about agreement, and to endeavour to fetch off their men as soon as they could.

16. The Athenian commanders accepting the proposition, the truce was made in this manner:

That the Lacedaemonians should deliver up not only those galleys wherein they fought but also bring to Pylus and put into the Athenians' hands whatsoever vessels of the long form of building were anywhere else in Laconia; that they should not make any assault upon the fort, neither by sea nor land.— That the Athenians should permit the Lacedaemonians that were in the continent to send over to those in the island a portion of ground corn agreed on, to wit, to every one two Attic choenickes of meal and two cotyles of wine and a piece of flesh, and to every of their servants half that quantity; [2] that they should send this the Athenians looking on, and not send over any vessel by stealth.—That the Athenians should nevertheless continue guarding of the island, provided that they landed not in it, and should not invade the Peloponnesian army neither by land nor sea.—That if either side transgressed in any part thereof, the truce was then immediately to be void, otherwise to hold good till the return of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors from Athens.—That the Athenians should convoy them in a galley unto Athens and back.—That at their return the truce should end, and the Athenians should restore them their galleys in as good estate as they had received them. [3]

Thus was the truce made, and the galleys were delivered to the Athenians, to the number of about three score; and the ambassadors were sent away, who, arriving at Athens, said as followeth:

17. "Men of Athens, the Lacedaemonians have sent us hither concerning our men in the island, to see if we can persuade you to such a course, as being most profitable for you, may, in this misfortune, be the most honourable for us that our present condition is capable of. [2] We will not be longer in discourse than standeth with our custom, being the fashion with us, where few words suffice there indeed not to use many; but yet to use more when the occasion requireth that by words we should make plain that which is to be done in actions of importance. [3] But the words we shall use we pray you to receive not with the mind of an enemy nor as if we went about to instruct you as men ignorant, but for a remembrance to you of what you know that you may deliberate wisely therein. [4] It is now in your power to assure your present good fortune with reputation, holding what you have, with the addition of honour and glory besides, and to avoid that which befalleth men upon extraordinary success, who through hope aspire to greater fortune because the fortune they have already came unhoped for. [5] Whereas they that have felt many changes of both fortunes ought indeed to be most suspicious of the good. So ought your city, and ours especially, upon experience in all reason to be.

18. "Know it, by seeing this present misfortune fallen on us, who, being of greatest dignity of all the Grecians, come to you to ask that which before we thought chiefly in our own hands to give. [2] And yet we are not brought to this through weakness nor through insolence upon addition of strength, but because it succeeded not with the power we had as we thought it should, which may as well happen to any other as to ourselves. [3] So that you have no reason to conceive that for your power and purchases fortune also must be therefore always yours. [4] Such wise men as safely reckon their prosperity in the account of things doubtful do most wisely also address themselves towards adversity and not think that war will so far follow and no further as one shall please more or less to take it in hand, but rather so far as fortune shall lead it. Such men also, seldom miscarrying because they be not puffed up with the confidence of success, choose then principally to give over when they are in their better fortune. [5] And so it will be good for you, men of Athens, to do with us, and not, if rejecting our advice you chance to miscarry (as many ways you may), to have it thought hereafter that all your present successes were but mere fortune; whereas, on the contrary, it is in your hands without danger to leave a reputation to posterity both of strength and wisdom.

19. "The Lacedaemonians call you to a peace and end of the war, giving you peace and alliance and much other friendship and mutual familiarity, requiring for the same [only] those their men that are in the island, though also we think it better for both sides not to try the chance of war, whether it fall out that by some occasion of safety offered they escape by force, or being expugned by siege should be more in your power than they be. [2] For we are of this mind, that great hatred is most safely cancelled not when one that having beaten his enemy and gotten much the better in the war brings him through necessity to take an oath and to make peace on unequal terms, but when having it in his power lawfully so to do if he please, he overcome him likewise in goodness, and, contrary to what he expects, be reconciled to him on moderate conditions. [3] For in this case, his enemy being obliged not to seek revenge as one that had been forced, but to requite his goodness, will, for shame, be the more inclined to the conditions agreed on. [4] And, naturally, to those that relent of their own accord men give way reciprocally with content; but against the arrogant they will hazard all, even when in their own judgments they be too weak.

20. ‘But for us both, if ever it were good to agree, it is surely so at this present and before any irreparable accident be interposed. Whereby we should be compelled, besides the common, to bear you a particular eternal hatred, and you be deprived of the commodities we now offer you. [2] Let us be reconciled while matters stand undecided, and whilst you have gained reputation and our friendship, and we not suffered dishonour and but indifferent loss. And we shall not only ourselves prefer peace before war, but also give a cessation of their miseries to all the rest of the Grecians, who will acknowledge it rather from you than us. For they make war not knowing whether side begun; but if an end be made, which is now for the most part in your own hands, the thanks will be yours. [3] And by decreeing the peace, you may make the Lacedaemonians your sure friends, inasmuch as they call you to it and are therein not forced but gratified. [4] Wherein consider how many commodities are like to ensue. For if we and you go one way, you know the rest of Greece, being inferior to us, will honour us in the highest degree.’

21. Thus spake the Lacedaemonians, thinking that in times past the Athenians had coveted peace and been hindered of it by them, and that being now offered, they would gladly accept of it. [2] But they, having these men intercepted in the island, thought they might compound at pleasure and aspired to greater matters. To this they were set on for the most part by Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, a popular man at that time and of greatest sway with the multitude. [3] He persuaded them to give this answer: ‘That they in the island ought first to deliver up their arms, and come themselves to Athens; and when they should be there, if the Lacedaemonians would make restitution of Nisaea and Pegae and Troezen and Achaia’—the which they had not won in war but had received by former treaty when the Athenians, being in distress and at that time in more need of peace than now, [yielded them up into their hands]—‘then they should have their men again, and peace should be made for as long as they both should think good.’

22. To this answer they replied nothing, but desired that commissioners might be chosen to treat with them, who, by alternate speaking and hearing, might quietly make such an agreement as they could persuade each other unto. [2] But then Cleon came mightily upon them saying he knew before that they had no honest purpose and that the same was now manifest in that they refused to speak before the people but sought to sit in consultation only with a few, and willed them, if they had aught to say that was real, to speak it before them all. [3] But the Lacedaemonians finding that, although they had a mind to make peace with them upon this occasion of adversity, yet it would not be fit to speak in it before the multitude, lest speaking and not obtaining they should incur calumny with their confederates; and seeing withal that the Athenians would not grant what they sued for upon reasonable conditions, they went back again without effect.

23. Upon their return, presently the truce at Pylus was at an end; and the Lacedaemonians, according to agreement, demanded restitution of their galleys. But the Athenians, laying to their charge an assault made upon the fort, contrary to the articles, and other matters of no great importance, refused to render them, standing upon this, that it was said that the accord should be void upon whatsoever the least transgression of the same. But the Lacedaemonians, denying it and protesting this detention of their galleys for an injury, went their ways and betook themselves to the war. [2] So the war at Pylus was on both sides renewed with all their power; the Athenians went every day about the island with two galleys, one going one way, another another way, and lay at anchor about it every night with their whole fleet, except on that part which lieth to the open sea; and that only when it was windy. (From Athens also there came a supply of thirty galleys more, to guard the island, so that they were in the whole threescore and ten.) And the Lacedaemonians made assaults upon the fort, and watched every opportunity that should present itself to save their men in the island.

24. Whilst these things passed, the Syracusians and their confederates in Sicily, adding to those galleys that lay in garrison at Messana the rest of the fleet which they had prepared, made war out of Messana, [2] instigated thereto chiefly by the Locrians, as enemies to the Rhegians, whose territory they had also invaded with their whole forces by land; [3] and seeing the Athenians had but a few galleys present and hearing that the greater number which were to come to them were employed in the siege of the island, desired to try with them a battle by sea. [4] For if they could get the better with their navy, they hoped, lying before Rhegium, both with their land-forces on the field side and with their fleet by sea, easily to take it into their hands and thereby strengthen their affairs. For Rhegium, a promontory of Italy, and Messana in Sicily lying near together, they might both hinder the Athenians from lying at anchor there against them and make themselves masters of the strait. [5] This strait is the sea between Rhegium and Messana where Sicily is nearest to the continent, and is that which is called Charybdis, where Ulysses is said to have passed through. Which, for that it is very narrow, and because the sea falleth in there from two great mains, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and is rough, hath therefore not without good cause been esteemed dangerous.

25. In this strait then the Syracusians and their confederates, with somewhat more than thirty galleys, were constrained in the latter end of the day to come to a sea-fight, having been drawn forth about the passage of a certain boat to undertake sixteen galleys of Athens and eight of Rhegium, and being overcome by the Athenians, fell off with the loss of one galley and went speedily each [side] to their own camp at Messana and Rhegium; [2] and the night overtook them in the action. [3] After this the Locrians departed out of the territory of the Rhegians, and the fleet of the Syracusians and their confederates came together to an anchor at Peloris and had their land-forces by them. [4] But the Athenians and Rhegians came up to them and, finding their galleys empty of men, fell in amongst them; and by means of a grapnel cast into one of their galleys they lost that galley, but the men swam out. [5] Upon this the Syracusians went aboard, and whilst they were towed along the shore towards Messana the Athenians came up to them again; and the Syracusians, opening themselves, charged first and sunk another of their galleys. [6] So the Syracusians passed on to the port of Messana, having had the better in their passage by the shore and in the sea-fight, which were both together in such manner as is declared. [7]

The Athenians, upon news that Camarina should by Archias and his complices be betrayed to the Syracusians, went thither. In the meantime the Messanians, with their whole power by land and also with their fleet, warred on Naxos, a Chalcidique city and their borderer. [8] The first day, having forced the Naxians to retire within their walls, they spoiled their fields; the next day they sent their fleet about into the river Acesine, which spoiled the country [as it went up the river], and with their land-forces assaulted the city. [9] In the meantime many of the Siculi, mountaineers, came down to their assistance against the Messanians, which when they of Naxos perceived, they took heart and, encouraging themselves with an opinion that the Leontines and all the rest of the Grecians their confederates had come to succour them, sallied suddenly out of the city and charged upon the Messanians and put them to flight with the slaughter of a thousand of their soldiers, and the rest hardly escaping home. [10] For the barbarians fell upon them and slew the most part of them in the highways. And the galleys that lay at Messana not long after divided themselves and went to their several homes. Hereupon the Leontines and their confederates, together with the Athenians, marched presently against Messana, as being now weakened, and assaulted it, the Athenians with their fleet by the haven and the land-forces at the wall to the field. [11] But the Messanians and certain Locrians with Demoteles, who after this loss had been left there in garrison, issuing forth and falling suddenly upon them, put a great part of the Leontines' army to flight and slew many. But the Athenians, seeing that, disbarked and relieved them and, coming upon the Messanians now in disorder, chased them again into the city. [12] Then they erected a trophy and put over to Rhegium. After this, the Grecians of Sicily warred one upon another without the Athenians.

26. All this while the Athenians at Pylus besieged the Lacedaemonians in the island; and the army of the Peloponnesians in the continent remained still upon the place. [2] This keeping of watch was exceedingly painful to the Athenians in respect of the want they had both of corn and water, for there was no well but one and that was in the fort itself of Pylus and no great one. And the greatest number turned up the gravel and drank such water as they were like to find there. [3] They were also scanted of room for their camp, and their galleys not having place to ride in, they were forced by turns some to stay ashore and others to take their victual and lie off at anchor. [4] But their greatest discouragement was the time which they had stayed there longer than they had thought to have done, for they thought to have famished them out in a few days, being in a desert island and having nothing to drink but salt water. [5] The cause hereof were the Lacedaemonians, who had proclaimed that any man that would should carry in meal, wine, cheese, and all other esculents necessary for a siege into the island, appointing for the same a great reward of silver; and if any Helot should carry in any thing, they promised him liberty. Hereupon divers with much danger imported victual, but especially the Helotes, who, putting off from all parts of Peloponnesus, wheresoever they chanced to be, came in at the parts of the island that lay to the wide sea. [6] But they had a care above all to take such a time as to be brought in with the wind. [7] For when it blew from the sea, they could escape the watch of the galleys easily; for they could not then lie round about the island at anchor. And the Helotes were nothing tender in putting ashore, for they ran their galleys on ground, valued at a price in money; and the men of arms also watched at all the landing places of the island. But as many as made attempt when the weather was calm were intercepted. [8] There were also such as could dive, that swam over into the island through the haven, drawing after them in a string bottles filled with poppy tempered with honey, and pounded linseed; whereof some at the first passed unseen, but were afterwards watched. [9] So that on either part they used all possible art, one side to send over food, the other to apprehend those that carried it.

27. The people of Athens being advertised of the state of their army, how it was in distress, and that victual was transported into the island, knew not what they should do to it and feared lest winter should overtake them in their siege, fearing not only that to provide them of necessaries about Peloponnesus, and in a desert place withal, would be a thing impossible, but also that they should be unable to send forth so many things as were requisite, though it were summer; and again, that the parts thereabout being without harbour, there would be no place to lie anchor in against them, but that the watch there ceasing of itself, the men would by that means escape or in some foul weather be carried away in the same boats that brought them meat. [2] But that which they feared most was that the Lacedaemonians seemed to have some assurance of them already, because they sent no more to negotiate about them. [3] And they repented now that they had not accepted of the peace. But Cleon, knowing himself to be the man suspected for hindering the agreement, said that they who brought the news reported not the truth. Whereupon, they that came thence advising them, if they would not believe it, to send to view the estate of the army, he and Theogenes were chosen by the Athenians to view it. [4] But when he saw that he must of force either say as they said whom he before calumniated or, saying the contrary, be proved a liar, he advised the Athenians, seeing them inclined of themselves to send thither greater forces than they had before thought to do, that it was not fit to send to view the place nor to lose their opportunity by delay; [5] but if the report seemed unto them to be true, they should make a voyage against those men; and glanced at Nicias, the son of Niceratus, then general, upon malice and with language of reproach, saying it was easy, if the leaders were men, to go and take them there in the island; and that himself, if he had the command, would do it.

28. But Nicias, seeing the Athenians to be in a kind of tumult against Cleon, for that when he thought it so easy a matter he did not presently put it in practice, and seeing also he had upbraided him, willed him to take what strength he would that they could give him and undertake it. [2] Cleon, supposing at first that he gave him this leave but in words, was ready to accept it; but when he knew he would give him the authority in good earnest, then he shrunk back and said that not he but Nicias was general, being now indeed afraid and hoping that he durst not have given over the office to him. [3] But then Nicias again bade him do it and gave over his command [to him] for so much as concerned Pylus and called the Athenians to witness it. They (as is the fashion of the multitude), the more Cleon declined the voyage and went back from his word, pressed Nicias so much the more to resign his power to him and cried out upon Cleon to go. [4] Insomuch as not knowing how to disengage himself of his word, he undertook the voyage, and stood forth saying that he feared not the Lacedaemonians and that he would not carry any man with him out of the city but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that then were present and those targettiers that were come to them from Aenus and four hundred archers out of other places; and with these, he said, added to the soldiers that were at Pylus already, he would within twenty days either fetch away the Lacedaemonians alive or kill them upon the place. [5] This vain speech moved amongst the Athenians some laughter, and was heard with great content of the wiser sort. For of two benefits, the one must needs fall out: either to be rid of Cleon (which was their greatest hope) or, if they were deceived in that, then to get those Lacedaemonians into their hands.

