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Browsing named entities in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham).

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Thebes (Greece) (search for this): book 3, chapter 1
Yet there seem to be some acts which a man cannot be compelled to do,i.e., some acts are so repulsive that a man's abhorrence of them must be stronger than any pressure that can be put on him to commit them; so that if he commits them he must be held to have chosen to do so. and rather than do them he ought to submit to the most terrible death: for instance, we think it ridiculous that Alcmaeon in Euripides' playIn a play now lost, Eriphyle was bribed with a necklace to induce her husband Amphiaraus, king of Argos, to join the expedition of the Seven against Thebes. Foreseeing he would lose his life, he charged his sons to avenge his death upon their mother, invoking on them famine and childlessness if they disobeyed. The verse in question is preserved: ma/lista me\n m' e)ph=r' e)piskh/yas path/r. Alcmaeon, fr. 69 （Nauck）. is compelled by certain threats to murder his mother!
Argos (Greece) (search for this): book 3, chapter 1
Yet there seem to be some acts which a man cannot be compelled to do,i.e., some acts are so repulsive that a man's abhorrence of them must be stronger than any pressure that can be put on him to commit them; so that if he commits them he must be held to have chosen to do so. and rather than do them he ought to submit to the most terrible death: for instance, we think it ridiculous that Alcmaeon in Euripides' playIn a play now lost, Eriphyle was bribed with a necklace to induce her husband Amphiaraus, king of Argos, to join the expedition of the Seven against Thebes. Foreseeing he would lose his life, he charged his sons to avenge his death upon their mother, invoking on them famine and childlessness if they disobeyed. The verse in question is preserved: ma/lista me\n m' e)ph=r' e)piskh/yas path/r. Alcmaeon, fr. 69 （Nauck）. is compelled by certain threats to murder his mother!
Lydia (Turkey) (search for this): book 1, chapter 10
Are we then to count no other human being happy either, as long as he is alive? Must we obey Solon's warning,See Hdt. 1.30-33. Solon visited Croesus, king of Lydia, and was shown all his treasures, but refused to call him the happiest of mankind until he should have heard that he had ended his life without misfortune; he bade him ‘mark the end of every matter, how it should turn out.’ and ‘look to the end’? And if we are indeed to lay down this rule, can a man really be happy after he is dead? Surely that is an extremely strange notion, especially for us who define happiness as a form of activity! While if on the other hand we refuse to speak of a dead man as happy, and Solon's words do not mean this, but that only when a man is dead can one safely call him blessed as being now beyond the reach of evil and misfortune, this also admits of some dispute; for it is believed that some evil and also some good can befall the de
Lesbos (Greece) (search for this): book 5, chapter 10
is a rectification of law where law is defective because of its generality. In fact this is the reason why things are not all determined by law: it is because there are some cases for which it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a special ordinance becomes necessary. For what is itself indefinite can only be measured by an indefinite standard, like the leaden ruleExplained either as used in building with polygonal stones （but this was not peculiar to Lesbos）, or in making the Lesbian form of moulding, which had a double curve. used by Lesbian builders; just as that rule is not rigid but can be bent to the shape of the stone, so a special ordinance is made to fit the circumstances of the case. It is now plain what the equitable is, and that it is just, and that it is superior to one sort of justice. And from this it is clear what the equitable man is: he is one who by choice and habit does what is equitable, and who
Athens (Greece) (search for this): book 8, chapter 10
onarch is not a kingProbably the text should read ‘a king is not a king at all unless—’ if he does not possess independent resources, and is not better supplied with goods of every kind than his subjects; but a ruler so situated lacks nothing, and therefore will not study his own interests but those of his subjects. （A king who is not independent of his subjects will be merely a sort of titular king.Literally, ‘a king elected by lot,’ like the annual archon at Athens, who had the title of king, but retained only certain religious functions from the primitive monarchy.） Tyranny is the exact opposite in this respect, for the tyrant pursues his own good. The inferiority of Tyranny among the perversions is more evident than that of Timocracy among the constitutions, for the opposite of the best must be the worst. When a change of constitution takes place, Kingship passes into Tyranny, because Tyranny is the bad form of m
