[
1239a]
[1]
There being then, as has been said,
1 three kinds of friendship, based on
goodness, utility and pleasantness, these are again divided in two,
one set being on a footing of equality and the other on one of
superiority. Though both
sets, therefore, are friendships, only when they are on an equality
are the parties friends; for it would be absurd for a man to be a
friend of a child, though he does feel affection for him and receive
it from him. In some cases, while the superior partner ought to
receive affection, if he gives it he is reproached as loving an
unworthy object; for affection is measured by the worth of the friends
and by one sort of equality.
2 So in some cases there is properly a
dissimilarity of affection because of inferiority of age, in others on
the ground of goodness or birth or some other such superiority; it is
right for the superior to claim to feel
3 either less affection or none, alike in a friendship
of utility and in one of pleasure and one based on goodness.
So in cases of
small degrees of superiority disputes naturally occur (for a small
amount is not of importance in some matters, as in weighing timber,
though in gold plate it is; but people judge smallness of amount
badly, since one's own good because of its nearness appears big and
that of others because of its remoteness small); but when there is an excessive
amount of difference, then even the parties themselves do not demand
that they ought to be loved in return, or not loved
alikeāfor example, if one were claiming a return of love
from God.
[20]
It is manifest, therefore,
that men are friends when they are on an equality, but that a return
of affection is possible without their being friends. And it is clear why men seek
friendship on a basis of superiority more than that on one of
equality; for in the former case they score both affection and a sense
of superiority at the same time. Hence with some men the flatterer is
more esteemed than the friend, for he makes the person flattered
appear to score both advantages. And this most of all characterizes
men ambitious of honors, since to be admired implies superiority.
Some persons grow
up by nature affectionate and others ambitious; one who enjoys loving
more than being loved is affectionate, whereas the other enjoys being
loved more. So the man who enjoys being admired and loved is a lover
of superiority, whereas the other, the affectionate man, loves the
pleasure of loving. For this he necessarily possesses by the mere
activity of loving; for being loved is an accident, as one can be
loved without knowing it, but one cannot love without knowing it.
Loving depends,
more than being loved, on the actual feeling, whereas being loved
corresponds with the nature of the object. A sign of this is that a
friend, if both things were not possible, would choose to know the
other person rather than to be known by him, as for example women do
when they allow others to adopt their children, and Andromache in the
tragedy of Antiphon.
4 Indeed the wish to be known seems to be
selfish, and its motive a desire to receive and not to confer some
benefit, whereas to wish to know a person is for the sake of
conferring benefit and bestowing affection.