29. Now when he had dispatched with the assembly and the Athenians had by their voices decreed him the voyage, he joined unto himself Demosthenes, one of the commanders at Pylus, and presently put to sea. [2] He made choice of Demosthenes for his companion because he heard that he also of himself had a purpose to set his soldiers aland in the isle. For the army, having suffered much by the straitness of the place and being rather the besieged than the besieger, had a great desire to put the matter to the hazard of a battle; [3] confirmed therein the more for that the island had been burnt. For having been for the most part wood and (by reason it had lain ever desert) without path, they were before [the more] afraid and thought it the advantage of the enemy; for assaulting them out of sight, they might annoy a very great army that should offer to come aland. For their errors being in the wood and their preparation could not so well have been discerned, whereas all the faults of their own army should have been in sight, so that the enemy might have set upon them suddenly in what part soever they had pleased, because the onset had been in their own election. [4] Again, if they should by force come up to fight with the Lacedaemonians at hand in the thick woods, the fewer and skilful of the ways, he thought, would be too hard for the many and unskilful. Besides, their own army being great it might receive an overthrow before they could know of it, because they could not see where it was needful to relieve one another.

30. These things came into his head especially from the loss he received in Aetolia; which in part also happened by occasion of the woods. [2] But the soldiers, for want of room, having been forced to put in at the outside of the island to dress their dinners with a watch before them, and one of them having set fire on the wood, [it burnt on by little and little], and the wind afterwards rising, the most of it was burnt before they were aware. [3] By this accident, Demosthenes, the better discerning that the Lacedaemonians were more than he had imagined, having before, by victual sent unto them, thought them not so many, did now prepare himself for the enterprise as a matter deserving the Athenians' utmost care and as having better commodity of landing in the island than before he had, and both sent for the forces of such confederates as were near and put in readiness every other needful thing. [4] And Cleon, who had sent a messenger before to signify his coming, came himself also, with those forces which he had required, unto Pylus.

When they were both together, first they sent a herald to the camp in the continent to know if they would command those in the island to deliver up themselves and their arms without battle, to be held with easy imprisonment till some agreement were made touching the main war.

31. Which when they refused, the Athenians for one day held their hands; but the next day, having put aboard upon a few galleys all their men of arms, they put off in the night and landed a little before day on both sides of the island, both from the main and from the haven, to the number of about eight hundred men of arms, and marched upon high speed towards the foremost watch of the island. [2] For thus the Lacedaemonians lay quartered. In this foremost watch were about thirty men of arms; the middest and evenest part of the island and about the water was kept by Epitadas, their captain, with the greatest part of the whole number; and another part of them, which were not many, kept the last guard towards Pylus, which place to the seaward was on a cliff and least assailable by land. For there was also a certain fort which was old and made of chosen [not of hewn] stones, which they thought would stand them in stead in case of violent retreat. Thus they were quartered.

32. Now the Athenians presently killed those of the foremost guard, which they so ran to, in their cabins and as they were taking arms. For they knew not of their landing but thought those galleys had come thither to anchor in the night according to custom, as they had been wont to do. [2] As soon as it was morning, the rest of the army also landed, out of somewhat more than seventy galleys, every one with such arms as he had, being all [that rowed] except only the Thalamii: eight hundred archers, targetiers as many, all the Messenians that came to aid them, and as many of them besides as held any place about Pylus, except only the garrison of the fort itself. [3] Demosthenes then, disposing his army by two hundred and more in a company, and in some less, [at certain distances], seized on all the higher grounds to the end that the enemies, compassed about on every side, might the less know what to do or against what part to set themselves in battle and be subject to the shot of the multitude from every part; and when they should make head against those that fronted them, be charged behind; [4] and when they should turn to those that were opposed to their flanks, be charged at once both behind and before. And which way soever they marched, the light-armed and such as were meanliest provided of arms followed them at the back with arrows, darts, stones, and slings, who have courage enough afar off, and could not be charged, but would overcome flying, and also press the enemies when they should retire. With this design Demosthenes both intended his landing at first and afterwards ordered his forces accordingly in the action.

33. Those that were about Epitadas, who were the greatest part of those in the island, when they saw that the foremost guard was slain and that the army marched towards them, put themselves in array and went towards the men of arms of the Athenians with intent to charge them; for these were opposed to them in front, and the light-armed soldiers on their flanks and at their backs. [2] But they could neither come to join with them nor any way make use of their skill. For both the lightarmed soldiers kept them off with shot from either side, and the men of arms advanced not. Where the light-armed soldiers approached nearest, they were driven back; but returning, they charged them afresh, being men armed lightly, and that easily got out of their reach by running, especially the ground being uneasy and rough by having been formerly desert, so that the Lacedaemonians in their armour could not follow them.

34. Thus for a little while they skirmished one against another afar off. But when the Lacedaemonians were no longer able to run out after them where they charged, these lightarmed soldiers, seeing them less earnest in chasing them and taking courage chiefly from their sight, as being many times their number, and having also been used to them so much as not to think them now so dangerous as they had done, for that they had not received so much hurt at their hands as their subdued minds, because they were to fight against the Lacedaemonians, had at their first landing prejudged, contemned them; and with a great cry ran all at once upon them, casting stones, arrows, and darts, as to every man came next to hand. [2] Upon this cry and assault they were much terrified, as not accustomed to such kind of fight; and withal a great dust of the woods lately burnt mounted into the air, so that by reason of the arrows and stones, that together with the dust flew from such a multitude of men, they could hardly see before them. [3] Then the battle grew sore on the Lacedaemonians' side, for their jacks now gave way to the arrows, and the darts that were thrown stuck broken in them, so as they could not handle themselves, as neither seeing before them, nor hearing any direction given them for the greater noise of the enemy, but danger being on all sides, were hopeless to save themselves upon any side by fighting.

35. In the end, many of them being now wounded, for that they could not shift their ground, they made their retreat in close order to the last guard of the island and to the watch that was there. [2] When they once gave ground, then were the lightarmed soldiers much more confident than before and pressed upon them with a mighty noise; and as many of the Lacedaemonians as they could intercept in their retreat they slew; but the most of them recovered the fort and together with the watch of the same put themselves in order to defend it in all parts that were subject to assault. [3] The Athenians following could not now encompass and hem them in, for the strong situation of the place, but, assaulting them in the face, sought only how to put them from the wall. [4] And thus they held out a long time, the better part of a day, either side tired with the fight and with thirst and with the sun, one endeavouring to drive the enemy from the top, the other to keep their ground. And the Lacedaemonians defended themselves easilier now than before because they were not now encompassed upon their flanks.

36. When there was no end of the business, the captain of the Messenians said unto Cleon and Demosthenes that they spent their labour there in vain and that if they would deliver unto him a part of the archers and light-armed soldiers to get up by such a way as he himself should find out and come behind upon their backs, he thought the entrance might be forced. [2] And having received the forces he asked, he took his way from a place out of sight to the Lacedaemonians that he might not be discovered making his approach under the cliffs of the island where they were continual in which part, trusting to the natural strength thereof, they kept no watch, and with much labour and hardly unseen, came behind them, and appearing suddenly from above at their backs, both terrified the enemies with the sight of what they expected not and much confirmed the Athenians with the sight of what they expected. [3] And the Lacedaemonians, being now charged with their shot both before and behind, were in the same case (to compare small matters with great) that they were in at Thermopylae. For then they were slain by the Persians, shut up on both sides in a narrow path; and these now, being charged on both sides, could make good the place no longer, but fighting few against many and being weak withal for want of food, were at last forced to give ground; and the Athenians by this time were also masters of all the entrances.

37. But Cleon and Demosthenes, knowing that the more they gave back the faster they would be killed by their army, stayed the fight and held in the soldiers, with desire to carry them alive to Athens in case their spirits were so much broken and their courage abated by this misery as upon proclamation made they would be content to deliver up their arms. [2] So they proclaimed that they should deliver up their arms and themselves to the Athenians to be disposed of as to them should seem good.

38. Upon hearing hereof the most of them threw down their bucklers and shook their hands above their heads, signifying their acceptation of what was proclaimed. Whereupon a truce was made and they came to treat, Cleon and Demosthenes of one side, and Styphon, the son of Pharax, on the other side. For of them that had command there, Epitadas, who was the first, was slain; and Hippagretes, who was chosen to succeed him, lay amongst the dead, though yet alive; and this man was the third to succeed in the command by the law in case the others should miscarry. [2] Styphon and those that were with him said they would send over to the Lacedaemonians in the continent to know what they there would advise them to. [3] But the Athenians, letting none go thence, called for heralds out of the continent; and the question having been twice or thrice asked, the last of the Lacedaemonians that came over from the continent brought them this answer: ‘The Lacedaemonians bid you take advice touching yourselves such as you shall think good, provided you do nothing dishonourably.’ Whereupon, having consulted, they yielded up themselves and their arms. [4] And the Athenians attended them that day and the night following with a watch; but the next day, after they had set up their trophy in the island, they prepared to be gone and committed the prisoners to the custody of the captains of the galleys. And the Lacedaemonians sent over a herald and took up the bodies of their dead. [5] The number of them that were slain and taken alive in the island was thus: There went over into the island in all four hundred and twenty men of arms; of these were sent away alive three hundred wanting eight; and the rest slain. Of those that lived, there were of the city itself of Sparta one hundred and twenty. Of the Athenians there died not many, for it was no standing fight.

39. The whole time of the siege of these men in the island, from the fight of the galleys to the fight in the island, was seventy-two days, of which for twenty days victual was allowed to be carried to them, that is to say, in the time that the ambassadors were away that went about the peace; [2] in the rest, they were fed by such only as put in thither by stealth; and yet there was both corn and other food left in the island. For their captain Epitadas had distributed it more sparingly than he needed to have done. [3] So the Athenians and the Peloponnesians departed from Pylus, and went home both of them with their armies. And the promise of Cleon, as senseless as is was, took effect; for within twenty days he brought home the men as he had undertaken.

40. Of all the accidents of this war, this same fell out the most contrary to the opinion of the Grecians. For they expected that the Lacedaemonians should never, neither by famine nor whatsoever other necessity, have been constrained to deliver up their arms, but have died with them in their hands, fighting as long as they had been able, and would not believe that those that yielded were like to those that were slain. [2] And when one afterwards of the Athenian confederates asked one of the prisoners, by way of insulting, if they which were slain were valiant men, he answered that a spindle (meaning an arrow) deserved to be valued at a high rate if it could know what was a good man, signifying that the slain were such as the stones and arrows chanced to light on.

41. After the arrival of the men, the Athenians ordered that they should be kept in bonds till there should be made some agreement; and if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their territory, then to bring them forth and kill them. [2] They took order also [in the same assembly] for the settling of the garrison at Pylus. And the Messenians of Naupactus, having sent thither such men of their own as were fittest for the purpose, as to their native country (for Pylus is in that country which belonged once to the Messenians), infested Laconia with robberies and did them much other mischief, as being of the same language. [3] The Lacedaemonians, not having in times past been acquainted with robberies and such war as that, and because their Helotes ran over to the enemy, fearing also some greater innovation in the country, took the matter much to heart; and though they would not be known of it to the Athenians, yet they sent ambassadors and endeavoured to get the restitution both of the fort of Pylus and of their men. [4] But the Athenians aspired to greater matters; and the ambassadors, though they came often about it, yet were always sent away without effect. These were the proceedings at Pylus.

42. Presently after this, the same summer, the Athenians, with eighty galleys, two thousand men of arms of their own city, and two hundred horse in boats built for transportation of horses, made war upon the territory of Corinth. There went also with them Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians, of their confederates. The general of the whole army was Nicias, the son of Niceratus, with two others in commission with him. [2] Betimes in a morning they put in at a place between Chersonesus and Rheitus on that shore above which standeth the hill Solygeius, whereon the Dorians in old time sat down to make war on the Corinthians in the city of Corinth, that were then Aeolians, and upon which there standeth now a village, called also Solygeia. From the shore where the galleys came in, this village is distant twenty furlongs, and the city of Corinth sixty, and the isthmus twenty. [3] The Corinthians, having long before from Argos had intelligence that an army of the Athenians was coming against them, came all of them with their forces to the isthmus, save only such as dwelt without the isthmus and five hundred garrison soldiers absent in Ambracia and Leucadia; all the rest of military age came forth to attend the Athenians where they should put in. [4] But when the Athenians had put to shore in the night unseen and that advertisement thereof was given them by signs put up into the air, they left the one half of their forces in Cenchreia lest the Athenians should go against Crommyon: and with the other half made haste to meet them.

43. Battus, one of their commanders (for there were two of them present at the battle), with one squadron went toward the village of Solygeia, being an open one, to defend it; and Lycophron with the rest charged the enemy. [2] And first they gave the onset on the right wing of the Athenians, which was but newly landed before Chersonesus; and afterwards they charged likewise the rest of the army. The battle was hot and at hand-strokes. [3] And the right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for of these consisted their utmost files) sustained the charge of the Corinthians; and with much ado drave them back. But as they retired they came up (for the place was all rising ground) to a dry wall, and from thence, being on the upper ground, threw down stones at them; and after having sung the Paean, came again close to them, whom when the Athenians abode, the battle was again at hand-strokes. [4] But a certain band of Corinthians that came in to the aid of their own left wing put the right wing of the Athenians to flight and chased them to the sea-side; but then from their galleys they turned head again, both the Athenians and the Carystians. [5] The other part of their army continued fighting on both sides, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron fought against the left wing of the Athenians; for they expected that the Athenians would attempt to go to Solygeia.

44. So they held each other to it a long time, neither side giving ground. But in the end (for that the Athenians had horsemen, which did them great service, seeing the other had none) the Corinthians were put to flight and retired to the hill, where they laid down their arms and descended no more, but there rested. [2] In this retreat, the greatest part of their right wing was slain, and amongst others Lycophron, one of the generals. But the rest of the army being in this manner neither much urged, nor retiring in much haste, when they could do no other, made their retreat up the hill and there sat down. [3] The Athenians, seeing them come no more down to battle, rifled the dead bodies of the enemy and took up their own and presently erected a trophy on the place. [4] That half of the Corinthians that lay at Cenchreia to watch the Athenians, that they went not against Crommyon, saw not this battle for the hill Oneius; but when they saw the dust and so knew what was in hand, they went presently to their aid. So did also the old men of Corinth from the city when they understood how the matter had succeeded. [5] The Athenians, when all these were coming upon them together, imagining them to have been the succours of the neighboring cities of Peloponnesus, retired speedily to their galleys, carrying with them the booty and the bodies of their dead, all save two, which, not finding, they left. [6] Being aboard, they crossed over to the islands on the other side, and from thence sent a herald and fetched away those two dead bodies which they left behind. There were slain in this battle Corinthians, two hundred and twelve, and Athenians, somewhat under fifty.

