hide
Named Entity Searches
hide
Matching Documents
The documents where this entity occurs most often are shown below. Click on a document to open it.
| Document | Max. Freq | Min. Freq | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| View all matching documents... | ||||
Browsing named entities in Plato, Parmenides, Philebus, Symposium, Phaedrus. You can also browse the collection for Socrates (Georgia, United States) or search for Socrates (Georgia, United States) in all documents.
Your search returned 35 results in 24 document sections:
Plato, Parmenides, section 131a (search)
as, for instance, those that partake of likeness become like, those that partake of greatness great, those that partake of beauty and justice just and beautiful?”“Certainly,” said Socrates.“Well then, does each participant object partake of the whole idea, or of a part of it? Or could there be some other third kind of participation?”“How could there be?” said he.“Do you think the whole idea, being one, is in each of the many participants, or what?”“Yes, for what prevents it from being in them,artake of likeness become like, those that partake of greatness great, those that partake of beauty and justice just and beautiful?”“Certainly,” said Socrates.“Well then, does each participant object partake of the whole idea, or of a part of it? Or could there be some other third kind of participation?”“How could there be?” said he.“Do you think the whole idea, being one, is in each of the many participants, or what?”“Yes, for what prevents it from being in them, Parmenides?”
Plato, Parmenides, section 131b (search)
“Then while it is one and the same, the whole of it would be in many separate individuals at once, and thus it would itself be separate from itself.”“No,” he replied, “for it might be like day, which is one and the same, is in many places at once, and yet is not separated from itself; so each idea, though one and the same, might be in all its participants at once.”“That,” said he, “is very neat, Socrates you make one to be in many places at once, just as if you should spread a sail over many persons and then should say it was one and all of
Plato, Parmenides, section 131c (search)
Is not that about what you mean?”“Perhaps it is,” said Socrates.“Would the whole sail be over each person, or a particular part over each?”“A part over each.”“Then,” said he, “the ideas themselves, Socrates, are divisible into parts, and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would be Socrates, are divisible into parts, and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would be not the whole, but only a part of each idea.”“So it appears.”“Are you, then, Socrates, willing to assert that the one idea is really divided and will still be one?”“By no means,” he replied.“No,” said Parmenides, “for if you divide absolute greatness,
ich partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would be not the whole, but only a part of each idea.”“So it appears.”“Are you, then, Socrates, willing to assert that the one idea is really divided and will still be one?”“By no means,” he replied.“No,
Plato, Parmenides, section 131e (search)
not greater, than before.”“That,” said he, “is impossible.”“How, then, Socrates, will other things partake of those ideas of yours, if they cannot partake of them either as parts or as wholes?”“By Zeus,” he replied, “I think that is a very hard question to determine.”“Well, what do you th
Plato, Parmenides, section 132b (search)
and another again in addition to these, by reason of which they are all great; and each of your ideas will no longer be one, but their number will be infinite.”“But, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “each of these ideas may be only a thought, which can exist only in our minds then each might be one, without being exposed to the consequences you have just mentioned.”“But,” he said, “is each thought one, but a thought of nothing?”“That is impossible,” he replied.“B
Plato, Parmenides, section 133a (search)
and a new idea will always be arising, if the idea is like that which partakes of it.”“Very true.”“Then it is not by likeness that other things partake of ideas we must seek some other method of participation.”“So it seems.”“Do you see, then, Socrates, how great the difficulty is, if we maintain that ideas are separate, independent entities?”“Yes, certainly.”“You may be sure,” he said, “that you d
Plato, Parmenides, section 133c (search)
he who maintains that they cannot be known would be unconvinced.”“Why is that, Parmenides?” said Socrates.“Because, Socrates, I think that you or anyone else who claims that there is an absolute idea of each thing would agree in the first place that none of them exists in us.”“No, for if it did, it would no longer be absolute,” sSocrates, I think that you or anyone else who claims that there is an absolute idea of each thing would agree in the first place that none of them exists in us.”“No, for if it did, it would no longer be absolute,” said Socrates.“You are right,” he said. “Then those absolute ideas which are relative to one another have their own nature in relation to themselves, and not in relation to the likenesses,
solute idea of each thing would agree in the first place that none of them exists in us.”“No, for if it did, it would no longer be absolute,” said Socrates.“You are right,” he said. “Then those absolute ideas which are relative to one another have their own nature in relation to themselves, a
Plato, Parmenides, section 133d (search)
or whatever we choose to call them, which are amongst us, and from which we receive certain names as we participate in them. And these concrete things, which have the same names with the ideas, are likewise relative only to themselves, not to the ideas, and, belong to themselves, not to the like-named ideas.”“What do you mean?” said Socrates.“For instance,” said Parmenides, “if one of us is master or slave of anyone, he is not the slave of master in th
Plato, Parmenides, section 134a (search)
they, as I say, belong to themselves and are relative to themselves and likewise our slaves and masters are relative to themselves. You understand what I mean, do you not?”“Certainly,” said Socrates, “I understand.”“Then knowledge also, if abstract or absolute, would be knowledge of abstract or absolute truth?”“Certainly.”“And likewise each kind of absolute knowledge would be knowledge of each kind of absolute being, would it not?”“Yes.”“And would not the knowledge that exists among us be the knowledge of the truth that exists among us, and
Plato, Parmenides, section 134e (search)
nor his knowledge know us or anything of our world; we do not rule the gods with our authority, nor do we know anything of the divine with our knowledge, and by the same reasoning, they likewise, being gods, are not our masters and have no knowledge of human affairs.”“But surely this,” said he, “is a most amazing argument, if it makes us deprive God of knowledge.”“And yet, Socrates,” sai