Athens (Greece) (search for this): book 5, chapter 11
e commits injustice. But he who kills himself in a fit of passion, voluntarily does an injury （against the right principlei.e., the principle of retaliation.） which the law does not allow. Therefore the suicide commits injustice; but against whom? It seems to be against the state rather than against himself; for he suffers voluntarily, and nobody suffers injustice voluntarily. This is why the state exacts a penalty; suicide is punished by certain marks of dishonor,At Athens a suicide's hand was buried apart from the body; Aeschin. 3.244. as being an offense against the state. （2） Moreover, it is not possible to act unjustly towards oneself in the sense in which a man is unjust who is a doer of injustice only and not universally wicked. （This case is distinct from the former, because Injustice in one sense is a special form of wickedness, like Cowardice, and does not imply universal wickedness; hence it is necessary further
Crete (Greece) (search for this): book 1, chapter 13
But inasmuch as happiness is a certain activity of soul in conformity with perfect virtue, it is necessary to examine the nature of virtue. For this will probably assist us in our investigation of the nature of happiness. Also, the true statesman seems to be one who has made a special study of goodness, since his aim is to make the citizens good and law-abiding men—witness the lawgivers of Crete and Sparta, and the other great legislators of history; but if the study of virtue falls within the province of Political Science, it is clear that in investigating virtue we shall be keeping to the plan which we laid down at the outset. Now the goodness that we have to consider is clearly human virtue, since the good or happiness which we set out to seek is human good and human happiness. But human virtue means in our view excellence of soul, not excellence of body; also our definition of happiness is an activity of the soul. Now if this i
Sparta (Greece) (search for this): book 1, chapter 13
But inasmuch as happiness is a certain activity of soul in conformity with perfect virtue, it is necessary to examine the nature of virtue. For this will probably assist us in our investigation of the nature of happiness. Also, the true statesman seems to be one who has made a special study of goodness, since his aim is to make the citizens good and law-abiding men—witness the lawgivers of Crete and Sparta, and the other great legislators of history; but if the study of virtue falls within the province of Political Science, it is clear that in investigating virtue we shall be keeping to the plan which we laid down at the outset. Now the goodness that we have to consider is clearly human virtue, since the good or happiness which we set out to seek is human good and human happiness. But human virtue means in our view excellence of soul, not excellence of body; also our definition of happiness is an activity of the soul. Now if this is
Athens (Greece) (search for this): book 3, chapter 2
Also we may wish for what cannot be secured by our own agency, for instance, that a particular actorGreek dramas were produced in competitions （and it is noteworthy that in the Old Comedy at Athens the play itself dramatized a contest or debate）. or athlete may win; but no one chooses what does not rest with himself, but only what he thinks can be attained by his own a
Athens (Greece) (search for this): book 4, chapter 2
Next it would seem proper to discuss Magnificence,megalopre/peia denotes Munificence of a magnificent kind, the spending of money on a grand scale from the motive of public spirit. In discussing it Aristotle is thinking especially of the lh|tourgi/ai or public services discharged at Athens, and in other Greek cities, by wealthy individuals; such as the refitting of a naval trireme, the equipment of a dramatic chorus, and the defraying of the cost of a qewri/a or delegation representing the State at one of the great Hellenic festivals. The word literally means ‘great conspicuousness’ or splendor, but in eliciting its connotation Aristotle brings in another meaning of the verb pre/pein, viz. ‘to be fitting,’ and takes the noun to signify ‘suitability on a great scale’; and also he feels that the element ‘great’ denotes grandeur as well as mere magnitude. for this also appears to be a virtue concerned with wealth.
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