45. The Athenians, putting off from the islands, sailed the same day to Crommyon in the territory of Corinth, distant from the city a hundred and twenty furlongs; where anchoring, they wasted the fields and stayed all that night. [2] The next day they sailed along the shore, first to the territory of Epidaurus, whereinto they made some little incursion from their galleys, and then went to Methone, between Epidaurus and Troezen, and there took in the isthmus of Chersonesus with a wall, and placed a garrison in it, which afterwards exercised robberies in the territories of Troezen, Halias, and Epidaurus. And when they had fortified this place, they returned home with their fleet.

46. About the same time that these things were in doing, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after their departure from Pylus with the Athenian fleet towards Sicily, arriving at Corcyra, joined with those of the city, and made war upon those Corcyraeans which lay encamped upon the hill Istone, and which after the sedition had come over, and both made themselves masters of the field and much annoyed the city, and having assaulted their fortification, took it. [2] But the men all in one troop escaped to a certain high ground and thence made their composition, which was this: that they should deliver up the strangers that aided them; and that they themselves, having rendered their arms, should stand to the judgment of the people of Athens. [3] Hereupon the generals granted them truce and transported them to the island of Ptychia to be there in custody till the Athenians should send for them; with this condition, that if any one of them should be taken running away, then the truce to be broken for them all. [4] But the patrons of the commons of Corcyra, fearing lest the Athenians would not kill them when they came thither, devise against them this plot. [5] To some few of those in the island they secretly send their friends and instruct them to say, as if forsooth it were for good will, that it was their best course with all speed to get away; and withal, to offer to provide them of a boat; for that the Athenian commanders intended verily to deliver them to the Corcyraean people.

47. When they were persuaded to do so and that a boat was treacherously prepared, as they rowed away they were taken; and the truce being now broken, were all given up into the hands of the Corcyraeans. [2] It did much further this plot, that to make the pretext seem more serious and the agents in it less fearful, the Athenian generals gave out that they were nothing pleased that the men should be carried home by others, whilst they themselves were to go into Sicily, and the honour of it be ascribed to those that should convoy them. [3] The Corcyraeans, having received them into their hands, imprisoned them in a certain edifice, from whence afterwards they took them out by twenty at a time and made them pass through a lane of men of arms, bound together and receiving strokes and thrusts from those on either side, according as any one espied his enemy. And to hasten the pace of those that went slowliest on, others were set to follow them with whips.

48. They had taken out of the room in this manner and slain to the number of threescore before they that remained knew it, who thought they were but removed and carried to some other place. But when they knew the truth, some or other having told them, they then cried out to the Athenians and said that if they would themselves kill them they should do it, and refused any more to go out of the room; [2] nor would suffer, they said, as long as they were able, any man to come in. But neither had the Corcyraeans any purpose to force entrance by the door; but getting up to the top of the house, uncovered the roof and threw tiles and shot arrows at them. [3] They in prison defended themselves as well as they could, but many also slew themselves with the arrows shot by the enemy, by thrusting them into their throats, and strangled themselves with the cords of certain beds that were in the room and with ropes made of their own garments rent in pieces. And having continued most part of the night (for night overtook them in the action) partly strangling themselves by all such means as they found, and partly shot at from above, they [all] perished. [4] When day came, the Corcyraeans laid them one across another in carts and carried them out of the city. [5] And of their wives, as many as were taken in the fortification, they made bondwomen. In this manner were the Corcyraeans that kept the hill brought to destruction by the commons. And thus ended this far-spread sedition for so much as concerned this present war; for of other seditions there remained nothing worth the relation. [6] And the Athenians being arrived in Sicily, whither they were at first bound, prosecuted the war there together with the rest of their confederates of those parts.

49. In the end of this summer, the Athenians that lay at Naupactus went forth with an army and took the city of Anactorium, belonging to the Corinthians and lying at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, by treason. And when they had put forth the Corinthians, the Acarnanians held it with a colony sent thither from all parts of their own nation. And so this summer ended.

50. The next winter, Aristides, the son of Archippus, one of the commanders of a fleet which the Athenians had sent out to gather tribute from their confederates, apprehended Artaphernes, a Persian, in the town of Eion upon the river Strymon, going from the king to Lacedaemon. [2] When he was brought to Athens, the Athenians translated his letters out of the Assyrian language into Greek and read them; wherein, amongst many other things that were written to the Lacedaemonians, the principal was this: that he knew not what they meant, for many ambassadors came, but they spake not the same thing; if therefore they had any thing to say certain, they should send somebody to him with this Persian. [3] But Artaphernes they send afterwards away in a galley, with ambassadors of their own, to Ephesus. And there encountering the news that king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, was lately dead (for about that time he died), they returned home.

51. The same winter also, the Chians demolished their new wall by command of the Athenians, upon suspicion that they intended some innovation, notwithstanding they had given the Athenians their faith and the best security they could to the intent they should let them be as they were. Thus ended this winter, and the seventh year of this war written by Thucydides.

52. The next summer, in the very beginning, at a change in the moon the sun was eclipsed in part; and in the beginning of the same month happened an earthquake. [2]

At this time the Mytilenaean and other Lesbian outlaws, most of them residing in the continent, with mercenary forces out of Peloponnesus and some which they levied where they were, seize on Rhoeteium, and for two thousand Phocaean states render it again without doing them other harm. [3] After this they came with their forces to Antander and took that city also by treason. They had likewise a design to set free the rest of the cities called Actaeae, which were in the occupation formerly of the Mytilenaeans, but subject to the Athenians; but above all the rest Antander, which when they had once gotten (for there they might easily build galleys, because there was store of timber, and Mount Ida was above their heads), they might issue from thence with other their preparation and infest Lesbos, which was near, and bring into their power the Aeolic towns in the continent. And this were those men preparing.

53. The Athenians the same summer, with sixty galleys, two thousand men of arms, and a few horsemen, taking with them also the Milesians and some other of their confederates, made war upon Cythera, under the conduct of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus, the son of Diotrephes, and Autocles, the son of Tolmaeus. [2] This Cythera is an island upon the coast of Laconia, over against Malea. The inhabitants be Lacedaemonians, of the same that dwell about them. And every year there goeth over unto them from Sparta a magistrate called Cyther- odikes. They likewise sent over men of arms from time to time to lie in the garrison there, and took much care of the place. [3] For it was the place where their ships used to put in from Egypt and Libya, and by which Laconia was the less infested by thieves from the sea, being that way only subject to that mischief. For the island lieth wholly out into the Sicilian and Cretic seas.

54. The Athenians, arriving with their army, with ten of their galleys and two thousand men of arms of the Milesians, took a town lying to the sea, called Scandeia; and with the rest of their forces, having landed in the parts of the island towards Malea, marched into the city itself of the Cythereans, lying likewise to the sea. [2] The Cythereans they found standing all in arms prepared for them. And after the battle began, the Cythereans for a little while made resistance, but soon after turned their backs and fled into the higher part of the city, and afterwards compounded with Nicias and his fellow-commanders that the Athenians should determine of them whatsoever they thought good but death. [3] Nicias had had some conference with certain of the Cythereans before, which was also a cause that those things which concerned the accord both now and afterwards were both the sooner and with the more favour dispatched. For the Athenians did but remove the Cythereans, and that also because they were Lacedaemonians, and because the island lay in that manner upon the coast of Laconia. [4] After this composition, having as they went by received Scandeia, a town lying upon the haven, and put a guard upon the Cythereans, they sailed to Asine and most of the towns upon the sea-side. And going sometimes aland, and staying where they saw cause, wasted the country for about seven days together.

55. The Lacedaemonians, though they saw the Athenians had Cythera and expected withal that they would come to land in the same manner in their own territory, yet came not forth with their united forces to resist them; but distributed a number of men of arms into sundry parts of their territory to guard it wheresoever there was need; and were otherwise also exceedingly watchful, fearing lest some innovation should happen in the state, as having received a very great and unexpected loss in the island, and the Athenians having gotten Pylus and Cythera, and as being on all sides encompassed with a busy and unavoidable war. [2] In so much that contrary to their custom they ordained four hundred horsemen, and some archers. And if ever they were fearful in matter of war, they were so now, because it was contrary to their own way to contend in a naval war, and against Athenians, who thought they lost whatsoever they not attempted. [3] Withal, their so many misfortunes in so short a time, falling out so contrary to their own expectation, exceedingly affrighted them. [4] And fearing lest some such calamity should again happen as they had received in the island, they durst the less to hazard battle, and thought that whatsoever they should go about would miscarry, because their minds, not used formerly to losses, could now warrant them nothing.

56. As the Athenians therefore wasted the maritime parts of the country and disbarked near any garrison, those of the garrison for the most part stirred not, both as knowing themselves singly to be too small a number, and as being in that manner dejected. Yet one garrison fought about Cortyta and Aphrodisia and frighted in the straggling rabble of light-armed soldiers; but when the men of arms had received them, it retired again with the loss of a few, whom they also rifled of their arms; and the Athenians, after they had erected a trophy, put off again and went to Cythera. [2] From thence they sailed about to Epidaurus, called Limera, and having wasted some part of that territory, came to Thyrea, which is of the territory called Cynuria, but is nevertheless the middle border between Argeia and Laconia. The Lacedaemonians, possessing this city, gave the same for an habitation to the Aeginetae, after they were driven out of Aegina, both for the benefit they had received from them about the time of the earthquake and of the insurrection of the Helotes, and also for that, being subject to the Athenians, they had nevertheless gone ever the same way with the Lacedaemonians.

57. When the Athenians were coming towards them, the Aeginetae left the wall which they happened to be then building toward the sea-side and retired up into the city above where they dwelt, and which was not above ten furlongs from the sea. [2] There was also with them one of those garrisons which the Lacedaemonians had distributed into the several parts of the country; and these, though they helped them to build the fort below, yet would not now enter with them into the town, though the Aeginetae entreated them, apprehending danger in being cooped up within the walls; and therefore retiring into the highest ground, lay still there, as finding themselves too weak to give them battle. [3] In the meantime the Athenians came in, and marching up presently with their whole army, won Thyrea, and burnt it, and destroyed whatsoever was in it. The Aeginetae, as many as were not slain in the affray, they carried prisoners to Athens, amongst whom Tantalus also, the son of Patroclus, captain of such Lacedaemonians as were amongst them, was wounded and taken alive. [4] They carried likewise with them some few men of Cythera, whom for safety's sake they thought good to remove into some other place. These therefore, the Athenians decreed, should be placed in the islands; and that the rest of the Cythereans at the tribute of four talents should inhabit their own territory; that the Aeginetae, as many as they had taken (out of former inveterate hatred), should be put to death; and that Tantalus should be put in bonds amongst those Lacedaemonians that were taken in the island.

58. In Sicily the same summer was concluded a cessation of arms, first between the Camarinaeans and the Geloans; but afterwards the rest of the Sicilians, assembling by their ambassadors out of every city at Gela, held a conference amongst themselves for making of a peace. Wherein, after many opinions delivered by men disagreeing and requiring satisfaction, every one as he thought himself prejudiced, Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a Syracusian, who also prevailed with them the most, spake unto the assembly to this effect:

59. "Men of Sicily, I am neither of the least city nor of the most afflicted with war that am now to speak and to deliver the opinion which I take to conduce most to the common benefit of all Sicily. [2] Touching war, how calamitous a thing it is, to what end should a man, particularising the evils thereof, make a long speech before men that already know it? For neither doth the not knowing of them necessitate any man to enter into war, nor the fear of them divert any man from it, when he thinks it will turn to his advantage. But rather it so falls out that the one thinks the gain greater than the danger; and the other prefers danger before present loss. [3] But lest they should both the one and the other do it unseasonably, exhortations unto peace are profitable, and will be very much worth to us if we will follow them at this present. [4] For it was out of a desire that every city had to assure their own, both that we fell ourselves into the war, and also that we endeavour now, by reasoning the matter, to return to mutual amity. Which if it succeed not so well that we may depart satisfied every man with reason, we will be at wars again.

60. "Nevertheless you must know that this assembly, if we be wise, ought not to be only for the commodity of the cities in particular, but how to preserve Sicily in general, now sought to be subdued (at least in my opinion) by the Athenians. And you ought to think, that the Athenians are more urgent persuaders of the peace than any words of mine; who, having of all the Grecians the greatest power, lie here with a few galleys to observe our errors, and by a lawful title of alliance, handsomely to accommodate their natural hostility to their best advantage. [2] For if we enter into a war and call in these men, who are apt enough to bring their army in uncalled, and if we weaken ourselves at our own charges and withal cut out for them the dominion here, it is likely, when they shall see us spent, they will sometime hereafter come upon us with a greater fleet and attempt to bring all these states into their subjection.

61. "Now, if we were wise, we ought rather to call in confederates and undergo dangers for the winning of somewhat that is none of ours than for the impairing of what we already have; and to believe that nothing so much destroys a city as sedition, and that Sicily, though we the inhabitants thereof be insidiated by the Athenians as one body, is nevertheless city against city in sedition within itself. [2] In contemplation whereof, we ought, man with man and city with city, to return again into amity; and with one consent to endeavour the safety of all Sicily: and not to have this conceit, that though the Dorians be the Athenians' enemies, yet the Chalcideans are safe, as being of the race of the Ionians. [3] For they invade not these divided races upon hatred of a side, but upon a covetous desire of those necessaries which we enjoy in common. And this they have proved themselves in their coming hither to aid the Chalcideans. [4] For though they never received any aid by virtue of their league from the Chalcideans, yet have they on their part been more forward to help them than by the league they were bound unto. [5] Indeed, the Athenians, that covet and meditate these things, are to be pardoned. I blame not those that are willing to reign, but those that are most willing to be subject; for it is the nature of man everywhere to command such as give way and to be shy of such as assail. [6] We are to blame that know this and do not provide accordingly and make it our first care of all to take good order against the common fear. [7] Of which we should soon be delivered, if we would agree amongst ourselves (for the Athenians come not amongst us out of their own country, but from theirs here that have called them in); and so, not war by war, but all our quarrels shall be ended by peace without trouble; and those that have been called in, as they came with fair pretence to injure us, so shall they with fair reason be dismissed by us without their errand.

62. "And thus much for the profit that will be found by advising wisely concerning the Athenians. [2] But when peace is confessed by all men to be the best of things, why should we not make it also in respect of ourselves? Or do you think, perhaps, if any of you possess a good thing or be pressed with an evil, that peace is not better than war, to remove the latter or preserve the former, to both; or that it hath not honours and eminence more free from danger, or whatsoever else one might discourse at large concerning war? Which things considered, you ought not to make light of my advice, but rather make use of it, every one to provide for his own safety. [3] Now if some man be strongly conceited to go through with some design of his, be it by right or by violence, let him take heed that he fail not, so much the more to his grief as it is contrary to his hope, knowing that many men ere now, hunting after revenge on such as had done them injury, and others trusting, by some strength they have had, to take away another's right, have, the first sort, instead of being revenged been destroyed, and the other, instead of winning from others, left behind them what they had of their own. [4] For revenge succeeds not according to justice, as that because an injury hath been done it should therefore prosper; nor is strength therefore sure because hopeful. It is the instability of fortune that is most predominant in things to come, which, though it be the most deceivable of all things, yet appears to be the most profitable. For whilst every one fear it alike, we proceed against each other with the greater providence.

