19. οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. The argument is here broken off, and
not (in its present form) again resumed. If Socrates had continued, Protagoras would doubtless have asserted that what is
ὠφέλιμον for man is for him ἀγαθόν. The argument has therefore
been: σωφρονεῖν, it is said, is ἀδικεῖν. But σωφρονεῖν = εὖ
φρονεῖν = εὖ βουλεύεσθαι if (but only if) εὖ πράττειν (i.e. ὠφέλιμα
πράττειν) accompanies εὐβουλία. In other words ὠφέλιμα πράττειν = ἀδικεῖν is the stage which we have reached—a thesis
which it is the object of the Republic and of a large part of the
Gorgias to refute.
πολλὰ οἶδ᾽ ἅ. The speech which follows may be from some
work by Protagoras (so recently Zeller in the Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie, V, 2, 177), perhaps his περὶ ἀρετῶν,
mentioned by Diog. Laert. IX. 8. 55 (since ἀρετή is a general
word for excellence). Zeller points out that just as the notion
‘true’ was conceived by Protagoras (in his πάντων μέτρον
ἄνθρωπος) as relative, so here the notion ‘good’ is represented
as relative and varying with that to which it is relative.
20. ἀνθρώποις μὲν—ὠφέλιμα: ἀνθρώποις μέν has no antithesis expressed: were the antitheses expressed in full, the
sentence would be very cumbrous, running somewhat as
follows: ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ᾽ ἃ ἀνθρώποις μὲν <τὰ μὲν> ἀνωφελῆ
ἐστί, καὶ σιτία—μυπία, <τοῖς δὲἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς ὠφέλιμα>,
τὰ δέ γε ὠφέλιμα <τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἀνωφελῆ>.
For μέν without a balancing clause see on τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι in Euthyphr. 3C, and on 330Aabove for τὰ δέ without
a preceding τὰ μέν. ἀνωφελῆ is ‘hurtful’, as frequently: see
above on οἷον μὴ ὅσιον in 331A With Protagoras' classification
of ὠφέλιμα—ἀνωφελῆ—οὐδέτερα cf. Gorg. 467E ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἔστιν
τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ
τούτων οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν (where see Thompson's note)
and below, 351D
23. οὐδενί: Schanz follows Naber in reading οὐδέσι against
the MSS. both here and in Euthyd. 302C. The plural would be
more appropriate here, but what is denied of all individuals is
denied of the species, and the dative plural of οὐδείς seems to
lack authority.
Plato. Protagoras. J. Adam & A. M. Adam. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1893.
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