63. "Now therefore terrified doubly, both with the implicit fear of the uncertainty of events, and with the terror of the Athenians present, and taking these for hindrances sufficient to have made us come short of what we had severally conceived to effect, let us send away our enemies that hover over us and make an eternal peace amongst overselves, or if not that, then a truce at least for as long as may be, and put off our private quarrels to some other time. In sum, let us know this: [2] that following my counsel, we shall every of us have our cities free; whereby being masters of ourselves, we shall be able to remunerate according to their merit such as do us good or harm; whereas rejecting it and following the counsel of others, our contention shall no more be how to be revenged, or at the best, [if it be], we must be forced to become friends to our greatest enemies and enemies to such as we ought not.

64. ‘For my part, as I said in the beginning, I bring to this the greatest city, and which is rather an assailant than assailed; and yet foreseeing these things, I hold it fit to come to an agreement, and not so to hurt our enemies as to hurt ourselves more. Nor yet through foolish spite will I look to be followed as absolute in my will and master of fortune, which I cannot command; but I will also give way where it is reason. [2] And so I look the rest should do as well as I; and that of yourselves, and not forced to it by the enemy. [3] For it is no dishonour to be overcome kinsmen of kinsmen, one Dorian of another Dorian, and one Chalcidean of another of his own race, or in sum, any one by another of us, being neighbours and cohabiters of the same region, encompassed by the sea, and all called by one name, Sicilians. Who, as I conceive, will both war when it happens, and again by common conferences make peace by our own selves. [4] But when foreigners invade us, we shall, if wise, unite all of us to encounter them, inasmuch as being weakened singly, we are in danger universally. [5] As for confederates, let us never hereafter call in any, nor arbitrators. For so shall Sicily attain these two benefits, to be rid of the Athenians and of domestic war for the present, and to be inhabited by ourselves with liberty and less insidiated by others for the time to come.’

65. Hermocrates having thus spoken, the Sicilians followed his advice and agreed amongst themselves that the war should cease, every one retaining what they then presently enjoyed; and that the Camarinaeans should have Morgantina, paying for the same unto the Syracusians a certain sum of money then assessed. [2] They that were confederates with the Athenians, calling such of the Athenians unto them as were in authority, told them that they also were willing to compound and be comprehended in the same peace. And the Athenians approving it, they did so; [3] and hereupon the Athenians departed out of Sicily. The people of Athens, when their generals came home, banished two, namely Pythodorus and Sophocles, and laid a fine upon the third, which was Eurymedon, as men that might have subdued the estates of Sicily, but had been bribed to return. [4] So great was their fortune at that time that they thought nothing could cross them, but that they might have achieved both easy and hard enterprises with great and slender forces alike. The cause whereof was the unreasonable prosperity of most of their designs, subministering strength unto their hope.

66. The same summer the Megareans in the city of Megara, pinched both by the war of the Athenians, who invaded their territory with their whole forces every year twice, and by their own outlaws from Pegae, who in a sedition driven out by the commons grievously afflicted them with robberies, began to talk one to another how it was fit to call them home again and not to let their city by both these means to be ruined. [2] The friends of those without, perceiving the rumour, they also, more openly now than before, required to have it brought to council. [3] But the patrons of the commons, fearing that they with the commons, by reason of the miseries they were in, should not be able to carry it against the other side, made an offer to Hippocrates, the son of Ariphon, and Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, commanders of the Athenian army, to deliver them the city, as esteeming that course less dangerous for themselves than the reduction of those whom they had before driven out. And they agreed that first the Athenians should possess themselves of the long-walls (these were about eight furlongs in length, and reached from the city to Nisaea their haven), thereby to cut off the aid of the Peloponnesians in Nisaea, in which (the better to assure Megara to their side) there lay no other soldiers in garrison but they; and then afterwards, that these men would attempt to deliver them the city above, which would the more easily succeed if that were effected first.

67. The Athenians therefore, after all was done and said on both sides and everything ready, sailed away by night to Minoa, an island of the Megareans, with six hundred men of arms led by Hippocrates, and sat down in a certain pit, out of which bricks had been made for the walls, and which was not far off. [2] But they that were with the other commander, Demosthenes, light-armed Plataeans and others called peripoli, lay in ambush at the temple of Mars, not so far off as the former. [3] And none of the city perceived any thing of this, but only such as had peculiar care to know the passages of this same night. When it was almost day, the Megarean traitors did thus: They had been accustomed long, as men that went out for booty with leave of the magistrates, of whom they had obtained by good offices the opening of the gates, to carry out a little boat, such as wherein the watermen used an oar in either hand, and to convey it by night down the ditch to the sea-side in a cart, and in a cart to bring it back again and set it within the gates, to the end that the Athenians which lay in Minoa might not know where to watch for them, no boat being to be seen in the haven. [4] At this time was that cart at the gates, which were opened according to custom as for the boat. And the Athenians seeing it (for so it was agreed on), arose from their ambush and ran with all speed to get in before the gates should be shut again, and to be there whilst the cart was yet in the gates and kept them open. [5] And first those Plataeans and peripoli that were with Demosthenes ran in, in that same place where the trophy is now extant, and fighting presently within the gates (for those Peloponnesians that were nearest heard the stir), the Plataeans overcame those that resisted and made good the gates for the Athenian men of arms that were coming after.

68. After this the Athenian soldiers, as they entered, went up every one to the wall. [2] And a few of the Peloponnesians that were of the garrison, made head at first and fought and were some of them slain; but the most of them took their heels, fearing in the night both the enemy that charged them and also the traitors of the Megareans that fought against them, apprehending that all the Megareans in general had betrayed them. [3] It chanced also that the Athenian herald of his own discretion made proclamation that if any Megarean would take part with the Athenians, he should come and lay down his arms. When the Peloponnesians heard this, they stayed no longer, but seriously believing that they jointly warred upon them, fled into Nisaea. [4] As soon as it was day, the walls being now taken and the Megareans being in a tumult within the city, they that had treated with the Athenians, and with them the rest, as many as were conscious, said it was fit to have the gates opened and to go out and give the enemy battle. [5] Now it was agreed on between them that when the gates were open, the Athenians should rush in, and that themselves would be easily known from the rest, to the end they might have no harm done them, for that they would besmear themselves with some ointment. And the opening of the gates would be for their greater safety, for the four thousand men of arms of Athens and six hundred horsemen, which according to the appointment were to come to them, having marched all night, were already arrived. [6] When they had besmeared themselves and were now about the gates, one of those who were privy discovered the conspiracy to the rest that were not. These joining their strength came all together to the gates, denying that it was fit to go out to fight, for that neither in former times when they were stronger than now, durst they do so, or to put the city into so manifest danger, and said, that if they would not be satisfied, the battle should be thereright. Yet they discovered not that they knew of the practice, but only, as having given good advice, meant to maintain it. And they stayed at the gates, insomuch as the traitors could not perform what they intended.

69. The Athenian commanders, knowing some cross accident had happened and that they could not take the city by assault, fell to enclosing of Nisaea with a wall, which if they could take before aid came, they thought Megara would the sooner yield. Iron was quickly brought unto them from Athens, and masons, and whatsoever else was necessary. [2] And beginning at the wall they had won, when they had built cross over to the other side, from thence both ways they drew it on to the sea on either side Nisaea; and having distributed the work amongst the army, as well the wall as the ditch, they served themselves of the stones and bricks of the suburbs, and having felled trees and timber, they supplied what was defective with a strong palisade. The houses also themselves of the suburbs, when they had put on battlements, served them for a fortification. All that day they wrought; [3] the next day about evening they had within very little finished. But then they that were in Nisaea, seeing themselves to want victual (for they had none but what came day by day from the city above), and without hope that the Peloponnesians could quickly come to relieve them, conceiving also that the Megareans were their enemies, compounded with the Athenians on these terms: to be dismissed every one at a certain ransom in money; to deliver up their arms; and the Lacedaemonians, both the captain and whosoever of them else was within, to be at discretion of the Athenians. Having thus agreed, they went out. [4] And the Athenians, when they had broken off the long walls from the city of Megara and taken in Nisaea, prepared for what was further to be done.

70. Brasidas, the son of Tellus, a Lacedaemonian, happened at this time to be about Sicyon and Corinth, preparing of an army to go into Thrace. And when he heard of the taking of the long walls, fearing what might become of the Peloponnesians in Nisaea, and lest Megara should be won, sent unto the Boeotians, willing them to meet him speedily with their forces at Tripodiscus, a village of Megaris so called at the foot of the hill Geraneia; and he marched presently himself with two thousand seven hundred men of arms of Corinth, four hundred of Phlius, six hundred of Sicyon, and those of his own all that he had yet levied, thinking to have found Nisaea yet untaken. [2] When he heard the contrary (for he set forth towards Tripodiscus in the night), with three hundred men chosen out of the whole army, before news should arrive of his coming, he came unseen of the Athenians that lay by the sea-side to the city of Megara, pretending in word, and intending also in good earnest if he could have done it, to attempt upon Nisaea, but desiring to get into Megara to confirm it; and required to be let in, for that he was, he said, in hope to recover Nisaea.

71. But the Megarean factions, being afraid, one, lest he should bring in the outlaws and cast out them, the other, lest the commons out of this very fear should assault them, whereby the city, being at battle within itself and the Athenians lying in wait so near, would be lost, received him not, but resolved on both sides to sit still and attend the success. [2] For both the one faction and the other expected that the Athenians and these that came to succour the city would join battle; and then they might with more safety, such as were the favoured side, turn unto them that had the victory. And Brasidas, not prevailing, went back to the rest of the army.

72. Betimes in the morning arrived the Boeotians, having also intended to come to the aid of Megara before Brasidas sent, as esteeming the danger to concern themselves, and were then with their whole forces come forward as far as Plataea. But when they had received also this message, they were a great deal the more encouraged and sent two thousand two hundred men of arms and two hundred horse to Brasidas, but went back with the greater part of their army. [2] The whole army being now together of no less than six thousand men of arms, and the Athenian men of arms lying indeed in good order about Nisaea and the sea-side, but the light-armed straggling in the plains, the Boeotian horsemen came unexpectedly upon the light-armed soldiers, and drove them towards the sea; for in all this time till now, there had come no aid at all to the Megareans from any place. [3] But when the Athenian horse went likewise out to encounter them, they fought, and there was a battle between the horsemen of either side that held long, wherein both sides claimed the victory. [4] For the Athenians slew the general of the Boeotian horse and some few others and rifled them, having themselves been first chased by them to Nisaea; and having these dead bodies in their power they restored them upon truce and erected a trophy. Nevertheless, in respect of the whole action, neither side went off with assurance; but parting asunder, the Boeotians went to the army, and the Athenians to Nisaea.

73. After this, Brasidas with his army came down nearer to the sea and to the city of Megara, and having seized on a place of advantage, set his army in battle array and stood still. For they thought the Athenians would be assailants, and knew the Megareans stood observing whether side should have the victory, and that it must needs fall out well for them both ways; [2] first, because they should not be the assailant and voluntarily begin the battle and danger, since having showed themselves ready to fight, the victory must also justly be attributed to them without their labour; [3] and next, it must fall out well in respect of the Megareans, for if they should not have come in sight, the matter had not been any longer in the power of fortune, but they had without all doubt been presently deprived of the city as men conquered; whereas now, if haply the Athenians declined battle likewise, they should obtain what they came for without stroke stricken; which also indeed came to pass. [4] For the Megareans—when the Athenians went out and ordered their army without the long walls, but yet, because the enemy charged not, stood also still, their commanders likewise considering, that if they should begin the battle against a number greater than their own, after the greatest part of their enterprise was already achieved, the danger would be unequal; for if they should overcome, they could win but Megara, and if they were vanquished, must lose the best part of their men of arms; whereas the enemy, who out of the whole power and number that was present in the field did adventure but every one a part, would in all likelihood put it to the hazard; and so for a while affronted each other, and, neither doing any thing, withdrew again, the Athenians first into Nisaea, and afterwards the Peloponnesians to the place from whence they had set forth—then, I say, the Megareans, such as were the friends of the outlaws, taking heart because they saw the Athenians were unwilling to fight, set open the gates to Brasidas as victor, and to the rest of the captains of the several cities; and when they were in (those that had practised with the Athenians being all the while in a great fear), they went to council.

74. Afterwards Brasidas, having dismissed his confederates to their several cities, went himself to Corinth in pursuit of his former purpose to levy an army for Thrace. [2] Now the Megareans that were in the city (when the Athenians also were gone home), all that had chief hand in the practice with the Athenians, knowing themselves discovered, presently slipt away; but the rest, after they had conferred with the friends of the outlaws, recalled them from Pegae, upon great oaths administered unto them no more to remember former quarrels, but to give the city their best advice. [3] These, when they came into office, took a view of the arms, and disposing bands of soldiers in divers quarters of the city, picked out of their enemies and of those that seemed most to have co-operated in the treason with the Athenians, about a hundred persons; and having constrained the people to give their sentence upon them openly, when they were condemned slew them, and established in the city the estate almost of an oligarchy. [4] And this change of government, made by a few upon sedition, did nevertheless continue for a long time after.

75. The same summer, when Antandros was to be furnished by the Mytilenaeans as they intended, Demodicus and Aristides, captains of certain galleys set forth by the Athenians to fetch in tribute, being then about Hellespont (for Lamachus that was the third in that commission, was gone with ten galleys into Pontus), having notice of the preparation made in that place, and thinking it would be dangerous to have it happen there as it had done in Anaea over against Samos, in which the Samian outlaws having settled themselves, aided the Peloponnesians in matters of the sea by sending them steersmen, and both bred trouble within the city and entertained such as fled out of it, levied an army amongst the confederates, and marched to it; and having overcome in fight those that came out of Antandros against them, recovered the place again. [2] And not long after, Lamachus that was gone into Pontus, as he lay at anchor in the river Calex in the territory of Heracleia, much rain having fallen above in the country and the stream of a land flood coming suddenly down, lost all his galleys and came himself and his army through the territory of the Bithynians (who are Thracians dwelling in Asia on the other side) to Chalcedon, a colony of the Megareans in the mouth of Pontus Euxinus, by land.

76. The same summer likewise Demosthenes, general of the Athenians, with forty galleys, presently after his departure out of Megaris, sailed to Naupactus. [2] For certain men in the cities thereabouts, desiring to change the form of the Boeotian government and to turn it into a democracy according to the government of Athens, practised with him and Hippocrates to betray unto him the estates of Boeotia, induced thereunto principally by Ptoeodorus, a Theban outlaw; and they ordered the design thus: [3] Some had undertaken to deliver up Siphae (Siphae is a city of the territory of Thespiae, standing upon the seaside in the Crissaean gulf); and Chaeroneia, which was a town that paid duties to Orchomenus (called heretofore Orchomenus in Minyeia, but now Orchomenus in Boeotia), some others of Orchomenus were to surrender into their hands. And the Orchomenian outlaws had a principal hand in this and were hiring soldiers to that end out of Peloponnesus. This Chaeroneia is the utmost town of Boeotia towards Phanotis in the country of Phocis; and some Phoceans also dwelt in it. [4] [On the other side], the Athenians were to seize on Delium, a place consecrated to Apollo in the territory of Tanagra, on the part toward Euboea. All this ought to have been done together upon a day appointed, to the end that the Boeotians might not oppose them with their forces united, but might be troubled every one to defend his own. [5] And if the attempt succeeded, and that they once fortified Delium, they easily hoped, though no change followed in the state of the Boeotians for the present, yet being possessed of those places, and by that means continually fetching in prey out of the country, because there was for every one a place at hand to retire unto, that it could not stand long at a stay; but that the Athenians joining with such of them as rebelled, and the Boeotians not having their forces united, they might in time order the state to their own liking. Thus was the plot laid.

77. And Hippocrates himself, with the forces of the city, was ready when time should serve to march; but sent Demosthenes before with forty galleys to Naupactus, to the end that he should levy an army of Acarnanians and other their confederates in these quarters, and sail to Siphae to receive it by treason. And a day was set down betwixt them on which these things should have been done together. [2] Demosthenes, when he arrived and found the Oeniades by compulsion of the rest of Acarnania entered into the Athenian confederation and had himself raised all the confederates thereabouts, made war first upon Salynthius and the Agraeans, and having taken in other places thereabouts, stood ready, when the time should require, to go to Siphae.

78. About the same time of this summer, Brasidas, marching towards the cities upon Thrace with seventeen hundred men of arms, when he came to Heracleia in Trachinia, sent a messenger before him to his friends at Pharsalus, requiring them to be guides unto him and to his army. And when there were come unto him Panaerus and Dorus and Hippolochidas and Torylaus and Strophacus, who was the public host of the Chalcideans, all which met him at Melitia, a town of Achaia, he marched on. [2] There were other of the Thessalians also that convoyed him; and from Larissa he was convoyed by Niconidas, a friend of Perdiccas. For it had been hard to pass Thessaly without a guide howsoever, but especially with an army. And to pass through a neighbour territory without leave is a thing that all Grecians alike are jealous of. Besides, that the people of Thessaly had ever borne good affection to the Athenians. [3] Insomuch, as if by custom the government of that country had not been lordly rather than a commonwealth, he could never have gone on. For also now as he marched forward, there met him at the river Enipeus others, of a contrary mind to the former, that forbade him and told him that he did unjustly to go on without the common consent of all. [4] But those that convoyed him answered that they would not bring him through against their wills, but that coming to them on a sudden, they conducted him as friends. And Brasidas himself said he came thither a friend both to the country and to them; and that he bore arms, not against them, but against the Athenians their enemies; and that he never knew of any enmity between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians whereby they might not use one another's ground; [5] and that even now he would not go on without their consent; for neither could he, but [only] entreated them not to stop him. When they heard this, they went their ways. And he, by the advice of his guides, before any greater number should unite to hinder him, marched on with all possible speed, staying nowhere by the way. And the same day he set forth from Melitia he reached Pharsalus and encamped by the river Apidanus; [6] from thence he went to Phacium; from thence into Peraebia. The Peraebians, though subject to the Thessalians, set him at Dion in the dominion of Perdiccas, a little city of the Macedonians situate at the foot of Olympus on the side towards Thessaly.

79. In this manner Brasidas ran through Thessaly before any there could put in readiness to stop him and came into the territory of the Chalcideans and to Perdiccas. [2] For Perdiccas and the Chalcideans, all that had revolted from the Athenians, when they saw the affairs of the Athenians prosper, had drawn this army out of Peloponnesus for fear; the Chalcideans, because they thought the Athenians would make war on them first, as having been also incited thereto by those cities amongst them that had not revolted; and Perdiccas, not that he was their open enemy, but because he feared the Athenians for ancient quarrels, but principally because he desired to subdue Arrhibaeus, king of the Lyncesteans. [3] And the ill success which the Lacedaemonians in these times had was a cause that they obtained an army from them the more easily.

80. For the Athenians vexing Peloponnesus, and their particular territory Laconia most of all, they thought the best way to divert them was to send an army to the confederates of the Athenians, so to vex them again. And the rather because Perdiccas and the Chalcideans were content to maintain the army, having called it thither to help the Chalcideans in their revolt. [2] And because also they desired a pretence to send away part of their Helotes, for fear they should take the opportunity of the present state of their affairs, the enemies lying now in Pylus, to innovate. [3] For they did also this further, fearing the youth and multitude of their Helotes, for the Lacedaemonians had ever many ordinances concerning how to look to themselves against the Helotes. They caused proclamation to be made that as many of them as claimed the estimation to have done the Lacedaemonians best service in their wars should be made free; feeling them in this manner and conceiving that, as they should every one out of pride deem himself worthy to be first made free, so they would soonest also rebel against them. [4] And when they had thus preferred about two thousand, which also with crowns on their heads went in procession about the temples as to receive their liberty, they not long after made them away; and no man knew how they perished. And now at this time, with all their hearts, they sent away seven hundred men of arms more of the same men along with Brasidas. [5] The rest of the army were mercenaries, hired by Brasidas out of Peloponnesus. [But] Brasidas himself the Lacedaemonians sent out, chiefly because it was his own desire;

81. notwithstanding the Chalcideans also longed to have him, as one esteemed also in Sparta every way an active man. And when he was out, he did the Lacedaemonians very great service. [2] For by showing himself at that present just and moderate towards the cities, he caused the most of them to revolt; and some of them he also took by treason. Whereby it came to pass that if the Lacedaemonians pleased to come to composition (as also they did), they might have towns to render and receive reciprocally. And also long after, after the Sicilian war, the virtue and wisdom which Brasidas showed now, to some known by experience, by others believed upon from report, was the principal cause that made the Athenian confederates affect the Lacedaemonians. [3] For being the first that went out, and esteemed in all points for a worthy man, he left behind him an assured hope that the rest also were like him.

82. Being now come into Thrace, the Athenians upon notice thereof declared Perdiccas an enemy, as imputing to him this expedition, and reinforced the garrisons in the parts thereabouts.

83. Perdiccas with Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, marched presently against Arrhibaeus, the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncesteans, a people of Macedonia, confining on Perdiccas his dominion, both for a quarrel they had against him and also as desiring to subdue him. [2] When he came with his army, and Brasidas with him, to the place where they were to have fallen in, Brasidas told him that he desired, before he made war, to draw Arrhibaeus by parley, if he could, to a league with the Lacedaemonians. [3] For Arrhibaeus had also made some proffer by a herald to commit the matter to Brasidas' arbitrement. And the Chalcidean ambassadors, being present, gave him likewise advice not to thrust himself into danger in favour of Perdiccas, to the end they might have him more prompt in their own affairs. [4] Besides, the ministers of Perdiccas, when they were at Lacedaemon, had spoken there as if they had meant to bring [as] many of the places about him [as they could] into the Lacedaemonian league. So that Brasidas favoured Arrhibaeus for the public good of their own state. [5] But Perdiccas said that he brought not Brasidas thither to be a judge of his controversies, but to destroy those enemies which he should show him; and that it will be an injury, seeing he pays the half of his army, for Brasidas to parley with Arrhibaeus. [6] Nevertheless Brasidas, whether Perdiccas would or not, and though it made a quarrel, had conference with Arrhibaeus, by whom also he was induced to withdraw his army. But from that time forward Perdiccas, instead of half, paid but a third part of his army, as conceiving himself to have been injured.

84. The same summer, a little before the vintage, Brasidas, having joined to his own the forces of the Chalcideans, marched to Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians. [2] And there arose sedition about receiving him between such as had joined with the Chalcideans in calling him thither and the common people. Nevertheless, for fear of their fruits, which were not yet gotten in, the multitude was won by Brasidas to let him enter alone, and then, after he had said his mind, to advise what to do amongst themselves. And presenting himself before the multitude (for he was not uneloquent, though a Lacedaemonian), he spake to this effect:

85. "Men of Acanthus, the reason why the Lacedaemonians have sent me and this army abroad is to make good what we gave out in the beginning for the cause of our war against the Athenians, which was that we meant to make a war for the liberties of Greece. [2] But if we be come late, as deceived by the war there in the opinion we had that we ourselves should soon have pulled the Athenians down without any danger of yours, no man hath reason therefore to blame us. [3] For we are come as soon as occasion served, and with your help will do our best to bring them under. [4] But I wonder why you shut me forth of your gates, and why I was not welcome. For we Lacedaemonians have undergone this great danger of passing many days' journey through the territory of strangers, and showed all possible zeal, because we imagined that we went to such confederates as before we came had us present in their hearts and were desirous of our coming. [5] And therefore it were hard that you should now be otherwise minded and withstand your own and the rest of the Grecians' liberty, [6] not only in that yourselves resist us, but also because others whom I go to will be the less willing to come in, making difficulty because you to whom I came first, having a flourishing city and being esteemed wise, have refused us. For which I shall have no sufficient excuse to plead, but must be thought either to pretend to set up liberty unjustly, or to come weak and without power to maintain you against the Athenians. [7] And yet against this same army I now have, when I went to encounter the Athenians at Nisaea, though more in number they durst not hazard battle. Nor is it likely that the Athenians will send forth so great a number against you as they had in their fleet there at Nisaea.

86. "I come not hither to hurt, but to set free the Grecians; and I have the Lacedaemonian magistrates bound unto me by great oaths that whatsoever confederates shall be added to their side, at least by me, shall still enjoy their own laws; and that we shall not hold you as confederates to us brought in either by force or fraud, but on the contrary, be confederates to you that are kept in servitude by the Athenians. [2] And therefore I claim not only that you be not jealous of me (especially having given you so good assurance), or think me unable to defend you, but also that you declare yourselves boldly with me. [3] And if any man be unwilling so to do through fear of some particular man, apprehending that I would put the city into the hands of a few, let him cast away that fear; [4] for I came not to side, nor do I think I should bring you an assured liberty, if neglecting the ancient use here I should enthral either the multitude to the few, or the few to the multitude. [5] For to be governed so were worse than the domination of a foreigner; and there would result from it to us Lacedaemonians not thanks for our labours, but instead of honour and glory, an imputation of those crimes for which we make war amongst the Athenians, and which would be more odious in us than in them that never pretended the virtue. [6] For it is more dishonourable, at least to men in dignity, to amplify their estate by specious fraud than by open violence. For the latter assaileth with a certain right of power given us by fortune, but the other with the treachery of a wicked conscience.

87. ‘But besides the oath which they have sworn already, the greatest further assurance you can have is this: that our actions weighed with our words, you must needs believe that it is to our profit to do as I have told you. [2] But if after these promises of mine you shall say you cannot, and yet, forasmuch as your affection is with us, will claim impunity for rejecting us, or shall say that this liberty I offer you seems to be accompanied with danger, and that it were well done to offer it to such as can receive it, but not to force it upon any, then will I call to witness the gods and heroes of this place that my counsel which you refuse was for your good, and will endeavour, by wasting of your territory, to compel you to it. [3] Nor shall I think I do you therein any wrong, but have reason for it for two necessities: one, of the Lacedaemonians, lest whilst they have your affections and not your society, they should receive hurt from your contributions of money to the Athenians; another, of the Grecians, lest they should be hindered of their liberty by your example. [4] For otherwise indeed we could not justly do it; nor ought we Lacedaemonians to set any at liberty against their wills if it were not for some common good. We covet not dominion [over you]; [5] but seeing we haste to make others lay down the same, we should do injury to the greater part, if bringing liberty to the other states in general we should tolerate you to cross us. [6] Deliberate well of these things; strive to be the beginners of liberty in Greece, to get yourselves eternal glory, to preserve every man his private estate from damage, and to invest the whole city with a most honourable title.’

88. Thus spake Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much said on either side, partly for that which Brasidas had effectually spoken and partly for fear of their fruits abroad, the most of them decreed to revolt from the Athenians, having given their votes in secret. And when they had made him take the same oath which the Lacedaemonian magistrates took when they sent him out, namely, that what confederates soever he should join to the Lacedaemonians should enjoy their own laws, they received his army into the city. [2] And not long after revolted Stageirus, another colony of the Andrians. And these were the acts of this summer.

89. In the very beginning of the next winter, when the Boeotian cities should have been delivered to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, generals of the Athenians, and Demosthenes should have gone to Siphae, and Hippocrates to Delium; having mistaken the days on which they should have both set forward, Demosthenes went to Siphae first, and having with him the Acarnans and many confederates of those parts in his fleet, [yet] lost his labour. For the treason was detected by one Nicomachus, a Phocean of the town of Phanotis, who told it unto the Lacedaemonians, and they again unto the Boeotians. [2] Whereby the Boeotians, concurring universally to relieve those places (for Hippocrates was not yet gone to trouble them in their own several territories), preoccupied both Siphae and Chaeroneia. And the conspirators, knowing the error, attempted in those cities no further.

90. But Hippocrates, having raised the whole power of the city of Athens, both citizens and others that dwelt amongst them and all strangers that were then there, arrived afterwards at Delium when the Boeotians were now returned from Siphae; and there stayed and took, in Delium, a temple of Apollo, with a wall, in this manner: [2] Round about the temple and the whole consecrated ground they drew a ditch; and out of the ditch, instead of a wall they cast up the earth; and having driven down piles on either side, they cast thereinto the matter of the vineyard about the temple, which to that purpose they cut down, together with the stones and bricks of the ruined buildings; and by all means heightened the fortification, and in such places as would give leave, erected turrets of wood upon the same. [3] There was no edifice of the temple standing, for the cloister that had been was fallen down. They began the work the third day after they set forth from Athens and wrought all the same day and all the fourth and the fifth day till dinner. [4] And then being most part of it finished, the camp came back from Delium about ten furlongs homewards. And the lightarmed soldiers went most of them presently away; but the men of arms laid down their arms there and rested. Hippocrates stayed yet behind and took order about the garrison and about the finishing of the remainder of the fortification.

91. The Boeotians took the same time to assemble at Tanagra; and when all the forces were come in that from every city were expected, and when they understood that the Athenians drew homewards, though the rest of the Boeotian commanders, which were eleven, approved not giving battle, because they were not now in Boeotia (for the Athenians, when they laid down their arms, were in the confines of Oropia); yet Pagondas, the son of Aioladas, being the Boeotian commander for Thebes, whose turn it was to have the leading of the army, was, together with Arianthidas, the son of Lysimachidas, of opinion to fight, and held it the best course to try the fortune of a battle; wherefore calling them unto him every company by itself, that they might not be all at once from their arms, he exhorted the Boeotians to march against the Athenians and to hazard battle, speaking in this manner:

92. ‘Men of Boeotia, it ought never to have so much as entered into the thought of any of us the commanders that, because we find not the Athenians now in Boeotia, it should therefore be unfit to give them battle. For they out of a bordering country have entered Boeotia and fortified in it with intent to waste it, and are indeed enemies in whatsoever ground we find them, or whencesoever they come doing the acts of hostility. [2] But now if any man think it also unsafe, let him henceforth be of another opinion. For providence, in them that are invaded, endureth not such deliberation concerning their own as may be used by them who, retaining their own, out of desire to enlarge, voluntarily invade the estate of another. [3] And it is the custom of this country of yours, when a foreign enemy comes against you, to fight with him both on your own and on your neighbour's ground alike; but much more you ought to do it against the Athenians when they be borderers. [4] For liberty with all men is nothing else but to be a match for the cities that are their neighbours. With these, then, that attempt the subjugation not only of their neighbours, but of estates far from them, why should we not try the utmost of our fortune? We have for example the estate that the Euboeans over against us, and also the greatest part of the rest of Greece, do live in under them. And you must know that though others fight with their neighbours about the bounds of their territories, we, if we be vanquished, shall have but one bound amongst us all, so that we shall no more quarrel about limits. [5] For if they enter, they will take all our several states into their own possession by force. So much more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians than of other people. And such as upon confidence in their strength invade their neighbours, as the Athenians now do, use to be bold in warring on those that sit still, defending themselves only in their own territories; whereas they be less urgent to those that are ready to meet them without their own limits, or [also] to begin the war when opportunity serveth. [6] We have experience hereof in these same men. For after we had overcome them at Coroneia, at what time through our own sedition they held our country in subjection, we established a great security in Boeotia, which lasted till this present. [7] Remembering which, we ought now, the elder sort to imitate our former acts there, and the younger sort, who are the children of those valiant fathers, to endeavour not to disgrace the virtue of their houses; but rather with confidence that the god, whose temple fortified they unlawfully dwell in, will be with us, the sacrifices we offered him appearing fair, to march against them, and let them see that though they may gain what they covet when they invade such as will not fight, yet men that have the generosity to hold their own in liberty by battle, and not invade the state of another unjustly, will never let them go away unfoughten.’

93. Pagondas with this exhortation persuaded the Boeotians to march against the Athenians, and making them rise led them speedily on, for it was drawing towards night. And when he was near to their army, in a place from whence by the interposition of a hill they saw not each other, making a stand he put his army into order and prepared to give battle. [2] When it was told Hippocrates, who was then at Delium, that the Boeotians were marching after them, he sends presently to the army, commanding them to be put in array. And not long after he came himself, having left some three hundred horse about Delium, both for a guard to the place if it should be assaulted, and withal to watch an opportunity to come upon the Boeotians when they were in fight. [3] But for these, the Boeotians appointed some forces purposely to attend them. And when all was as it should be, they showed themselves from the top of the hill, where they sat down with their arms in the same order they were to fight in, being about seven thousand men of arms, of light-armed soldiers above ten thousand, a thousand horsemen, and five hundred targetiers. [4] Their right wing consisting of the Thebans, and their partakers; in the middle battle were the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the rest that dwell about the lake; in the left were the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians. The horsemen and light-armed soldiers were placed on either wing. The Thebans were ordered by twentyfive in file; but the rest, every one as it fell out. [5] This was the preparation and order of the Boeotians.

94. The Athenian men of arms, in number no fewer than the enemy, were ordered by eight in file throughout; their horse they placed on either wing. But for light-armed soldiers, armed as was fit, there were none; nor was there any in the city. Those that went out followed the camp for the most part without arms, as being a general expedition both of citizens and strangers; and after they once began to make homeward, there stayed few behind. [2] When they were now in their order and ready to join battle, Hippocrates, the general, came into the army of the Athenians and encouraged them, speaking to this effect:

95. ‘Men of Athens, my exhortation shall be short, but with valiant men it hath as much force as a longer, and is for a remembrance rather than a command. [2] Let no man think, because it is in the territory of another, that we therefore precipitate ourselves into a great danger that did not concern us. For in the territory of these men, you fight for your own. If we get the victory, the Peloponnesians will never invade our territories again, for want of the Boeotian horsemen. So that in one battle you shall both gain this territory and free your own. [3] Therefore march on against the enemy, every one as becometh the dignity both of his natural city, which he glorieth to be chief of all Greece, and of his ancestors, who having overcome these men at Oenophyta under the conduct of Myronides, were in times past masters of all Boeotia.’

96. Whiles Hippocrates was making this exhortation, and had gone with it over half the army, but [could proceed] no further, the Boeotians (for Pagondas likewise made but a short exhortation and had there sung the Paean) came down upon them from the hill. And the Athenians likewise went forward to meet them, [so fast that] they met together running. [2] The utmost parts of both the armies never came to join, hindered both by one and the same cause; for certain currents of water kept them asunder. [3] But the rest made sharp battle, standing close, and striving to put by each others' bucklers. The left wing of the Boeotians, to the very middle of the army, were overthrown by the Athenians, who in this part had to deal, amongst others, principally with the Thespians. For whilst they that were placed within the same wing gave back and were circled in by the Athenians in a narrow compass, those Thespians that were slain were hewed down in the very fight. [4] Some also of the Athenians themselves, troubled with inclosing them, through ignorance slew one another. So that the Boeotians were overcome in this part and fled to the other part where they were yet in fight. [5] But the right wing, wherein the Thebans stood, had the better of the Athenians, and by little and little forced them to give ground and followed upon them from the very first. [6] It happened also that Pagondas, while the left wing of his army was in distress, sent two companies of horse secretly about the hill, whereby that wing of the Athenians which was victorious, apprehending upon their sudden appearing that they had been a fresh army, was put into affright; [7] and the whole army of the Athenians, now doubly terrified by this accident and by the Thebans that continually won ground and brake their ranks, betook themselves to flight. Some fled toward Delium and the sea, and some towards Oropus; [8] others toward the mountain Parnethus, and others other ways, as to each appeared hope of safety. The Boeotians, especially their horse and those Locrians that came in after the enemy was already defeated, followed killing them. But night surprising them, the multitude of them that fled was the easier saved. [9] The next day those that were gotten to Oropus and Delium went thence by sea to Athens, having left a garrison in Delium, which place, notwithstanding this defeat, they yet retained.

97. The Boeotians, when they had erected their trophy, taken away their own dead, rifled those of the enemy, and left a guard upon the place, returned back to Tanagra and there entered into consultation for an assault to be made on Delium. [2] In the meantime, a herald sent from the Athenians to require the bodies met with a herald by the way sent by the Boeotians, which turned him back by telling him he could get nothing done till himself was returned from the Athenians. This herald, when he came before the Athenians, delivered unto them what the Boeotians had given him in charge, namely, that they had done unjustly to transgress the universal law of the Grecians, being a constitution received by them all; [3] that the invader of another's country should abstain from all holy places in the same; that the Athenians had fortified Delium and dwelt in it, and done whatsoever else men use to do in places profane, and had drawn that water to the common use, which was unlawful for themselves to have touched, save only to wash their hands for the sacrifice; [4] that therefore the Boeotians, both in the behalf of the god and of themselves, invoking Apollo and all the interested spirits, did warn them to be gone and to remove their stuff out of the temple.

98. After the herald had said this, the Athenians sent a herald of their own to the Boeotians, denying that either they had done any wrong to the holy place already or would willingly do any hurt to it hereafter; for neither did they at first enter into it to such intent, but to requite the greater injuries which had been done unto them; [2] as for the law which the Grecians have, it is no other but that they which have the dominion of any territory, great or small, have ever the temples also, and besides the accustomed rites, may superinduce what other they can: [3] for also the Boeotians, and most men else, all that having driven out another nation possess their territory, did at first invade the temples of others and make them their own; [4] that therefore, if they could win from them more of their land, they would keep it, and for the part they were now in, they were in it with a good will and would not out of it, as being their own; that for the water, they meddled with it upon necessity; [5] which was not to be ascribed to insolence, but to this, that fighting against the Boeotians that had invaded their territory first, they were forced to use it; [6] for whatsoever is forced by war or danger hath in reason a kind of pardon even with the god himself; for the altars, in cases of involuntary offences, are a refuge, and they are said to violate laws that are evil without constraint, not they that are a little bold upon occasion of distress; [7] that the Boeotians themselves, who require restitution of the holy places for a redemption of the dead, are more irreligious by far than they, who, rather than let their temples go, are content to go without that which were fit for them to receive; [8] and they bade him say plainly that they would not depart out of the Boeotian territory, for that they were not now in it, but in a territory which they had made their own by the sword; and nevertheless, required truce, according to the ordinances of the country, for the fetching away of the dead.

99. To this the Boeotians answered that if the dead were in Boeotia, they should quit the ground and take with them whatsoever was theirs; but if the dead were in their own territory, the Athenians themselves knew best what to do. For they thought that though Oropia, wherein the dead lay (for the battle was fought in the border between Attica and Boeotia), by subjection belonged to the Athenians, yet they could not fetch them off by force; and for truce that the Athenians might come safely on Athenian ground, they would give none, but conceived it was a handsome answer to say that if they would quit the ground, they should obtain whatsoever they required. Which when the Athenian herald heard, he went his way without effect.

100. The Boeotians presently sent for darters and slingers from [the towns on] the Melian gulf; and with these, and with two thousand men of arms of Corinth, and with the Peloponnesian garrison that was put out of Nisaea, and with the Megareans, all which arrived after the battle, they marched forthwith to Delium and assaulted the wall. And when they had attempted the same many other ways, at length they brought to it an engine, wherewith they also took it, made in this manner: [2] Having slit in two a great mast, they made hollow both the sides, and curiously set them together again in the form of a pipe. At the end of it in chains they hung a cauldron; and into the cauldron from the end of the mast they conveyed a snout of iron, having with iron also armed a great part of the rest of the wood. [3] They carried it to the wall, being far off, in carts, to that part where it was most made up with the matter of the vineyard and with wood. [4] And when it was to, they applied a pair of great bellows to the end next themselves, and blew. The blast, passing narrowly through into the cauldron, in which were coals of fire, brimstone, and pitch, raised an exceeding great flame, and set the wall on fire, so that no man being able to stand any longer on it, but abandoning the same and betaking themselves to flight, the wall was by that means taken. [5] Of the defendants, some were slain and two hundred taken prisoners; the rest of the number recovered their galleys and got home.

101. Delium thus taken on the seventeenth day after the battle, and the herald, which not long after was sent again about the fetching away of the dead, not knowing it, the Boeotians let him have them, and answered no more as they had formerly done. [2] In the battle there died Boeotians few less than five hundred; the Athenians few less than a thousand, with Hippocrates the general; but of light-armed soldiers and such as carried the provisions of the army, a great number. [3]

Not long after this battle, Demosthenes, that had been with his army at Siphae, seeing the treason succeeded not, having aboard his galleys his army of Acarnanians and Agraeans and four hundred men of arms of Athens, landed in Sicyonia. But before all his galleys came to shore, the Sicyonians, who went out to defend their territory, put to flight such as were already landed and chased them back to their galleys, having also slain some and taken some alive. [4] And when they had erected a trophy, they gave truce to the Athenians for the fetching away of their dead. [5] About the time that these things passed at Delium, died Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, overcome in battle in an expedition against the Triballians. And Seuthes, the son of Spardocus, his brother's son, succeeded him in the kingdom, both of the Odrysians and of the rest of Thrace as much as was before subject to Sitalces.

102. The same winter, Brasidas with the confederates in Thrace made war upon Amphipolis, a colony of the Athenians, situated on the river Strymon. [2] The place whereon the city now standeth, Aristagoras of Miletus had formerly attempted to inhabit when he fled from king Darius, but was beaten away by the Edonians. Two-and-thirty years after this, the Athenians assayed the same, and sent thither ten thousand of their own city, and of others as many as would go; and these were destroyed all by the Thracians at Drabescus. [3] In the twenty-ninth year after, conducted by Agnon, the son of Nicias, the Athenians came again, and having driven out the Edonians, became founders of this place, formerly called the Nine-ways. His army lay then at Eion, a town of traffic by the seaside subject to the Athenians, at the mouth of the river Strymon, five-andtwenty furlongs from the city. Agnon named this city Amphipolis because it was surrounded by the river Strymon, that runs on either side it. When he had taken it in with a long wall from river to river, he put inhabitants into the place, being conspicuous round about both to the sea and land.

103. Against this city marched Brasidas with his army, dislodging from Arnae in Chalcidea. Being about twilight come as far as Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe entereth into the sea, he caused his army to sup, and then marched forward by night. [2] The weather was foul, and a little it snowed, which also made him to march the rather, as desiring that none of Amphipolis, but only the traitors, should be aware of his coming. [3] For there were both Argilians that dwelt in the same city (now Argilus is a colony of the Andrians), and others, that contrived this, induced thereunto some by Perdiccas and some by the Chalcideans. [4] But above all the Argilians, being of a city near unto it, and ever suspected by the Athenians, and secret enemies to the place, as soon as opportunity was offered and Brasidas arrived (who had also long before dealt underhand with as many of them as dwelt in Amphipolis to betray it), both received him into their own city, and revolting from the Athenians, brought the army forward the same night as far as to the bridge of the river. [5] The town stood not close to the river, nor was there a fort at the bridge then as there is now; but they kept it only with a small guard of soldiers. Having easily forced this guard, both in respect of the treason and of the weather, and of his own unexpected approach, he passed the bridge and was presently master of whatsoever the Amphipolitans had that dwelt without.

104. Having thus suddenly passed the bridge, and many of those without being slain, and some fled into the city, the Amphipolitans were in very great confusion at it; and the rather because they were jealous one of another. [2] And it is said that if Brasidas had not sent out his army to take booty, but had marched presently to the city, he had in all likelihood taken it then. But so it was that he pitched there and fell upon those without; [3] and seeing nothing succeeded by those within, lay still upon the place. [4] But the contrary faction to the traitors being superior in number, whereby the gates were not opened presently, both they and Eucles the general, who was then there for the Athenians to keep the town, sent unto the other general, Thucydides, the son of Olorus, the writer of this history, who had charge in Thrace, and was now about Thasos (which is an island and a colony of the Parians, distant from Amphipolis about half a day's sail), requiring him to come and relieve them. [5] When he heard the news, he went thitherwards in all haste with seven galleys, which chanced to be with him at that time. His purpose principally was to prevent the yielding up of Amphipolis; but if he should fail of that, then to possess himself of Eion [before Brasidas' coming].

105. Brasidas, in the meantime, fearing the aid of the galleys to come from Thasos, and having also been informed that Thucydides possessed mines of gold in the parts of Thrace thereabouts, and was thereby of ability amongst the principal men of the continent, hasted by all means to get Amphipolis before he should arrive, lest otherwise at his coming the commons of Amphipolis, expecting that he would levy confederates both from the sea-side and in Thrace, and relieve them, should thereupon refuse to yield. [2] And to that end offered them a moderate composition, causing to be proclaimed that whosoever, Amphipolitan or Athenian, would, might continue to dwell there and enjoy his own, with equal and like form of government; and that he that would not, should have five days' respite to be gone and carry away his goods.

106. When the commons heard this, their minds were turned; and the rather, because the Athenians amongst them were but few, and the most were a promiscuous multitude; and the kinsmen of those that were taken without flocked together within. And in respect of their fear, they all thought the proclamation reasonable; the Athenians thought it so because they were willing to go out, as apprehending their own danger to be greater than that of the rest, and withal, not expecting aid in haste; and the rest of the multitude, as being thereby both delivered of the danger, and withal to retain their city with the equal form of government. [2] Insomuch that they which conspired with Brasidas now openly justified the offer to be reasonable; and seeing the minds of the commons were now turned and that they gave ear no more to the words of the Athenian general, they compounded, and upon the conditions proclaimed received him. [3] Thus did these men deliver up the city. Thucydides with his galleys arrived in the evening of the same day at Eion. [4] Brasidas had already gotten Amphipolis, and wanted but a night of taking Eion also; for if these galleys had not come speedily to relieve it, by next morning it had been had.

107. After this Thucydides assured Eion, so as it should be safe both for the present, though Brasidas should assault it, and for the future; and took into it such as, according to the proclamation made, came down from Amphipolis. [2] Brasidas with many boats came suddenly down the river to Eion and attempted to seize on the point of the ground lying out from the wall into the sea, and thereby to command the mouth of the river; he assayed also the same at the same time by land, and was in both beaten off; but Amphipolis he furnished with all things necessary. [3] Then revolted to him Myrcinus, a city of the Edonians, Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, being slain by the sons of Goaxis and by Braures his own wife. And not long after Gapselus also, and Oesyme, colonies of the Thasians. Perdiccas also, after the taking of these places, came to him and helped him in assuring of the same.

108. After Amphipolis was taken, the Athenians were brought into great fear, especially for that it was a city that yielded them much profit, both in timber which is sent them for the building of galleys and in revenue of money, and because also, though the Lacedaemonians had a passage open to come against their confederates, the Thessalians convoying them, as far as to Strymon, yet if they had not gotten that bridge, the river being upwards nothing but a vast fen, and towards Eion well guarded with their galleys, they could have gone no further; which now they thought they might easily do, and therefore feared lest their confederates should revolt. [2] For Brasidas both showed himself otherwise very moderate, and also gave out in speech that he was sent forth to recover the liberty of Greece. [3] And the cities which were subject to the Athenians, hearing of the taking of Amphipolis, and what assurance he brought with him, and of his gentleness besides, were extremely desirous of innovation, and sent messengers privily to bid him draw near, every one striving who should first revolt. [4] For they thought they might do it boldly, falsely estimating the power of the Athenians to be less than afterwards it appeared, and making a judgment of it according to [blind] wilfulness rather than safe forecast; it being the fashion of men, what they wish to be true to admit even upon an ungrounded hope, and what they wish not, with a magistral kind of arguing to reject. [5] Withal, because the Athenians had lately received a blow from the Boeotians, and because Brasidas had said (not as was the truth, but as served best to allure them) that when he was at Nisaea the Athenians durst not fight with those forces of his alone, they grew confident thereon, and believed not that any man would come against them. [6] But the greatest cause of all was that for the delight they took at this time to innovate, and for that they were to make trial of the Lacedaemonians, not till now angry, they were content by any means to put it to the hazard. Which being perceived, the Athenians sent garrison soldiers into those cities, as many as the shortness of the time and the season of winter would permit. And Brasidas sent unto Lacedaemon to demand greater forces, and in the meantime prepared to build galleys on the river Strymon. [7] But the Lacedaemonians, partly through envy of the principal men, and partly because they more affected the redemption of their men taken in the island and the ending of the war, refused to furnish him.

109. The same winter the Megareans, having recovered their long walls holden by the Athenians, razed them to the very ground.

Brasidas, after the taking of Amphipolis, having with him the confederates, marched with his army into the territory called Acte. [2] This Acte is that prominent territory which is disjoined from the continent by a ditch made by the king; and Athos, a high mountain in the same, determineth at the Aegean sea. [3] Of the cities it hath, one is Sane, a colony of the Andrians, by the side of the said ditch on the part which looketh to the sea towards Euboea; [4] the rest are Thyssus, Cleone, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dion, and are inhabited by promiscuous barbarians of two languages. Some few there are also of the Chalcidean nation; but the most are Pelasgic, of those Tyrrhene nations that once inhabited Athens and Lemnos, and of the Bisaltic and Chrestonic nations, and Edonians, and dwell in small cities. [5] The most of which yielded to Brasidas; but Sane and Dion held out, for which cause he stayed with his army and wasted their territories.

110. But seeing they would not hearken unto him, he led his army presently against Torone of Chalcidea, held by the Athenians. He was called in by the few, who were ready withal to deliver him the city; and arriving there a little before break of day, he sat down with his army at the temple of Castor and Pollux, distant about three furlongs from the city. [2] So that to the rest of the city and to the Athenian garrison in it, his coming was unperceived. But the traitors, knowing he was to come (some few of them being also privily gone to him), attended his approach; and when they perceived he was come, they took in unto them seven men armed only with daggers (for of twenty appointed at first to that service, seven only had the courage to go in; and were led by Lysistratus of Olynthus); which, getting over the wall towards the main sea unseen, went up (for the town standeth on a hill's side) to the watch that kept the upper end of the town, and having slain the watchmen brake open the postern gate towards Canastraea.

111. Brasidas this while with the rest of his army lay still, and then coming a little forward, sent a hundred targetiers before, who, when the gates should be opened and sign agreed on be set up, should run in first. [2] These men, expecting long and wondering at the matter, by little and little were at length come up close to the city. Those Toronaeans within, which helped the men that entered to perform the enterprise, when the postern gate was broken open, and the gate leading to the market-place opened likewise by cutting asunder the bar, went first and fetched some of them about to the postern, to the end that they might suddenly affright such of the town as knew not the matter, both behind and on either side; and then they put up the sign appointed, which was fire, and received the rest of the targetiers by the gate that leadeth to the market-place.

112. Brasidas, when he saw the sign, made his army rise, and with a huge cry of all at once, to the great terror of those within, entered into the city running. [2] Some went directly in by the gate, and some by certain squared timber-trees, which lay at the wall (which having been lately down was now again in building) for the drawing up of stone. [3] Brasidas, therefore, with the greatest number, betook himself to the highest places of the city to make sure the winning of it by possessing the places of advantage. But the rest of the rabble ran dispersed here and there without difference.

113. When the town was taken, the most of the Toronaeans were much troubled, because they were not acquainted with the matter; but the conspirators, and such as were pleased with it, joined themselves presently with those that entered. [2] The Athenians (of which there were about fifty men of arms asleep in the market-place), when they knew what had happened, fled all, except some few that were slain upon the place, some by land, some by water in two galleys that kept watch there, and saved themselves in Lecythus, which was a fort which they themselves held, cut off from the rest of the city to the seaward in a narrow isthmus. [3] And thither also fled all such Toronaeans as were affected to them.

114. Being now day, and the city strongly possessed, Brasidas caused a proclamation to be made that those Toronaeans which were fled with the Athenians might come back, as many as would, to their own and inhabit there in security. To the Athenians he sent a herald, bidding them depart out of Lecythus under truce with all that they had, as a place that belonged to the Chalcideans. [2] The Athenians denied to quit the place, but the truce they desired for one day for the taking up of their dead. And Brasidas granted it for two, in which two days he fortified the buildings near; and so also did the Athenians theirs. [3] He also called an assembly of the Toronaeans and spake unto them as he had done before to the Acanthians, adding that there was no just cause why either they that had practised to put the city into his hands should be the worse thought of or accounted traitors for it, seeing that they did it with no intent to bring the city into servitude, nor were hired thereunto with money, but for the benefit and liberty of the city; or that they which were not made acquainted with it should think that themselves were not to reap as much good by it as the others; [4] for he came not to destroy either city or man, but had therefore made that proclamation touching those that fled with the Athenians because he thought them never the worse for that friendship, and made account when they had made trial of the Lacedaemonians, they would show as much good will also unto them, or rather more, inasmuch as they would behave themselves with more equity; and that their present fear was only upon want of trial. [5] Withal he wished them to prepare themselves to be true confederates for the future, and from henceforward, to look to have their faults imputed; for, for what was past, he thought they had not done any wrong, but suffered it rather from other men that were too strong for them, and therefore were to be pardoned if they had in aught been against him.

115. When he had thus said and put them again into heart, the truce being expired, he made divers assaults upon Lecythus. The Athenians fought against them from the wall, though a bad one, and from the houses such as had battlements, and for the first day kept them off. [2] But the next day, when the enemies were to bring to the wall a great engine, out of which they intended to cast fire upon their wooden fences, and that the army was now coming up to the place where they thought they might best apply the engine, and which was easiest to be assaulted, the Athenians, having upon the top of the building erected a turret of wood, and carried up many buckets of water, and many men being also gone up into it, the building overcharged with weight fell suddenly to the ground, and that with so huge a noise that though those which were near and saw it were grieved more than afraid, yet such as stood further off, especially the furthest of all, supposing the place to be in that part already taken, fled as fast as they could towards the sea and went aboard their galleys. [3]

116. Brasidas, when he perceived the battlements to be abandoned and saw what had happened, came on with his army and presently got the fort and slew all that he found within it. [2] But the rest of the Athenians, which before abandoned the place, with their boats and galleys put themselves into Pallene.

There was in Lecythus a temple of Minerva. And when Brasidas was about to give the assault, he had made proclamation that whosoever first scaled the wall should have thirty minae of silver for a reward. Brasidas now, conceiving that the place was won by means not human, gave those thirty minae to the goddess to the use of the temple. And then pulling down Lecythus, he built it anew and consecrated unto her the whole place. [3]

The rest of this winter he spent in assuring the places he had already gotten and in contriving the conquest of more. Which winter ending, ended the eighth year of this war.

117. The Lacedaemonians and Athenians, in the spring of the summer following, made a cessation of arms presently for a year, having reputed with themselves, the Athenians, that Brasidas should by this means cause no more of their cities to revolt, but that by this leisure they might prepare to secure them; and that if this suspension liked them, they might afterwards make some agreement for a longer time; the Lacedaemonians, that the Athenians fearing what they feared, would, upon the taste of this intermission of their miseries and weary life, be the willinger to compound, and with the restitution of their men to conclude a peace for a longer time. [2] For they would fain have recovered their men while Brasidas' good fortune continued; and whilst, if they could not recover them, they might yet (Brasidas prospering and setting them equal with the Athenians) try it out upon even terms and get the victory. [3] Whereupon a suspension of arms was concluded, comprehending both themselves and their confederates, in these words:

118. "Concerning the temple and oracle of Apollo Pythius, it seemeth good unto us that whosoever will may without fraud and without fear ask counsel threat, according to the laws of his country. [2] The same also seemeth good to the Lacedaemonians and their confederates here present; and they promise moreover to send ambassadors to the Boeotians and Phoceans, and do their best to persuade them to the same. [3] That concerning the treasure belonging to the god, we shall take care to find out those that have offended therein, both we and you, proceeding with right and equity, according to the laws of our several states; [4] and that whosoever else will may do the same every one according to the law of his own country.

"If the Athenians will accord that each side shall keep within their own bounds, retaining what they now possess, the Lacedaemonians and the rest of the confederates touching the same think good thus:

"That the Lacedaemonians in Coryphasium stay within the mountains of Buphras and Tomeus, and the Athenians in Cythera without joining together in any league, either we with them or they with us. That those in Nisaea and Minoa pass not the highway, which from the gate of Megara near the temple of Nisus leadeth to the temple of Neptune, and so straightforward to the bridge that lies over into Minoa; that the Megareans pass not the same highway, nor into the island which the Athenians have taken, neither having commerce with other. That the Megareans keep what they now possess in Troezen and what they had before by agreement with the Athenians, and have free navigation, both upon the coasts of their own territories and their confederates. [5]

"That the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall pass the seas not in a long ship, but in any other boat rowed with oars of burden not exceeding five hundred talents. [6]

"That the heralds and ambassadors that shall pass between both sides for the ending of the war or for trials of judgment may go and come without impeachment, with as many followers as they shall think good, both by sea and land. [7]

"That during this time of truce, neither we nor you receive one another's fugitives, free nor bond. [8]

"That you to us and we to you shall afford law according to the use of our several states, to the end our controversies may be decided judicially without war. [9]

"This is thought good by the Lacedaemonians and their confederates. But if you shall conceive any other articles more fair or of more equity than these, then shall you go and declare the same at Lacedaemon. For neither shall the Lacedaemonians nor their confederates refuse anything that you shall make appear to be just. [10] But let those that go, go with full authority, even as you do now require it of us.—That this truce shall be for a year. [11]

‘The people decreed it. Acamantis was president of the assembly. Phaenippus the scribe. Niciades overseer, and Laches pronounced these words: 'With good fortune to the people of Athens, a suspension of arms is concluded, according as the Lacedaemonians and their confederates have agreed.' [12] And they consented before the people that the suspension should continue for a year, beginning that same day, being the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion, [13] in which time the ambassadors and heralds, going from one side to the other, should treat about a final end of the wars; and that the commanders of the army [14] and the presidents of the city calling an assembly, the Athenians should hold a council, touching the manner of embassage for ending of the war first; and the ambassadors there present should now immediately swear this truce for a year.’

119. The same articles the Lacedaemonians propounded and the confederates agreed unto with the Athenians and their confederates in Lacedaemon on the twelfth day of the month Gerastion. [2] The men that agreed upon these articles, and sacrificed, were these, viz.: Of the Lacedaemonians, Taurus, the son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus, the son of Pericleidas, and Philocharidas, the son of Eryxidaidas; of the Corinthians, Aeneas, the son of Ocytes, and Euphamidas, the son of Aristonymus; of the Sicyonians, Damotimos, the son of Naucrates, and Onasimus, the son of Megacles; of the Megareans, Nicasus, the son of Cecalus, and Menecrates, the son of Amphidorus; of the Epidaurians, Amphias the son of Eupaidas; [3] of the Athenians, the generals [themselves], Nicostratus, the son of Diotrephes, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Autocles the son of Tolmaeus. This was the truce; and during the same they were continually in treaty about a longer peace.

120. About the same time, whilst they were going to and fro, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they be Pallenians descended of those of Peloponnesus, and that their ancestors, passing the seas from Troy, were driven in by a tempest, which tossed the Achaeans up and down, and planted themselves in the place they now dwell in. [2] Brasidas, upon their revolt, went over into Scione by night; and though he had a galley with him that went before, yet he himself followed aloof in a light-horseman. His reason was this: that if his light-horseman should be assaulted by some greater vessel, the galley would defend it; but if he met with a galley equal to his own, he made account that such a one would not assault his boat, but rather the galley, whereby he might in the meantime go through in safety. [3] When he was over and had called the Scionaeans to assemble, he spake unto them as he had done before to them of Acanthus and Torone, adding that they of all the rest were most worthy to be commended, inasmuch as Pallene, being cut off in the isthmus by the Athenians that possess Potidaea, and being no other than islanders, did yet of their own accord come forth to meet their liberty, and stayed not through cowardliness till they must of necessity have been compelled to their own manifest good; which was an argument that they would valiantly undergo any other great matter to have their state ordered to their minds; and that he would verily hold them for most faithful friends to the Lacedaemonians, and also otherwise do them honour.

121. The Scionaens were erected with these words of his; and now every one alike encouraged, as well they that liked not what was done as those that liked it, entertained a purpose stoutly to undergo the war; and received Brasidas both otherwise honourably and crowned him with a crown of gold, in the name of the city, as the deliverer of Greece. And private persons honoured him with garlands and came to him as they use to do to a champion that hath won a prize. [2] But he leaving there a small garrison for the present, came back, and not long after carried over a greater army, with design by the help of those of Scione to make an attempt upon Mende and Potidaea. For he thought the Athenians would send succours to the place, as to an island, and desired to prevent them. Withal, he had in hand a practice with some within to have those cities betrayed. So he attended, ready to undertake that enterprise.

122. But in the meantime came unto him in a galley Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the Lacedaemonians, that carried about the news of the truce. Whereupon he sent away his army again to Torone: [2] and these men related unto Brasidas the articles of the agreement. The confederates of the Lacedaemonians in Thrace approved of what was done; and Aristonymus had in all other things satisfaction. [3] But for the Scionaeans, whose revolt by computation of the days he had found to be after the making of the truce, he denied that they were comprehended therein. Brasidas said much in contradiction of this, and that the city revolted before the truce, and refused to render it. But when Aristonymus had sent to Athens to inform them of the matter, the Athenians were ready presently to have sent an army against Scione. [4] The Lacedaemonians in the meantime sent ambassadors to the Athenians to tell them that they could not send an army against it without breach of the truce, and, upon Brasidas' word, challenged the city to belong unto them, offering themselves to the decision of law. [5] But the Athenians would by no means put the matter to judgment, but meant with all the speed they could make to send an army against it, being angry at the heart that it should come to this pass, that even islanders durst revolt and trust to the unprofitable help of the strength of the Lacedaemonians by land. [6] Besides, touching [the time of] the revolt, the Athenians had more truth on their side than themselves alleged; for the revolt of the Scionaeans was after the truce two days. Whereupon, by the advice of Cleon, they made a decree to take them by force and to put them all to the sword. And, forbearing war in all places else, they prepared themselves only for that.

123. In the meantime revolted also Mende in Pallene, a colony of the Eretrians. These also Brasidas received into protection, holding it for no wrong, because they came in openly in time of truce; and somewhat there was also which he charged the Athenians with, about breach of the truce. [2] For which cause the Mendaeans had also been the bolder, as sure of the intention of Brasidas, which they might guess at by Scione, inasmuch as he could not be gotten to deliver it. Withal, the few were they which had practised the revolt, who, being once about it, would by no means give it over, but, fearing lest they should be discovered, forced the multitude contrary to their own inclination to the same. [3] The Athenians being hereof presently advertised, and much more angry now than before, made preparation to war upon both; [4] and Brasidas expecting that they would send a fleet against them, received the women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans into Olynthus in Chalcidea, and sent over thither five hundred Peloponnesian men of arms and three hundred Chalcidean targetiers, and for commander of them all Polydamidas. And those that were left in Scione and Mende joined in the administration of their affairs, as expecting to have the Athenian fleet immediately with them.

124. In the meantime Brasidas and Perdiccas, with joint forces, march into Lyncus against Arrhibaeus the second time. Perdiccas led with him the power of the Macedonians, his subjects, and such Grecian men of arms as dwelt among them. Brasidas, besides the Peloponnesians that were left him, led with him the Chalcideans, Acanthians, and the rest, according to the forces they could severally make. The whole number of the Grecian men of arms were about three thousand. The horsemen, both Macedonians and Chalcideans, somewhat less than a thousand; but the other rabble of barbarians was great. [2] Being entered the territory of Arrhibaeus, and finding the Lyncesteans encamped in the field, they also sat down opposite to their camp. [3] And the foot of each side being lodged upon a hill, and a plain lying betwixt them both, the horsemen ran down into the same, and a skirmish followed, first between the horse only of them both. But afterwards, the men of arms of the Lyncesteans coming down to aid their horse from the hill, and offering battle first, Brasidas and Perdiccas drew down their army likewise, and charging, put the Lyncesteans to flight; many of which being slain, the rest retired to the hill-top and lay still. [4] After this they erected a trophy and stayed two or three days, expecting the Illyrians who were coming to Perdiccas upon hire; and Perdiccas meant afterwards to have gone on against the villages of Arrhibaeus one after another, and to have sitten still there no longer. But Brasidas, having his thoughts on Mende, lest if the Athenians came thither before his return it should receive some blow, seeing withal that the Illyrians came not, had no liking to do so, but rather to retire.

125. Whilst they thus varied, word was brought that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas and joined themselves with Arrhibaeus. So that now it was thought good to retire by them both, for fear of these who were a warlike people; but yet for the time when to march, there was nothing concluded, by reason of their variance. The next night, the Macedonians and multitude of barbarians (as it is usual with great armies to be terrified upon causes unknown) being suddenly affrighted, and supposing them to be many more in number than they were, and even now upon them, betook themselves to present flight and went home. And Perdiccas, who at first knew not of it, they constrained when he knew, before he had spoken with Brasidas (their camps being far asunder), to be gone also. [2] Brasidas betimes in the morning, when he understood that the Macedonians were gone away without him, and that the Illyrians and Arrhibaeans were coming upon him, putting his men of arms into a square form and receiving the multitude of his light-armed into the middle, intended to retire likewise. The youngest men of his soldiers he appointed to run out upon the enemy when they charged the army anywhere [with shot]; [3] and he himself, with three hundred chosen men marching in the rear, intended, as he retired, to sustain the foremost of the enemy, fighting if they came close up. [4] But before the enemy approached, he encouraged his soldiers, as the shortness of time gave him leave, with words to this effect:

126. ‘Men of Peloponnesus, if I did not mistrust, in respect you are thus abandoned by the Macedonians and that the barbarians which come upon you are many, that you were afraid, I should not [at this time] instruct you and encourage you as I do. But now, against this desertion of your companions and the multitude of your enemies, I will endeavour with a short instruction and hortative to give you encouragement to the full. [2] For to be good soldiers is unto you natural, not by the presence of any confederates, but by your own valour; and not to fear others for the number, seeing you are not come from a city where the many bear rule over the few, but the few over the many; and have gotten this for power by no other means than by overcoming in fight. [3] And as to these barbarians, whom through ignorance you fear, you may take notice, both by the former battles fought by us against them before, in favour of the Macedonians, and also by what I myself conjecture and have heard by others, that they have no great danger in them. [4] For when any enemy whatsoever maketh show of strength, being indeed weak, the truth once known doth rather serve to embolden the other side; whereas, against such as have valour indeed, a man will be the boldest when he knoweth the least. These men here, to such as have not tried them, do indeed make terrible offers; [5] for the sight of their number is fearful, the greatness of their cry intolerable, and the vain shaking of their weapons on high is not without signification of menacing. But they are not answerable to this when with such as stand them they come to blows. For fighting without order they will quit their place without shame if they be once pressed; and seeing it is with them honourable alike to fight or run away, their valours are never called in question; and a battle wherein every one may do as he lists, affords them a more handsome excuse to save themselves. But they trust rather in their standing out of danger and terrifying us afar off than in coming to hands with us; for else they would rather have taken that course than this. [6] And you see manifestly that all that was before terrible in them is in effect little, and serves only to urge you to be going with their show and noise. Which if you sustain at their first coming on, and again withdraw yourselves still, as you shall have leisure, in your order and places, you shall not only come the sooner to a place of safety, but shall learn also against hereafter that such a rabble as this, to men prepared to endure their first charge, do but make a flourish of valour with threats from afar before the battle; but to such as give them ground, they are eager enough to seem courageous where they may do it safely.’

127. When Brasidas had made his exhortation, he led away his army. And the barbarians, seeing it, pressed after them with great cries and tumult, as supposing he fled. [2] But seeing that those who were appointed to run out upon them [did so, and] met them which way soever they came on, and that Brasidas himself, with his chosen band, sustained them where they charged close and endured the first brunt beyond their expectation, and seeing also that afterwards continually when they charged, the other received them and fought, and when they ceased the other retired, then at length the greatest part of the barbarians forbore the Grecians that with Brasidas were in the open field, and leaving a part to follow them with shot, the rest ran with all speed after the Macedonians which were fled, of whom as many as they overtook they slew; and withal prepossessed the passage, which is a narrow one between two hills, giving entrance into the country of Arrhibaeus, knowing that there was no other passage by which Brasidas could get away. And when he was come to the very strait, they were going about him to have cut him off.

128. He, when he saw this, commanded the three hundred that were with him to run every man as fast as he could to one of the tops, which of them they could easliest get up to, and try if they could drive down those barbarians that were now going up to the same, before any greater number was above to hem them in. [2] These accordingly fought with and overcame those barbarians upon the hill, and thereby the rest of the army marched the more easily to the top. For this beating of them from the vantage of the hill made the barbarians also afraid, so that they followed them no further, conceiving withal that they were now at the confines and already escaped through. [3] Brasidas, having now gotten the hills and marching with more safety, came first the same day to Arnissa, of the dominion of Perdiccas. [4] And the soldiers of themselves, being angry with the Macedonians for leaving them behind, whatsoever teams of oxen or fardles fallen from any man (as was likely to happen in a retreat made in fear and in the night) they lighted on by the way, the oxen they cut in pieces and took the fardles to themselves. [5] And from this time did Perdiccas first esteem Brasidas as his enemy, and afterwards hated the Peloponnesians, not with ordinary hatred for the Athenians' sake, but being utterly fallen out with him about his own particular interest, sought means as soon as he could to compound with these and be disleagued from the other.

129. Brasidas, at his return out of Macedonia to Torone, found that the Athenians had already taken Mende; and therefore staying there (for he thought it impossible to pass over into Pallene and to recover Mende), he kept good watch upon Torone. [2] For about the time that these things passed amongst the Lyncesteans, the Athenians, after all was in readiness, set sail for Mende and Scione with fifty galleys (whereof ten were of Chios) and a thousand men of arms of their own city, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and other targetiers of their own confederates thereabouts, under the conduct of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus, the son of Diotrephes. [3] These, launching from Potidaea with their galleys and putting in at the temple of Neptune, marched presently against the Mendaeans. The Mendaeans with their own forces, three hundred of Scione that came to aid them, and the aids of the Peloponnesians, in all seven hundred men of arms, and Polydamidas their commander, were encamped upon a strong hill without the city. [4] Nicias, with a hundred and twenty lightarmed soldiers of Methone and sixty chosen men of arms of Athens and all his archers, attempting to get up by a path that was in the hill's side, was wounded in the attempt and could not make his way by force. And Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, going another way further about, as he climbed the hill, being hard of access, was quite disordered; [5] and the whole army wanted little of being utterly discomfited. So for this day, seeing the Mendaeans and their confederates stood to it, the Athenians retired and pitched their camp; and at night the Mendaeans retired into the city.

130. The next day the Athenians, sailing about unto that part of the city which is towards Scione, seized on the suburbs, and all that day wasted their fields, no man coming forth to oppose them (for there was also sedition in the city); and the three hundred Scionaeans the night following went home again. [2] The next day Nicias, with the one half of the army, marched to the confines and wasted the territory of the Scionaeans; and Nicostratus at the same time, with the other half, sat down against the city before the higher gates towards Potidaea. [3] Polydamidas (for it fell out that the Mendaeans and their aids had their arms lying within the wall in this part) set his men in order for the battle and encouraged the Mendaeans to make a sally. [4] But when one of the faction of the commons in sedition said, to the contrary, that they would not go out and that it was not necessary to fight, and was upon this contradiction by Polydamidas pulled and molested, the commons in passion presently took up their arms and made towards the Peloponnesians and such other with them as were of the contrary faction; [5] and falling upon them put them to flight, partly with the suddenness of the charge and partly through the fear they were in of the Athenians, to whom the gates were at the same time opened. For they imagined that this insurrection was by some appointment made between them. [6] So they fled into the citadel, as many as were not presently slain, which was also in their own hands before. But the Athenians (for now was Nicias also come back, and at the town-side) rushed into the city with the whole army and rifled it, not as opened to them by agreement, but as taken by force; and the captains had much ado to keep them that they also killed not the men. [7] After this, they bade the Mendaeans use the same form of government they had done before, and to give judgment upon those they thought the principal authors of the revolt amongst themselves. Those that were in the citadel they shut up with a wall reaching on both sides to the sea, and left a guard to defend it. And having thus gotten Mende, they led their army against Scione.

131. The Scionaeans and the Peloponnesians, coming out against them, possessed themselves of a strong hill before the city, which if the enemy did not win, he should not be able to enclose the city with a wall. [2] The Athenians, having strongly charged them [with shot] and beaten the defendants from it, encamped upon the hill, and after they had set up their trophy, prepared to build their wall about the city. [3] Not long after, whilst the Athenians were at work about this, those aids that were besieged in the citadel of Mende, forcing the watch by the sea-side, came by night, and escaping most of them through the camp before Scione, put themselves into that city.

132. As they were enclosing of Scione, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian commanders and concluded a peace with the Athenians, upon hatred to Brasidas about the retreat made out of Lyncus, having then immediately begun to treat of the same. [2] For it happened also at this time that Ischagoras, a Lacedaemonian, was leading an army of foot unto Brasidas. And Perdiccas, partly because Nicias advised him, seeing the peace was made, to give some clear token that he would be firm, and partly because he himself desired not that the Peloponnesians should come any more into his territories, wrought with his hosts in Thessaly, having in that kind ever used the prime men, and so stopped the army and munition as they would not so much as try the Thessalians [whether they would let them pass or not]. [3] Nevertheless Ischagoras and Ameinias and Aristeus themselves went on to Brasidas, as sent by the Lacedaemonians to view the state of affairs there, and also took with them from Sparta, contrary to the law, such men as were but in the beginning of their youth to make them governors of cities rather than commit the cities to the care of such as were there before. And Clearidas, the son of Cleonymus, they made governor of Amphipolis; and Epitelidas the son of Hegesander, governor of Torone.

133. The same summer, the Thebans demolished the walls of the Thespians, laying Atticism to their charge. And though they had ever meant to do it, yet now it was easier, because the flower of their youth was slain in the battle against the Athenians. [2] The temple of Juno in Argos was also burnt down the same summer, by the negligence of Chrysis the priest, who, having set a burning torch by the garlands, fell asleep, insomuch as all was on fire and flamed out before she knew. [3] Chrysis, the same night, for fear of the Argives, fled presently to Phlius; and they, according to the law formerly used, chose another priest in her room, called Phaeinis. Now, when Chrysis fled, was the eighth year of this war ended, and half of the ninth. [4] Scione, in the very end of this summer, was quite enclosed; and the Athenians, having left a guard there, went home with the rest of their army.

134. The winter following nothing was done between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians because of the truce. But the Mantineans and the Tegeatae, with the confederates of both, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the territory of Orestis, wherein the victory was doubtful; for either side put to flight one wing of their enemies, both sides set up trophies, and both sides sent of their spoils unto Delphi. [2] Nevertheless, after many slain on either side, and equal battle which ended by the coming of night, the Tegeatae lodged all night in the place and erected their trophy then presently; whereas the Mantineans turned to Bucolion and set up their trophy afterwards.

135. The same winter ending and the spring now approaching, Brasidas made an attempt upon Potidaea. For coming by night, he applied his ladders and was thitherto undiscerned. He took the time to apply his ladders when the bell passed by, and before he that carried it to the next returned. Nevertheless, being discovered, he scaled not the wall, but presently again withdrew his army with speed, not staying till it was day. [2] So ended this winter, and the ninth year of this war written by Thucydides.